

**1**

JANUARY – MARCH 1971

13th Year

# **european documentation**

*a survey*

**E U R O P E A N   P A R L I A M E N T**

Secretariat

General directorate of parliamentary  
documentation and information

Centre européen  
Plateau du Kirchberg  
Luxembourg

In addition to the official acts published in the Official Gazette of the European Communities, the activities of the European Communities are reported on in publications appearing at regular intervals.

Thus, the Commission of the European Communities publishes a Monthly Bulletin on the activities of the Communities while the European Parliament issues a periodical Information Bulletin on its own activities.

The Council of Ministers issues a press release after all its sessions. Its activities are also reported on in a special section of the Bulletin of the European Communities.

The Economic and Social Committee issues press releases at the close of its plenary sessions, and its overall activities are reported on in a Quarterly Information Bulletin.

The Survey of European Documentation is intended to serve as a supplement to the above publications. It deals with salient features of the process of European integration taking place outside Community bodies.

# CONTENTS

## Part I

### DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

#### At the National Level

	<u>Page</u>
<u>GOVERNMENTS AND PARLIAMENTS</u> .....	3
<u>Belgium</u> .....	3
1. Extension of the right to vote in Belgian local elections to nationals of the signatory States of the EEC Treaty .....	3
2. Interpellations and oral and written questions in the Chamber of Representatives .....	4
(a) Ministerial responsibility for a decision taken by the Council of Ministers of the Communities .....	4
(b) Imports into the Community from East Germany .....	5
(c) Export taxation .....	6
(d) European defence policy .....	7
(e) Economic and monetary union .....	9
(f) Accession of the United Kingdom to the EEC .....	12
(g) The obstacles raised by the growth of the Euro-dollar market against the anti-inflation drive within the EEC ..	14
(h) The fall of incomes in agriculture .....	15
<u>France</u> .....	18
1. Statement by Mr. Debré, Minister of National Defence, on European policy .....	18
2. Mr. Jacques Duhamel, Minister of Agriculture, states that European unification must be based on monetary, economic and political progress .....	20
3. 'Europe must be a confederation of States which agree to harmonize their policies and integrate their economies,' Mr. Georges Pompidou states .....	23
4. Franco-German discussions .....	25

	<u>Page</u>
5. Interview with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Maurice Schumann .....	28
<u>Germany</u> .....	31
1. Statements by Mr. Walter Scheel, Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, about European policy and the Ostpolitik .....	31
2. An inter-group working party intends to introduce a Bill in the Bundestag for the direct election of the European Parliament .....	33
3. Bundestag debates .....	35
(a) On the Federal Government's report on the state of the nation for 1971 .....	35
(b) On agricultural policy and the Federal Government's 1971 report on agriculture .....	39
(a) Debate on agriculture held on 9 February 1971 ...	39
(b) The Federal Government's 1971 report on agriculture .....	42
(c) Debate on agriculture on 10 March 1971 .....	43
4. Interview with Mr. Focke on German policy on Europe after the recent Franco-German consultations .....	45
5. The Federal Government welcomes the agreement reached by the Council of Ministers of the European Community on the establishment by stages of an economic and monetary union .....	47
<u>Italy</u> .....	48
1. Parliamentary debates .....	48
(a) On the common agricultural policy .....	48
(b) On foreign policy .....	54
(c) On the convention for mutual customs assistance between the EEC countries, and the exclusion of Greece therefrom .....	57
2. Senate motion on the Mills Bill .....	58



	<u>Page</u>
3. Statement by the President of the Council to the Chamber of Deputies on European policy on the occasion of his visit to the United States .....	59
4. The Senate's Consultative Committee discusses the activities of the European Economic Community.....	60
5. Mr. Emilio Colombo, President of the Council of Ministers, says that the work of European unification must be speeded up .....	63
6. Mr. Pedini, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, discusses the position of the neutral countries vis-à-vis the Europe of the Six .....	64
7. Mr. Colombo, Prime Minister, discusses the common agricultural policy .....	65
8. Statements by Mr. Carlo Russo, the Minister for Relations with Parliament, on the election of members to the European Parliament.....	67
<u>Luxembourg</u> .....	69
1. The Chamber of Deputies passes a motion on the raising of agricultural prices in the Community .....	69
2. Statements by the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the pace of negotiations between the Community and the United Kingdom .....	70
<u>Netherlands</u> .....	73
1. <u>Written Questions</u>	
(a) Parliamentary procedure on proposed trade agreements between the EEC and non-member States .....	73
(b) The European Community and development aid .....	73
(c) Trade relations between the United States and the European Community.....	75
2. Amendment to the Westerterp proposal on the direct election of Dutch members of the European Parliament .....	76

	<u>Page</u>
<u>Switzerland</u> .....	77
Statements by members of the Government on relations between Switzerland and the European Economic Community .	77
<u>United Kingdom</u> .....	79
1. Debates in the House of Commons .....	79
(a) Speech by Mr. Heath, Prime Minister, on British foreign and defence policy .....	79
(b) Problem of the United Kingdom's accession to the European Communities .....	80
2. Speaking in The Hague Mr. Davies, President of the Board of Trade, discusses the costs of Britain's entering the European Communities .....	83
3. Mr. Rippon, Minister responsible for European Affairs, and Britain's entry into the Common Market .....	84
4. A British Member of Parliament calls for the transfer of the European Parliament to London .....	87
<u>United States</u>	
1. British application to join the Common Market given fresh US support .....	88
2. Speech by President Nixon to Congress on US foreign policy	89
II. <u>PARTIES AND PROMINENT POLITICIANS</u> .....	93
1. The manifesto of the Belgian Christian Social Party .....	93
2. The Italian Social Democratic Party (PSDI) and European problems .....	95
3. The Italian Liberal Party is committed to Europe .....	97
4. CDU policy on Europe .....	98

	<u>Page</u>
5. Agricultural Congress of the Dutch Labour Party .....	101
6. Mr. Jean de Broglie indicates his support for a 'real rather than constitutional Europe' .....	102
7. Mr. Pierre Mendès-France on the problems of European monetary union .....	104
8. Position of the Italian Communist Party on the European Community: the Party's experience in the European Par- liament .....	105
9. Resolution of the Congress of the Dutch Labour Party on democratic control in the European Communities .....	107
10. Speech by Mr. Enoch Powell, a former Conservative Minister, against British membership of the European Communities .....	108
11. Statements by Mr. Jean Monnet on European unification ..	111
12. Mr. Rey discusses the responsibilities and means of action of the Community .....	113
13. Mr. Willis C. Armstrong, President of the American Council of the International Chamber of Commerce, calls for liberal trade policy .....	115
14. Mr. P.W.Spaak: Political Europe will not be built by technical organizations .....	117
15. Interview with Mr. Scelba on the role of the European Parliament in the process of integration .....	118
16. Mr. Rumor stresses the irreversible nature of the process of European unification .....	121
 III. <u>ORGANIZATIONS AND GROUPINGS</u> .....	 123
1. The Permanent Assembly of the Chambers of Agriculture states its position on the proposals for reforming European agriculture and on the future of the EEC .....	123

	<u>Page</u>
2. The Chairman of the Netherlands Product Association for Meat and Cattle discusses the risk of technocracy in the European Community .....	125
3. Italian General Confederation of Labour comments on the Werner Plan .....	127
4. Controversy in Great Britain over the effects of United Kingdom entry into the European Community on parliamentary sovereignty .....	128
5. The Economic Association for Wholesale and Foreign Trade criticizes the EEC's preferential policy .....	134
6. The President of the Federal Association of German Banks speaks of the 'struggle for stability' as a task for Europe .	135
7. Italian trade unionists favour European integration .....	137
8. Congress of the Belgian General Federation of Labour (FGTB) .....	137
9. Mr. Agnelli, Chairman of Fiat, discusses the problem of scale in European industry .....	139
10. The attitude of the Central Association of German Chambers of Industry and Commerce and of the Industrieinstitut (Industrial Institute) to monetary union .....	140
11. Forum in Leiden discusses the gas-centrifuge project ....	142
12. The European Movement in the Netherlands puts forward a 'Blueprint for Europe in 1980' .....	143
13. European questions discussed at the 26th Congress of the National Federation of Farmers' Unions .....	144
14. The Association of Industry and Trade, meeting at The Hague, calls for a European currency .....	146
15. Statement on European problems by the National Council of the Italian Association of the Council of European Local Authorities .....	148

At the Community and International Level

I.	<u>COMMUNITY INSTITUTIONS</u> .....	153
1.	A speech by the President of the Commission of the European Communities: Europe takes stock .....	153
2.	Mr. Spinelli, member of the European Commission, discusses EEC technology .....	154
II.	<u>MOVEMENTS, ORGANIZATIONS AND PROMINENT FIGURES</u> ..	157
1.	Western Communist Parties hold a conference in London .	157
2.	The European Union of Christian Democrats (EUCD) criticizes the German Opposition's attitude to the Ostpolitik ..	159
3.	European industry and the granting of generalized tariff preferences .....	160
4.	Opinion of the Association of EEC Savings Banks on the plans for economic and monetary union .....	161
5.	The European Left and the economic and monetary union .	163
6.	Speech by Mr. Edward Heath, British Prime Minister, before the Parliamentary Council of the European Movement, and final declaration of the Conference .....	167
7.	The Conference of the Monnet Committee in Bonn .....	169
8.	The European trade unions pledge their support for the developing countries .....	174
9.	Manifesto of the Liberal Movement for a United Europe ..	176
10.	Resolution of the Institute for Cooperation between Italy and Latin America on relations between Latin America and the EEC .....	178

	<u>Page</u>
11. Press conference given by Mr. Vetrone, President of the Committee of Professional Agricultural Organizations (COPA), and resolution passed by the Committee .....	179
12. European industries want balanced economic expansion ..	180

## Part II

### METHODICAL BIBLIOGRAPHY

	<u>Page</u>
1. General matters .....	2/B
2. Institutional matters .....	5/B
3. Economic matters .....	7/B
4. Financial and monetary matters .....	9/B
5. Competition .....	12/B
6. Social matters .....	14/B
7. Agriculture .....	15/B
8. Transport .....	20/B
9. Energy .....	22/B
10. Research and cultural matters .....	24/B
11. Associated countries and territories .....	25/B
12. External relations .....	26/B
13. Defence .....	30/B
14. Legal matters .....	31/B

PE-i-847

Political Parties and Groups represented in the Parliaments  
of the Member States of the European Communities

---

Belgium

CVP .....	Christelijke Volkspartij, Christian People's Party
PSC .....	Parti social-chrétien, Christian People's Party
BSP .....	Belgische Socialistische Partij, Belgian Socialist Party
PSB .....	Parti socialiste belge, Belgian Socialist Party
PVV .....	Partij voor vrijheid en vooruitgang, Party for Liberty and Progress
PLP .....	Parti de la liberté et du progrès, Party for Liberty and Progress
VU .....	Volksunie (Union du peuple flamand), Union of the Flemish People
FDF-RW .	Front démocratique des Francophones - Rassemblement wallon, Democratic Front of the French-speaking People (Walloon Party)
PCB .....	Parti communiste de Belgique, Belgian Communist Party
KPB .....	Kommunistische Partij van België, Belgian Communist Party

France

UDR .....	Union des démocrates pour la République, Union of Democrats for the Republic
RI .....	Républicains indépendants, Independent Republicans
PS .....	Parti socialiste, Socialist Party
PDM ....	Progrès et démocratie moderne, Progress and Modern Democracy
PCF .....	Parti communiste français, French Communist Party
Gauch dém.	Gauche démocratique, Democratic Left
CRARS...	Centre républicain d'action rurale et sociale, Republican Centre for Rural and Social Action
UCDP ...	Union centriste des démocrates de progrès, Centre Union of Democrats for Progress



## Germany

CDU .....	Christlich-Demokratische Union , Christian-Democratic Union
CSU .....	Christlich-Soziale Union, Christian-Social Union
SPD .....	Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, Social-Democratic Party of Germany
FDP .....	Freie Demokratische Partei, Free Democratic Party

## Italy

DC .....	Democrazia cristiana, Christian Democracy
PCI .....	Partito comunista italiano, Italian Communist Party
PSI .....	Partito socialista italiano, Italian Socialist Party
PLI .....	Partito liberale italiano, Italian Liberal Party
PSDI ....	Partito socialista democratico italiano, Italian Socialist Democratic Party
MSI .....	Movimento sociale italiano, Italian Social Movement
PSIUP ...	Partito socialista italiano di unità proletaria, Italian Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity
PRI .....	Partito repubblicano italiano, Italian Republican Party
PDIUM ..	Partito democratico italiano di unità monarchica, Italian Democratic Party of Monarchic Unity
SVP .....	Südtiroler Volkspartei (Partito popolare sudtirolese) South Tyrolean People's Party)
Ind. sin. .	Indipendenti di sinistra, Left-Wing Independent (Member)

## Luxembourg

PCS .....	Parti chrétien social, Christian Social Party
POSL ....	Parti ouvrier socialiste luxembourgeois, Luxembourg Socialist Workers' Party
PD .....	Parti démocratique, Democratic Party
PSDL ....	Parti social-démocrate luxembourgeois, Luxembourg Social Democratic Party
PCL ....	Parti communiste luxembourgeois, Luxembourg Communist Party

## Netherlands

KVP .....	Katholieke Volkspartij, Catholic People's Party
PvdA ....	Partij van de Arbeid, Labour Party
VVD .....	Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie, People's Party for Freedom and Democracy
AR .....	Antirevolutionaire partij, Anti-Revolutionary Party
CHU .....	Christelijk-Historische Unie, Christian Historical Union
D'66 .....	Demokraten '66, Democrats '66
CPN .....	Communistische Partij Nederland, Communist Party of the Netherlands
PSP .....	Pacifistisch Socialistische Partij, Socialist Pacifist Party
SGP .....	Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij, Reformed Constitutional Party
PPR .....	Politieke Partij Radicalen, Political Party of Radicals
BP .....	Boeren Partij, Farmers' Party
GPV .....	Gereformeerd Politiek Verbond, Reformed Political Alliance
DS '70 ...	Demokratische Socialisten '70, Social Democrats '70

P a r t I

DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

At the National Level

-----



## I. GOVERNMENTS AND PARLIAMENTS

### Belgium

#### 1. Extension of the right to vote in Belgian local elections to nationals of the signatory States of the EEC Treaty

On 16 March 1971 Mr. Glinne, a member of the Chamber of Representatives (Belgian Socialist Party) introduced a bill which would empower the local authorities to extend the right to vote at their elections to nationals of the signatory States of the EEC Treaty.

In support of his bill Mr. Glinne stated: 'The governments of the signatory States of the Rome Treaty have entered on a process of integration which, apart from a programme of economic and monetary unification, involves a drive towards political unification. It is realistic to hope that within a reasonable period there will be concerted foreign policies and participation by all these peoples of the EEC - whether it is enlarged or not - in the election of the European Parliament by universal suffrage, whatever their place of residence.

Within this framework it is desirable to put forward arrangements whereby nationals of EEC Member States may take part in the political life of the local councils. Thus the draft bill on large population centres included granting the right to vote to foreign citizens of the EEC: the bill sponsored by the Government sets this intention on one side because certain legal experts regard it as being inconsistent with the constitution and some politicians find it both better and more convenient to begin at the local council level.

This bill reflects this last concern. It overcomes the constitutional objection because Article 5 of the Constitution has already been weakened in its literal interpretation, by the minor naturalization system, whilst the problem is obviously a political one, as it is a political will that has to be expressed. The bill also takes into account the anomaly whereby the number of seats of a series of elected authorities depends on the number of inhabitants and not on the number of citizens, while there are regions (particularly in the French-speaking areas) where foreigners often represent more than 15 per cent of the local population and 40 to 50 per cent of primary school children. These foreigners pay their local taxes in the same way as Belgians but they are not represented except at rare consultative councils.

Mr. Glinne stressed the experimental nature of his proposal, because a decision as to whether or not to increase the size of the electorate depended on the local council, which was responsible for assessing local interests.

(Chamber of Representatives, Doc. No. 936 (1970-1971 No. 1)

## 2. Interpellations and oral and written questions in the Chamber of Representatives

The Chamber of Representatives heard several interpellations and written and oral questions:

### (a) Ministerial responsibility for a decision taken by the Council of Ministers of the Communities

On 29 December 1970 Mr. Harmel, Minister for Foreign Affairs, replied to a written question from Mr. Califice (Social Christian Party) on the administrative accounts and financial statements relating to the budgetary operations of the European Communities for the financial year 1968.

The reply reads: 'The question raised by the honourable member concerns a decision taken by the Council of Ministers of the Community. It is thus for the Council, as a body, to reply to any question if it is submitted through the institutions set up for this purpose within the Community. The honourable member will, I am sure, understand that if each national delegation uses official channels to give its particular explanation of collective decisions, there is a risk that the whole system of parliamentary questions may be made inoperable, within the framework of the procedures in use within the European Parliamentary Assembly.'

(Chamber of Representatives, Questions and Answers, No. 9 of 29 December 1970)

(b) Imports into the Community from East Germany

Mr. Glinne (Belgian Socialist Party) addressed a written question to Mr. Harmel concerning imports into the Federal Republic of Germany of goods from East Germany. In this he said: 'The politico-legal fiction of describing East Germany as "German territory", so that the trade in question does not in fact concern a third country is creating a great many difficulties because products from East Germany sometimes originate from other third countries and are sometimes re-exported from Federal Germany (after processing or as they are) to other countries in the Common Market.'

In his reply of 29 December 1970 the Minister stated: 'The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany is keeping a constant watch on trade with the Eastern zone.'

Trade in goods with this area is subject to quotas. Goods from the monetary area of the Eastern DM can only be brought into the Federal territory if a purchasing authorization has been issued by the responsible economic agency. In this way such trade with the German Democratic Republic is kept within limits consistent with the Federal Republic's needs for goods from this area. Goods from the GDR in transit through the territory of the FRG are controlled by the issue of transfer documents. The goods circulating under this system are not "entitled to free circulation" in the Community within the meaning of Articles 9 and 10 of the Treaty of Rome. Certificates cannot therefore be drawn up for these goods to enable anyone to claim the benefit of the Rome Treaty in another Member State.

As the honourable member rightly says, each Member State may, by applying paragraph 3 of the protocol concerning internal German trade, take appropriate measures to prevent any difficulties arising for it from the special system of trade between the monetary area of the Western DM and the monetary area of the Eastern DM.

The Belgian Government has not yet had to resort to this escape clause.

It could do so if the need arose. For this purpose it maintains the necessary contacts with governments of the Benelux countries ...

The Belgian Government feels that under the present circumstances it would not help the policy of détente being pursued by the Government of the

Federal Republic of Germany to reconsider its own attitude to the German Democratic Republic or to the scope of the Treaty protocol concerning internal German trade and connected problems.'

(Chamber of Representatives, Questions and Answers, No. 9, 29 December 1970)

(c) Export taxation

On 19 January Mr. de Croo (Party for Liberty and Progress) addressed a question to Mr. Snoy et d'Oppuers, Minister for Finance, on 'the consequences of an export tax and its inconsistency with Article 12 of the Rome Treaty.' The speaker stated that the law on the phasing out of taxes on exports had in fact led to higher export duties to offset the reduction in fiscal receipts resulting from the introduction of the value added tax. Article 12 of the Treaty of Rome clearly provides that the Member States shall refrain from introducing new customs duties on imports or exports. The Government had infringed this Article. It could have invoked Article 103 of the Rome Treaty and imposed a cyclical tax on a temporary basis in the same way as the Federal Republic of Germany.

Mr. de Croo feared that the export tax might give rise to a lawsuit before the Court of Justice of the European Communities on the basis of Article 169 of the Treaty.

Mr. Snoy et d'Oppuers replied: 'The legal problem under the Treaty of Rome is in fact dealt with in the Article to which you referred. When we reduce the tax charged on exports we are still respecting this Article but although we must respect the law we must also be careful about the institutional aspect of the Treaty of Rome.

On this subject we were in touch with the institutions of the Community, and in particular with the Committee on short-term economic policy at its meetings of 10 and 11 December when it came out in favour of the measures for the partial lifting of taxation in its cyclical aspects.

The European Finance Ministers also issued a joint statement on the dangers of overheating the economy. Under present circumstances financial facilities must be kept within reasonable bounds, and a partial de-



taxation of exports remains a perfectly sound measure.

It would be surprising if the European Commission were to disagree. But it must be admitted that the way the two rates are applied is somewhat inflexible. But this is the system preferred by the professional organizations.'

A motion suggesting that the export tax is a manifest infringement of the Treaty was rejected in favour of the original motion.

(Chamber of Representatives, Compte rendu analytique, 19 and 21 January 1971)

(d) European defence policy

On 26 January Mr. Larock (Belgian Socialist Party) questioned Mr. Harmel, Minister for Foreign Affairs, about the role that Belgium can and must play in the negotiations now in progress between East and West and where the issues at stake are European defence and the possibilities of a real détente. The agenda of the Chamber provided for the simultaneous discussion of a question from Mr. Drumaux (Belgian Communist Party) on the measures taken by Belgium with reference to European defence policy.

Mr. Larock thought that 'the success or failure of Bonn's new policy will affect the whole future of Europe. If the West refuses to reach agreement about Berlin this can indefinitely delay the ratification of the Russo-German Treaty and, as a side effect, that of the Treaty between Germany and Poland too. The consequences would be disastrous . . . the failure of Bonn's policy would not only cause resentment among the large numbers of people who approve of this policy; it would also make those people in Germany, who do not want either an opening up to the East or any final settlement, feel they had succeeded.'

'To the partners and allies in the Community of the Six and NATO, of the Federal Republic and the three Western countries which deliberate with the Soviets on a question of the first importance, I would say, we have to choose: either we accept the decision of the great powers or we adopt as firm a stand as European solidarity allows, side by side with the Federal Republic, with a view to détente.

The Minister can certainly give reasons for not taking a stand. He could simply repeat the ambiguous phrases circulating in the foreign press: agreement in principle with Bonn, yes - but with reservations which make the agreement quite ineffective.

The advantage of taking a definite attitude would be to show that Belgium intends to be on the side of peace within the Western union. This is obviously not a gesture in favour of the Federal Republic; still less is it an act of confidence in the manner in which the Soviets and their allies may pursue future negotiations. It is a question of plainly stating our realistic will to take advantage of a decisive opportunity to replace the false and always precarious balance and the accumulation of armaments by peace, organized on the basis of common interests and mutual guarantees.

Mr. Drumaux, for his part, went back over the attitude of the Belgian Government to the problem of Western defence and asked the Minister to explain Belgium's position.

Mr. Harmel replied as follows: 'God knows that we support the Federal Republic of Germany but we also agree with it that we must progress a little more on the ground and not have to grope our way in a maze of abstraction involving West Berlin - this for four reasons:

For multilateral negotiations to continue the climate must be right, and this is impossible with the tension caused by the problem of West Berlin.

Negotiations about defence should not only involve those who were in the last world war but all the European States. The problem of Berlin only concerns those who were in the last world war; it must therefore be settled first.

The success of the Moscow and Warsaw agreements is conditional on a settlement on Berlin.

Lastly why should we doubt that it is not so easy for the Government of the Federal Republic to stand before the Parliament? There are 10 million electors who came from the East; everybody knows the geography of the Federal Republic and knows that it is in the general interest for certain matters to be settled by reference to the general consensus. Therefore a treaty is needed and the logical, legitimate and necessary sequel to be hoped for is an agreement on Berlin. Without this there will be a sort of

shrinking back because too much has been given and not enough received. The general interest lies in an agreement.

That is why the Alliance - not just the United States or France or the United Kingdom but the 15 members - felt that, in view of this progress, the task had to be finished to facilitate further progress.

This is not a new attitude. Belgium really wants to begin the multilateral phase of agreements on defence. We stand side by side with the Federal Republic of Germany regarding détente. We understand its policy and we support it fair and square. The agreement we are trying to reach, and for which a little patience will be needed, will help towards a détente.'

Mr. Larock described the Minister's reply as 'subtle' and 'evasive'. 'The Soviet-German Treaty and German-Polish Treaty offer Europe a unique opportunity to manifest its solidarity and independence. Why not say clearly and unreservedly: 'Yes, we stand by the Federal Republic to ensure that, after the renunciation of any recourse to force, the doors between East and West may open as wide as possible without any attempt being made to change regimes for any reason; in the foreseeable future, any such attempt could only result in the spilling of blood. This, Mr. Minister, is what I hoped you would say, although I am perfectly well aware of the difficulty you are faced with in saying aloud what many responsible men, perhaps including yourself, actually think.'

(Chamber of Representatives, Compte-rendu analytique, 26 January)

(e) Economic and monetary union

On 26 January Mr. Radoux (Belgian Socialist Party) questioned Mr. Harmel, Minister for Foreign Affairs, on the 'Report to the Council and the Commission on the realization by stages of economic and monetary union in the Community.' He asked several questions:

1. 'Do you think it necessary that in any event, and in view of the progress made in constructing Europe the first stage should be initiated as soon as possible?'

2. 'What are we to understand in the final version of the Werner Report - because the original version did not contain these words - by "centre of decision for the economic and monetary policy"?'
3. 'Does not the Minister think that a bill should be tabled to amend the Treaty of Rome at the beginning of the first stage rather than at the end of it?'

Lastly Mr. Radoux asked that both sides of industry be closely associated in the achievement of economic and monetary union. He stressed the lack of parliamentary control at the European level and said a transfer of powers was called for.

In reply, Mr. Harmel began by describing Belgium's position with regard to the achievement of economic and monetary union. Belgium's position lay between 'the temptation of the experimenters and the exigencies of the institutionalists.' He added: 'Belgium's position is different in so far as there are three positions. Ours has always been as follows: we must have a modest experimental period as envisaged in the Werner Plan but we should begin it at once and commit ourselves to it resolutely. For to be perfectly truthful, it is a matter of political will. On this point there is thus no difficulty. But we should like - and this is the point of view we are putting forward - to be able to set the final objective in 1971. Do we want a single currency in 1980 or not? Do we or do we not want economic union? What are to be the tools and fundamental aims of this policy?

It was not stated in the Treaty what machinery would be used or what the methods were to be; but it was stated what the objectives were.

We believe that it is in our interest to settle two points in 1970/71: the time limit that we are to have for completing this and the aim we wish to achieve.

As regards the method and the institutions, we have a little longer to describe them in an experimental manner.

We say this because we believe that now, as in 1957-59, the political Europe, with its Member States and its four applicant States, is sustained by the impetus of a political will which may not only help us to get through the present stage but may perhaps prove a source of strength for the future.

I say that because I was there when we went from the transitional to the final period when, by virtue of the Treaty, we were told in 1970: 'By 1 January 1970 you must, in order to be able to go on to the final period, have achieved this or that objective. If you do not wish to go on to the final period, in other words if you do not want by that time to have overcome the final obstacles you have come up against during the first twelve years, then a new decision will have to be taken, but it will have to be unanimous, i. e. the decision not to go on to the final period, and this sort of reverse decision is hard to secure.'

In other words, I can now tell the Parliament that the fact that we have gone on to the final period is not only because of our own determination but also because we had this sort of help from the Treaty that the founders of 1957-1958 gave us: the obligation to choose between doing what was laid down in the Treaty or taking a decision to do the opposite.

The ideal for me is that, within a time-limit I am not going to stipulate - perhaps at the end of the experimental period - we should still have the same political will that there is in Europe now: to have at our disposal and in reserve enough strength for a 1980 whose strong and weakpoints none of us can guess.

The Minister then replied to the various questions:

- (a) 'The first stage will set things in motion and we shall learn a lot. It is therefore in our interests to start this phase now;
- (b) Everybody is agreed about the objective and we shall need a centre of decision for the Community; if we are to pursue a unified economic and monetary policy it is obvious that much more important decisions than those of the customs union or the agricultural common market will have to be taken, decisions which will have implications for the whole range of the internal and external economic and social activities of the States.

It is argued this would in fact presuppose that in common with the customs union and the agricultural union, the common agricultural market had, a fortiori, a centre of decision, so that it would not simply be an accumulation of separate economic and monetary policies but would become a single policy with a single centre.

We shall go a little bit further in respect of Belgium's attitude on this subject because it is the only one that we can tell you about today, and we can tell you that we are firmly attached to major decisions being taken by the Council of Ministers . . .

I believe that it would be in our interest for the objectives to be attained to be set out in the Treaty under specific time-limits; as to whether we are going to be able to work out the necessary arrangements during the experimental period, time alone will tell. Will we be able to pass any judgement on the main outlines of what should be institutionalized in 1980 or earlier? For to tell the truth, to go from the first to the second phase, the Werner Report has already conceded that there would have to be a change in the Treaty to go beyond the first phase, and in this modification of the Treaty it would certainly be necessary to lay down interim arrangements before the final solution of the monetary union.'

Lastly Mr. Harmel stated: 'You have outlined the views of your party and I am convinced that all the parties in this Assembly must have the same opinion - that is, that there should be a consolidation of the Communities both in respect of their objectives and their substance, that there should be Community decisions on such important matters as economic and social policy, and that this should be coupled with the consolidation of the parliamentary powers of the Community, that is of European parliamentary power.'

On this subject I do not detect any inconsistencies on the Council of Ministers. I did not even find any in the remarks made by the head of the French State two days ago.

To say that we already have the answer is going too far because the States have not discussed this problem, but it is certain that we shall have to do so again.'

(Chamber of Representatives, Annales parlementaires No. 35, 26 January 1970)

#### (f) Accession of the United Kingdom to the EEC

On 11 February Mr. Van Offelen (Party for Liberty and Progress) addressed an oral question to the Foreign Minister concerning Britain's contribution to the EEC budget.

Mr. Harmel replied: 'The main points outstanding with the United Kingdom concerning finance are also those on which the Six are trying to work out a common agreement among themselves.'

The Community already reached agreement on 1 February on the guidelines governing the adoption by the applicant States of the system of own resources at the end of the transitional period, viz:

- a regularly phased introduction of the system of own resources will be based on three factors: levies, customs duties and a proportion of the value added tax (or failing this, a budgetary contribution based on the gross national product);
- when we go from the last stage of the transitional period to the stage at which the own resources system is completely operational there must not be any major leap forward; nor must there be any too sudden move forward during the transitional period. Progress must be gradual and the level of the initial contribution must be set accordingly.

These preliminary guidelines for the Six have been communicated to the British delegation.

The other factors which could be part of a practical proposal on the transition in the financial sector are still being examined by the Six.

Keeping to its conciliatory role, the Belgian delegation did not spare any effort to bring about a rapprochement of the points of view of the Six and to contribute towards the elaboration of a common position, particularly regarding the initial guidelines I have just referred to. It was against this background that I suggested, at the end of the Council meeting prior to the last meeting with the British, that we should adopt a working method to enable the Community to establish a common position with regard to the whole question of British participation in financing Community expenditure.

The aim of this method is to determine a final figure now - this will be a little bit arbitrary but it will be plausible - of what the financial contribution of the United Kingdom would be in 1978. By working back from this figure we would obtain a sum for the beginning for 1973 and at the intermediary stages, so as to ensure a satisfactory rate of progress.

This proposal was accepted by the Council as a working basis.'

(Chamber of Representatives, compte rendu analytique, 11 February 1971)

(g) The obstacles raised by the growth of the Euro-dollar market against the anti-inflation drive within the EEC

This was the subject of an oral question from Mr. Glinne (Belgian Socialist Party) to the Finance Minister at the sitting of 11 March.

This covered three points:

1. 'Is it not necessary to negotiate a review of the Bretton Woods rules and to introduce a "ceiling" for obligatory acquisitions of dollars by European financial institutions?'

Mr. Snoy et d'Oppuers, Minister for Financial Affairs replied: 'It is not certain that a reform of the Bretton Woods rules would be sufficient to remedy these difficulties, nor that it is necessary in order to resolve them. At the last meeting of the International Monetary Fund the Belgian Government came out against any radical change in the system of rates of exchange; setting a ceiling to interventions in dollars would be equivalent to abandoning the system of fixed rates of exchange and would create an even more chaotic situation on the exchange markets than that which is causing concern to the honourable member. The Belgian Government considers it is more important to improve the coordination of economic policies - and to this end it has taken the initiative within the framework of the OECD - of which the USA is a member - to try to work out arrangements in terms of monetary techniques which would imply abandoning well-tried rules. The economic and monetary union within the Community should make it easier to find the common solution to the problems raised by external monetary influences. In this context Belgium came out in favour of setting up a European monetary cooperation fund as from the first stage.'

2. 'Could not the EEC Governments call for a limited supply of gold against a proportion of the paper dollar reserves accumulated by the European central banks?'

The Minister replied: 'The management of monetary reserves is a matter for each Member State of the Community. Certain Member States have from time to time requested and obtained the conversion into gold of their dollar assets. The National Bank of Belgium does not normally hold any other currencies in its reserves than those which are covered in the long term or are strictly necessary as operating funds. The institution of a European monetary cooperation fund should make it easier to harmonize the management of reserves in the member countries of the Community.'



3. 'What measures have been taken in recent weeks by the Government of the United States, the United States Export-Import Bank and the New York Federal Reserve Bank with a view to placing a check on the excessive conversion of dollars into European currencies, and what effect have they had? Can one regard these measures as being enough at a time when the European difficulties are the result of the internal and external policy decisions taken by the United States despite a wide measure of disagreement among the general public and even the governments of the EEC countries?'

Mr. Snoy et d'Oppuers replied: 'The policy of monetary expansion pursued by the Federal Reserve Board which enabled the American banks to obtain the necessary funds at more advantageous rates than on the Eurodollar market has, in fact, led to an accelerated liquidation of the debts of the latter in relation to their agencies abroad, especially since they were not making the fullest use of their available resources because economic recovery was taking time to make itself felt. In order to forestall the accumulation by foreign central banks of dollars thus reimbursed, the Export-Import Bank has relieved the American banks by borrowing from its foreign branches in the short term. Thus at the end of January it issued bonds at three months subscribed by the latter to the extent of \$1,000m. It has just issued a second tranche of \$500m. Other bodies are thought to be intending to resort to the same technique. The Federal Reserve Bank furthermore has recently been intervening on the long-term German market, selling Deutschemarks against dollars.

If the technical measures taken recently can momentarily relieve the balance of payments difficulties of the United States, the fact remains that as long as there is no expansion in the economy the monetary policy now being followed is unlikely to check the exportation of American inflation.'

(Compte rendu analytique, sitting of 11 March 1971)

(h) The fall of incomes in agriculture

On 16 March the Chamber heard an interpellation from Miss Devos (Catholic People's Party) to the Minister of Agriculture 'on the spectacular fall in incomes in agriculture.'

Miss Devos stated: 'Within 10 years Mr. Mansholt would like to see five million people leave agriculture by depriving the less prosperous farmers of their livelihood. The farmers are rightly rebelling against such measures. I am not criticizing our Minister of Agriculture. The present government is not the main culprit, but it is impossible for us to call the European Commission or the Council of Ministers to account. Why are agricultural prices alone frozen? Four reasons are given: (1) The drive against structural surpluses; (2) Checking the expenditure of the European Agricultural Fund; (3) The need to facilitate the accession of the United Kingdom to the Common Market; (4) Controlling the increase in the cost of living. In fact these are fallacious arguments because there are no surpluses. In Pakistan, for example, there is a shortage of milk powder. Mr. Mansholt is, in fact, organizing a shortage of foodstuffs in Western Europe. The costs of the EAGGF are deliberately shown under a false light: they amount to about BF180 per inhabitant, which is not too much for ensuring the production of abundant foodstuffs at reasonable prices.'

After explaining that the agricultural sector was not the cause of the high cost of living, the speaker added: 'As for the enlargement of the EEC, even the greatest optimists do not think that the United Kingdom can join the Common Market before 1978. Will the farmers have to wait so long?'

There were several other speakers in this debate. Mr. Cornet d'Elzuis (Party for Liberty and Progress) stressed that the demands of the Committee of Professional Agricultural Organizations (COPA) were reasonable; Mr. Collax (Party for Liberty and Progress) said that it was the Minister who was responsible for what was sometimes a catastrophic situation in Belgian agriculture; Mr. Sels (United Peoples Party) called for the maintenance of the family farm and came out against the industrialization of agriculture.

In reply, Mr. Héger, Minister of Agriculture, stated that a substantial improvement in agricultural prices was necessary. In his opinion the proposal of the Commission of the Communities in the matter of prices was inadequate and unrealistic. The Minister further stated that if the situation were to grow worse, the Belgian Government - while trusting that this contingency could be avoided - would have to review its entire position.

Following this interpellation the Chamber passed the following motion on 18 March:

'The Chamber,

having heard the interpellation of Miss Devos to the Minister for Agriculture and his reply;

notes that the European agricultural policy has not enabled Belgian farmers and horticulturists to share the general increase in prosperity;

notes that instead of there being any improvement, farm incomes have fallen even further behind in the last few years;

considers therefore that there is good ground for giving vigorous support to the legitimate claims as regards agricultural prices with the European Council of Ministers;

considers that if the results obtained at European level are inadequate, measures should be taken at national level so as to put an end to this intolerable situation; and continues with other business. '

(Compte rendu analytique, sittings of 16 and 18 March 1971)

## France

### 1. Statement by Mr. Debré, Minister of National Defence, on European policy

Interviewed by 'l'Express', Mr. Michel Debré, Minister of National Defence, explained his views about European policy. He said that in 1951-52 he had, as a member of the Assembly in Strasbourg, countered an absurd plan for a European constitution with a text calling on the Governments to meet once every three months either at Head of State or Foreign Minister level to discuss and try to work out together a common policy for foreign affairs.

'What is happening now? Europe is thought to have achieved an unheard-of success because it is envisaging the plan that was so unanimously rejected eighteen years ago! I was a good European before the rest and am still - I would even make so bold as to suggest that I am a better one. Let the powers of Europe hold discussions together as States, as Governments, as nations, so that the legitimate authorities of these States and nations may endeavour to formulate an attitude towards the external world that is, shall we say, well-thought-out and coordinated.'

Mr. Debré agreed that there might in the long term be governments which delegated a measure of authority to a federal power. 'But beware of appearances for they can be fatal.

The meaning of the word "federal" varies according to whether it is used by a politician or a legal expert. As far as the latter is concerned a federal power comes into being with the setting up of a beautiful constitution. For me, for the politician, it comes into being when a legitimate authority is set up, for example, a president elected by universal suffrage. If you believe that we shall reach that stage, I am for it and I hope we shall ...

The day the French come to regard the German frontier as their own, and the day the man from Hamburg comes to regard it as vital to defend Sicily, then you will have a basis. There can be no government or State if there is no nation, and there can be no nation without patriotism, which is not something artificial but a profound feeling resulting from an education. A European feeling will not be engendered by the Coal and Steel Community or anything of that kind. What will engender it is an exchange between young people. Let young Germans, Frenchmen and Belgians get to know each

other. This is what matters. This could decide everything within two or three generations.'

Mr. Debré rejected the argument that as the nations slowly trudged on, the Europe of shopkeepers, the Europe of the technocrat and the monetary Europe would come into being.

'There is no monetary Europe! Either Europe is political and it has a currency, or Europe does not exist and it has no currency. Do not be taken in by articles written by experts or professed experts!'

I was at the Ministry of Finance for nearly three years and never stopped saying to my colleagues: "We need to act together in cyclical, budgetary and fiscal affairs. It is in this way that Europe will be built, starting not with monetary affairs but with politics."

Mr. Debré said he was in favour of a common parity 'provided it is decided by the governments responsible for the policy which would allow for the necessary adjustment of parity rates. One must be realistic if one wishes to get anywhere: we shall reach the stage where the rate of exchange cannot be changed without prior consultation. This will be a major step forward. We shall have reached the useful and necessary stage of monetary cooperation but not that of a single currency, which is at present a political pipedream. When some supporters of supranationality speak of a common currency, they immediately begin thinking in terms of the supposed political power of a commission of officials set up, on paper, as a government. This is the fundamental mistake, just as the European Defence Community was a mistake. Not to realize that patriotism is the only permanent support for any policy is to accept that the foreigner who, for his part, is first and foremost a patriot, gives you orders in his own interests, not in yours. Never ignore this fact.

The first thing to do in building Europe is to bring the various patriotisms together. This would be a noble task and, if the governments wanted to achieve this as much as the present French Government does, a great responsibility.'

In Paris on 24 February 1971 Mr. Debré addressed members of the Union of Young People for Progress.

Turning to the Gaullist legacy, he stated: 'The trade-mark of Gaullism is constant concern about France's ability to remain independent.' He recalled that General de Gaulle had refused to integrate the French army in the Atlantic Alliance or to disrupt the State by embodying it in a supra-national European system. 'The President of the Republic and I remain faithful to this principle which is based on good sense. It is true that France enters into commitments but these conform to its own standard and to its own wishes.'

Stressing the value of a national monetary policy, Mr. Debré explained that 'the concern about having a national currency appreciated at home and abroad is part of the Gaullist legacy ... A currency is first and foremost the sign of a political authority. Who has taxes, who has savings, who has credit, who has power? The term "European currency" is therefore ambiguous. Strictly speaking it ought to mean that Europe is a nation and that everything has been settled. That is not the road we are taking. On the other hand we are for concertation and cooperation to avoid excessive variations between rates of exchange. This approach seems to us to be as realistic as the other is, at present, utopian.'

(Le Monde, 26 February 1971;  
l'Express, 5-10 January 1971)

2. Mr. Jacques Duhamel, Minister of Agriculture, states that European unification must be based on monetary, economic and political progress

The Centre for Democracy and Progress held its fourth study session on 9 and 10 January 1971 in Lyons. In his closing speech Mr. Jacques Duhamel, the Minister of Agriculture, proposed three paths for further progress: progress in democracy, in the economy and in Europe.

'Europe is the third sector in which we wish to draw the majority and government's attention to the need for progress.' Referring to the situation of two years ago, Mr. Duhamel highlighted the progress made since then in reopening the negotiations on enlargement and agreeing on financial arrangements for agriculture. This new spirit had been made possible by the Hague conference convened on the initiative of the President of the French Republic.

'In future, while pursuing the negotiations on enlargement and completing agricultural Europe, it is clear that the task of European unification must centre on two areas: the political sector and the monetary and economic sector.

The proposals made by the Commission in the light of the Werner Report certainly provide a basis for detailed reflection: the technical measures and stages proposed are no doubt the most serious and realistic it is possible to envisage.

It is apparent that, beyond technical measures, the political significance of this report is considerable. Two aspects must be stressed:

On the one hand, currency is probably one of the sovereign prerogatives to which nation States are most firmly attached. If they envisage the progressive creation of a common currency, the European States must also agree to hand over responsibility for a major sector of their own individual policy to a common power.

In addition it is perfectly true that the creation of a strong European currency will completely change both the international monetary situation and the context in which the influences of individual countries make themselves felt, in particular the influence of the United States; the increasingly reserved attitude of the American Government towards the work of European unification symbolizes this thorough-going change.

We are in favour of unification and are well aware of the obligations it entails. Public opinion tends to believe all too simply that monetary unification implies that a single bank-note will be valid in France and Germany. In reality it entails effective and difficult limitations on our freedom of decision and choice in the budgetary, fiscal and many other spheres. It means very precise restrictions on national freedom to determine expenditure, investment and receipts.

The obligations involved are far more stringent than many people imagine. It is our duty not to hide this fact.

In the political sphere, the Davignon Report proposes a formula for organized, periodic consultations on foreign policy. This is a realistic, prudent and reasonable approach. Political Europe is now recovering from the great crises of confidence experienced in the fairly recent past. Too

many examples have shown us that in this sphere of Community development, zeal is likely to be fatal if it entails excessive haste or provocation. European unification calls for enormous patience. Those who are impatient are either nationalists or dreamers who do not really know what they want.

We have learnt the lesson of all our past adventures and prefer to tread warily along a clearly sign posted path rather than rush headlong into the future and so court disaster. But our path must indeed be clearly marked.

While it is true that the Rome Treaty contained the seeds of several different Europes and although it is also true that in another age it might have been possible to move forward more quickly along the federal road, we must be more restrained today, or as Cardinal du Retz said, we must "learn to distinguish the extraordinary from the impossible."

Two threats must be avoided in the Europe of today: the break-up of our unity through the advance of nationalism and the stifling of development by an irresponsible Eurocratic structure. A progressive confederal formula, on the other hand, will enable us to advance without jeopardizing past achievements or mortgaging the future. If a European Parliament were elected at once by universal suffrage before we have set up a European Government, we should be plunged straight into an assembly system or else obliged to give primacy to the Commission, which cannot and must not be the centre of power.

At present European decisions are taken by agreement between the States, expressed in the Council of Ministers. It is the Council of Ministers which must be the heart of political unification. It is the Council which must be granted powers. To begin with it is desirable to develop parliamentary control and enable the Commission to play its full part as a body responsible for making suggestions and proposals. The steadily increasing cooperation between States will then lead naturally to new forms of European power.

National democracy has not been achieved by legal regulations or professorial precepts. It was born from a need and developed through practical experience. Let us not try to transfer the institutions and techniques of nation States to Europe. Those who claim to have found the secret of European unity in such a transfer reveal a lack of imagination because Europe is certainly far more than a State enlarged into a territory without frontiers. Europe cannot be built in 1980 by formulae which held good in 1950. Let us steer clear of nostalgia which paralyses imagination. Europe is a reality for the future and not a dream of the past. Because we are a responsible



movement we want a strong, continuously developing Europe. It is up to us to stimulate the continuity of this progression. Whenever the work of European unification has met with success, it has found the impetus for future development. That is our hope and that is also our whole strategy.'

(Centre for Democracy and Progress, National Study Session, Lyon, 9-10 January 1971)

3. 'Europe must be a confederation of States which agree to harmonize their policies and integrate their economies,' Mr. Georges Pompidou states

At his press conference on 21 January 1971, Mr. Georges Pompidou, President of the Republic, discussed European unification at length and outlined his ideas on this subject.

'Some people have imagined that Europe could be organized around a number of technical organizations and committees which would, to some extent, prefigure a European federation.

But, whether it is federal or not, international life must be political. And political power used to be lacking for one good reason: power lay elsewhere, in Washington. This was not surprising, since the United States had sole responsibility for the defence of Europe and organized its economic reconstruction through the Marshall Plan. Europe was therefore anything but European.

Times have changed. The nations of Europe have rebuilt their economies and strengthened their currencies. They have become aware once again of their identities, interests and aspirations.

The only possibility open to us now is to work on the basis of all that already exists and build a confederation of States determined to harmonize their policies and integrate their economies. And if we approach the problem in this way, we can see that the argument about supranationality is misguided. If the European confederation one day becomes a reality we shall need a government whose decisions will be binding on all the Member States. The problem is to know on what basis, by what methods and in what form this government will be established.

Facts have already proved it illusory to suppose that such a government can develop from technical organizations and committees. I say this all the more freely as I have the greatest respect for the Commission in Brussels, for its President and the services it renders to the Community. But a European government can only result from concertation between national governments which reach agreed decisions binding on all parties. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs now meet in the Council of Ministers as do the technical ministers who also hold specialized meetings in appropriate cases. In the immediate or more distant future the governments may feel the need to appoint ministers specifically responsible for European matters. Perhaps this will come about because the questions to be debated at European level will be increasingly numerous and the meetings more and more frequent. One can even conceive an ultimate phase in which these ministers will only have strictly European functions and will no longer belong to national governments.'

After recalling that France stands by application of the majority rule in the Six, the President added the following comments on the European Parliament.

'It seems obvious to me that we shall need a genuine European Parliament once there is a genuine European Government. This will raise many problems, if only because of the different opinions and customs prevailing in the Community on the subject of relations between governments and Parliament. But in the meantime speculation about the European Parliamentary Assembly seems completely futile. It is only possible to envisage a substantial increase in its powers when a genuine executive power is set up opposite it.'

Mr. Pompidou felt that the Hague spirit was 'both a will and a method. It is a will to enlarge and deepen the Community. I guarantee that France has this will. The method must be to make progress in word and deed; progress speaks for itself.

Viewed from this angle, when it comes to the question of economic and monetary union, the Hague spirit means that we must resolutely embark upon the first stage rather than indulging in theoretical discussion of what may perhaps happen if all goes well after 1980.'

Finally Mr. Pompidou referred to Britain's application to join the Common Market:

'The British have three notable qualities: humour, tenacity and realism. I sometimes think that we have got little further than the stage of humour. No doubt tenacity will follow. I hope too that realism will ultimately prevail. We shall do all we can to achieve that end. And then there is not only the problem of entry into the Community. There is also the matter of relations between France and Britain. And may I say that I hope most profoundly that these relations which have now improved a great deal will return to the warmth which once characterized them. I suppose you expect me to quote a line of poetry, so why not Rimbaud: "May the time come when hearts at last unite"?'

(Le Monde, 23 January 1971)

#### 4. Franco-German discussions

The 30th Franco-German meeting was held in Paris on 26 and 27 January 1971.

After the discussions between President Pompidou and Chancellor Brandt, spokesmen for the two governments, made the following statement at a joint press conference: 'The two governments agreed to suggest to their four partners in the Common Market a method for the establishment by stages of an economic and monetary union in the Community. This development would be spread over a period of ten years beginning with a first stage lasting about three years, after which the Six would jointly examine the results achieved and work out procedures for the following stage.'

Referring to the problem of Britain's entry into the Common Market, the French Government spokesman said that 'the two Governments hope and believe that Britain's entry will involve acceptance by London of the regulations already laid down, especially in the agricultural sector.' President Pompidou, the French spokesman added, had expressed his hope that the main difficulties arising from Britain's application would be solved by the autumn.

The German spokesman referred to a proposal which Chancellor Brandt had laid before his partners to the effect that the five year transitional period should be followed by a three year adjustment period.

During the dinner offered to mark Chancellor Brandt's visit, President Pompidou made the following statement in a speech in German:

'I can see two major international problems which concern us directly: the construction of Western Europe and relations with the rest of the European continent. I believe, Mr. Chancellor, that there is a lesson to be drawn from the policy you pursued in 1970. By signing Treaties with the Soviet Union and Poland you opted for realism. You believed that this was in the interest of the Federal Republic, of Europe and also of peace. By choosing this option you followed a path parallel to the one along which the French Government is now moving.

Membership of the western world, the Atlantic Alliance and a Community which will perhaps soon take in other countries involves neither commitment to a bloc policy nor the intention of establishing a new bloc. Our aim must be to work with greater cohesion and open-mindedness, in other words in a more balanced manner, to improve the security of Europe. The reality of this intention is best proved by our common will to develop cooperation with the East European countries on the basis of a certain idea of Europe.

A great debate has now begun in Brussels on this idea of Europe in connection with the economic and monetary union. It seems to me that this debate may be unrealistic and the problems raised artificial. We both agree that European unity must be achieved progressively, in accordance with the decisions taken at the conference held at my initiative at The Hague. We are increasingly aware of the specific nature of European problems, of the common purpose which unites us and of the possibilities afforded by a great design.

But I hope that a realistic approach will prevail as it has in your own policy. We are acquainted with the history of Europe. No words, and still less technocratic institutions, can eliminate what Germany and France both stand for. If the work of European unification is to be strong, its foundations must not be shaken. This unification will be brought about by the governments working in the light of national realities. The European confederation which should emerge from our joint efforts is without precedent in history and cannot be defined in abstract terms before the event. It is a daily task to which we must devote our increasing efforts, without prejudice and with no illusions.'

Replying in French, Chancellor Brandt stated: 'The exemplary achievement of reconciliation and cooperation symbolized by the signing eight

years ago of the Franco-German Treaty by Charles de Gaulle and Konrad Adenauer is, to my mind, a legacy which any German Government has a vital duty to honour. Our cooperation must, we believe, serve the cause of European unification.

I have in mind the twin objectives of enlargement and economic and monetary union raised at The Hague. We have both helped to define these objectives and will spare no effort to achieve them.

Strengthened by the progress made towards unification of Western Europe we can push forward without illusion but with stubborn tenacity our policy of détente with Eastern Europe. My Government's policy is part of our joint efforts to guarantee and organize peace.

(...) In recent months we have seen the signature of Treaties by which the Federal Republic of Germany hopes to safeguard its interests and make a constructive contribution to détente and cooperation. I wish to thank you, Mr. President, for the energetic and active support you have given to this policy in all its phases; indeed the very direction of this policy has to some extent been guided by France.

I also pay homage to the way in which France is trying, in the light of its responsibilities and special rights, to achieve a satisfactory settlement of the Berlin problem.

I share your vision, Mr. President, of a parallel between the completion of the Community in Western Europe and the gradual establishment of improved relations with all the countries on our continent because we have no intention of setting up Western Europe as a closed citadel; on the contrary we see it as a vital component in establishing a peace settlement covering the whole of Europe; it is our duty to prepare and systematically develop such a settlement.

Our action is guided by the decisions taken at the Hague summit conference, to whose adoption you made such a vigorous contribution.

We have made substantial progress in the last twelve months. I share your conviction that we shall continue to use Franco-German cooperation in the interest of the Community and all that is common to us during the

stage which now lies ahead of us as we have already done repeatedly in the past.'

(Le Monde, 27 January 1971;  
Bulletin of the Press and Information Office of the Federal German Government, 27 January 1971)

##### 5. Interview with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Maurice Schumann

In an interview given to a Belgian daily on 17 February Mr. Maurice Schumann answered questions on the economic and political integration of Europe.

Referring to the negotiations between the Community and applicant countries, the Minister spoke of differences of opinion which had arisen: 'These differences seem rather minor to me and I have no doubt that we will manage to narrow the gap even more. What in fact is involved? We are inviting the applicant countries to adapt themselves fully during a reasonable transitional period to the rules of the Treaty and subscribe to the political options which the Six have agreed between them in the development sphere. I am sure that this is the aim of the Six and also of our future partners, even if some of the proposals made to us at present seem to diverge somewhat from this objective.'

Mr. Schumann thought that France had shown a clear political will to succeed. 'During the press conference he gave on 21 January, the President of the Republic made this abundantly clear. Not only did Mr. Pompidou say that he wanted Britain and the other applicant countries to join, he also expressed his belief and certainty that realism would enable the negotiations to be successful.

The deepening of the Community which has been proceeding in the meantime should certainly not interfere with the negotiations on enlargement; on the contrary it should help these negotiations.

It is said that the agreement of 9 February on the economic and monetary union would facilitate enlargement of the Common Market because it avoids confronting the United Kingdom with a fait accompli. One may even go further by referring to a recent analysis published in a leading Bri-

tish daily newspaper which said in substance: "If Britain believes it will have have difficulty in paying a normal contribution during the transitional period this difficulty will merely be a reflection of its delicate balance of payments situation. This is a problem which Europe will be able to help Britain to solve if indeed Europe is moving towards monetary union."

If we develop this analysis further we arrive at two basic assumptions: any country applying for membership of the Community must approach the latter under conditions such that no one can doubt its resolve and ability not to throw into question the machinery and rules of that Community. But any applicant country must also be able to count on the machinery and rules of the Community to overcome the obstacles it encounters on its path to membership.'

The Minister welcomed the decision taken in the Council of the Communities on economic and monetary union. 'You will understand that we are particularly pleased with that decision in France because for us it is a striking sign that our partners share our desire for economic and monetary union and have chosen with us the pragmatic approach, i. e. (do we need to go into etymological details?) the path of action.'

Mr. Schumann thought it was wrong to say that France was imposing limits on European unification. 'We certainly don't believe that everything can be done at once. It is a fact, for example, that the foreign policies of our six countries do not coincide on every point and we think it is idle to suppose that they could suddenly be brought into agreement at the stroke of some magician's wand. It is better to recognize the difficulties and work effectively to alleviate them.

The Davignon Report gives us practical means to do so. For the first time since the birth of the Communities our six governments are able to discuss specific problems of international policy jointly and in detail. This means that by acquiring the habit of reflecting and working together they will infuse an atmosphere of confidence and trust into their relations which will become increasingly close. It also means that areas of agreement will gradually be extended.

Once this process has advanced sufficiently new prospects will open out before us. Mr. Pompidou referred to them by pointing to the future pattern of the European confederation.

To sum up, I would say that we have no illusions because we are aware of the objective limits which reality places on our progress and also that we have no complexes because we believe that these limits are only provisional and we trust in the dynamism of our joint enterprise. '

At a lunch offered by the Foreign Press Association in Belgium on 2 March 1970, Mr. Schumann pointed out that France's partners had not put forward any ideas to counter the French confederalist doctrine and that Mr. Pompidou believed the Council of Ministers of the Community could form the embryo of a European Government, taking over a role which some people feel should be that of the European Commission. The Minister added that this latter thesis had found no supporters as yet.

Mr. Schumann drew attention to the interest shown by France's partners in President Pompidou's confederalist doctrine in particular as regards the appointment of 'Ministers of European Affairs'.

In view of the progressive increase of the Council's powers Mr. Schumann felt that the permanent representatives of the Six in Brussels could have Ministerial rank, sit in the national cabinets and become 'specialist Ministers' of European affairs under the authority of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs.

He went on: 'There is no binding power in a confederation. The States retain their personality and act jointly in accordance with the rule of unanimity which is that of coalition governments, as the President of the Republic has pointed out. This is the only possible concept likely to meet with the approval of Britain which will never agree to limit the powers of its parliament or to allow the rule of the crown to be weakened and merged in a supranational federation.

(Le Soir, 17 February and 3 March,  
Le Mond, 9 March)



## Germany

### 1. Statements by Mr. Walter Scheel, Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, about European policy and the Ostpolitik

At the 1971 meeting of the Baden Württemberg Free Democratic Party held in Stuttgart on 6 January Mr. Walter Scheel, Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs and Chairman of the FDP, made a speech in which he dealt in detail with matters of European policy and the Ostpolitik.

The following are extracts from his speech: 'Everyone knows that we carry out what we make up our minds to do. We stand by our declarations on foreign policy and in this connection we have over the past year endeavoured by making greater efforts, to bring about the unification of Western Europe and ease tension with Eastern Europe.

Progress has been made in both directions. Western European integration is moving along the right tracks. On 1 January 1970 the Community entered its final phase after the twelve-year transitional period. All the necessary political, financial and economic decisions, which involved a tough struggle, have been taken. The first steps have been made towards enlarging the powers of the European Parliament. This does not mean that everything is completely in line with our own wishes. But any one who waits until he has solved everything before even starting is never going to achieve his objective.

The negotiations with the United Kingdom, Denmark, Norway and Ireland are progressing favourably. I am optimistic enough to say that these could be successfully concluded before the end of this year; talks with the EFTA States, on an economic arrangement with the EEC, are in full swing.

One of the most important steps forward has been the introduction of political cooperation between the six Member States of the Community with the participation of the applicant States.

Here the main point that stood out was the advantage of a pragmatic approach to uniting Europe. For a long time a point of principle - whether to have supranational institutions or not - stood in the way of political co-operation. Now we have found a solution whose objective is a unified policy but which will not initially depend on international institutions. The political

directors of the foreign ministries of the Member States will carry out the work. They will thus develop a solidarity which will favour our objective. Hence the first consultations which were held in Munich on 19 November 1970 were a complete success. I hope that in the first half of 1971 we shall have one or two pleasant surprises in this field.

All this is evidence of the European activity and purposeful policy of the Federal Government which has risen above the cheap criticism of the Opposition that the Government was leaving the unification of Western Europe on one side in favour of its Ostpolitik. Which Government in the past has done more for European unification than the present one? Although here I will not deny that circumstances here and there have perhaps favoured us.

...

Similarly the economic and monetary union will gradually attain maturity. A design covering a ten-year period is not going to founder because it is not decided on by the 31 December but, perhaps, in the first few months of the year following. Many things take a lot longer to complete. The development of the European Community is a continuous process. It is not dependent on deadlines coming up at the end of the year. There is no need to stop the clocks for its sake. Have confidence in our tenacity, as also in the fact that my colleague Mr. Schumann is the next President of the Council of Ministers.

We deliberately redoubled our efforts for the unification of Western Europe at the precise moment when we took long overdue decisions regarding the Ostpolitik. Just as our Ostpolitik is based on the political integration of Western Europe and close and friendly relations with our Western neighbours so too any political unification of Western Europe depends on the removal of any source of tension with Eastern Europe. Our contribution is that of an equal partner in the Western Community towards a general policy of peace and détente. It does not stand on its own, and we shall not be left on our own. The German Ostpolitik is thus not a policy of renunciation or of one-sided concessions, of selling out or treachery, of giving away or squandering. It is much more a serious and necessary contribution towards de-escalating confrontation and overcoming the danger of war in Europe. This policy can make the binding and honourable claim that it helps, through practical steps, to bring about understanding between peoples and to overcome the division of our nation. This policy is a deliberate turning away from the dreadful sequence of 'conquest and reconquest' which has for hundreds of years involved the people of our continent in tragedy and death.

It needed the prospect of the infernal potential of the techniques of modern warfare to make us recognize that power can no longer be used for settling disputes between peoples. And maintaining legal titles on their own, without ever being able to redeem them, becomes pointless if its effects are detrimental to the interests of mankind.

(Freie Demokratische Korrespondenz, 8 January 1971)

2. An inter-group working party intends to introduce a Bill in the Bundestag for the direct election of the European Parliament

On 4 February 1971 an inter-group working party - 'Initiative-Direct Elections' - was set up in the Bundestag. This comprised 42 members (from the three groups in the Bundestag) who advocated that the members of the European Parliament should as soon as possible be elected by direct universal suffrage.

The inter-group working party elected Dr. Klaus-Peter Schulz, Berlin SPD member, as Chairman at its constituent meeting. Mr. Carl-Ludwig Wagner (CDU/Trier) and Dr. Emmy Diemer-Nicolaus (FDP) were elected Deputy Chairmen.

The immediate object was to introduce an inter-group Bill in the German Bundestag for the direct election of the 36 German members of the European Parliament. Because direct European elections, as laid down in the Rome Treaties, are unlikely to be held at the same time in all six EEC States, an increasing number of members of the Bundestag are tending to favour unilateral direct elections on a national basis. The Bundestag CDU/CSU and SPD groups set up working parties last year to examine the problem and, if necessary, to make practical proposals. As a result of the setting up of 'Initiative-Direct Elections' this important question has ceased to be a purely party issue and become a matter of common concern to all democratic forces in the German Bundestag.

The members of this working party intend to have the 36 German members of the European Parliament elected possibly at the same time as the new Bundestag in the autumn of 1973. The procedure to be followed for the purpose, however, has not yet been entirely settled. Nevertheless it is expected that the decisive breakthrough on this point can be achieved in the Bundestag by 1973. Direct elections in the Federal Republic will no doubt

encourage similar efforts in the parliament's of other EEC Member States. The fact that Article 138 of the EEC Treaty permits of such unilateral direct elections is therefore of importance. In Article 138,1 the procedure for the elections is left to the discretion of the individual Member States.

At present the line being taken in the Bundestag by the parties represented there is broadly as follows: The CDU and CSU appear to be determined to introduce an appropriate Bill this spring. In November 1970 the CSU had already announced 'a Bill for the election of German representatives in the European Parliament' but not yet introduced it in the Bundestag. One of the problems raised by this proposal is, it is felt, the division of the electoral area of the Federal Republic of Germany into 36 constituencies: such immense constituencies comprising over a million voters would bring with them technical problems and would make an electoral campaign between rival candidates a matter of some difficulty.

The other parties are therefore thinking in terms of a unified electoral list covering the candidates of individual parties and valid for the whole federal area. The Bill submitted to the Bundestag by the SPD on 10 June 1964 at the instance of Dr. Karl Mommer provided for just such a solution. This Bill for the election of the 36 German European Parliamentarians was rejected in 1965 by the CDU/CSU and the FDP - then in power - because they thought it would be better all round to hold direct elections to the European Parliament simultaneously in all six countries under a uniform procedure (see Furler report of 19 February 1965 drawn up on behalf of the Committee for External Affairs and plenary debate on the Bill of 20 May 1965).

Today the CDU and the CSU are also advocating national direct elections. The coalition parties, SPD and FDP, on the other hand, are in agreement with the Federal Government in first securing the approval of the Council of Ministers of the European Communities to direct elections.

In a reply to a question the Federal Government pointed out on 15 January 1971 that the EEC Council of Ministers had been looking more deeply into the matter for about a year on the basis of the draft of the European Parliament. In 1970 alone the Council of Ministers had discussed this question of direct elections on three occasions. Similarly several discussions took place between the then President of the Council and President Scelba of the European Parliament. This contact procedure was to be further improved. Nevertheless the Federal Government had to point out that the 'standpoints of the six governments are not yet identical'.

The inter-group working party 'Initiative-Direct Elections' held its first working meeting on 24 March 1971. As announced in Parliament on 25 March, the 42 members of the group had a general teach-in about the preliminary work on the election of the European Parliament and on the legal situation. It is intended to submit an inter-group Bill on the election of the German members to the European Parliament. This should be laid before the other members of the Parliament after the summer recess.

(Das Parlament, 16 January and 27 February 1971)

### 3. Bundestag debates

#### (a) On the Federal Government's report on the state of the nation for 1971

Federal Chancellor Brandt gave his second report on the state of the nation to the plenary session of the German Bundestag on 28 January 1971. The agenda also included an important question by the coalition groups on the Government's foreign policy (Docs. VI/1690, 1638, 1728).

Mr. Brandt began by drawing attention to the fact that his Ost-politik had met with unanimous support from the Federal Republic's allies. The latest discussions with the French Government had shown particularly clearly that the Federal Republic's policies on West and East Europe were interdependent. West European cooperation and unification did not prevent the Federal Government from developing better relations with the East; indeed they must be the basis for such relations. The Chancellor emphasized the part played by Germany in shaping West European policy but objected to the assertion that last year had been a 'German year'; he described the Federal Republic, which stood foursquare in the Western Community, as a driving force behind West European cooperation. A close and indissoluble partnership with the friends and allies of the Federal Republic was not only the basis for common efforts to bring about peace in Europe but also highly desirable in itself.

Speaking for the CDU/CSU group, Dr. Barzel criticized the Chancellor: 'We have to look to the closing passages of this government statement to find any practical content. The rest of it avoids more issues than it actually discusses.' The leader of the Opposition wanted his observations to be remembered in the subsequent debate on West European policy, which was largely overshadowed by problems of East Europe: 'We are very sorry to

note that your statements on European policy are becoming increasingly infrequent. We keep on hearing the word cooperation when we should prefer to hear you speak of unification and union. Are you no longer interested in European unity? Do you not favour a European federal State as we do? Are you satisfied with the loose cooperation which is now being offered all the time? Do you not share our belief that jointly agreed European positions have been watered down in Paris?'

Mr. Brandt denied Dr. Barzel's allegation that the Federal Government had taken a step backwards in its European policy during the visit to Paris. 'Statements of that kind can only be made if practical politics are patterned on daydreams. We worked out, in free discussion with our partners - each of us defending his own position - a series of points which we are convinced will help us to make effective progress towards economic and monetary union. This is the important thing: not a policy of high-sounding phrases, but a policy which brings about real changes.'

Dr. Apel, Deputy Chairman of the SPD group, thought the EEC had a triple significance for the German people:

- It was not an end in itself to procure economic advantages on a reciprocal basis;
- It had not yet been completed and must develop rationally as a component of a peaceful European order;
- It was helping, and would continue to help, the German people to find their place in a Europe of good neighbours.

West European politics moved into the centre of the discussions on the second day of the debate on 29 January 1971.

Dr. Marx (CDU/CSU) criticized the Government's reply to the question put by the SPD and FDP, particularly as regards the USSR's attitude to the Common Market. While the Federal Government claimed that the Soviet Government had already arrived at a realistic appraisal of the present position although this was not being reflected in public statements, Dr. Marx called upon the Foreign Minister to show his true colours. He criticized the Federal Government for systematically avoiding the notion of political union and pursuing a dead-end policy which held out no prospects for the future. He went on: 'The reply to the important question on the effects on Western integration of the Ostpolitik and the policy on Eastern Germany is extremely unsatisfactory. The fears that West European unification has been sacrificed to an illusion of a larger Europe have been streng-

thened. We do not doubt that the Federal Government has good intentions, but something more is needed.'

Replying for the Social Democrat Group, Dr. Apel said that the Opposition was constantly introducing red herrings; Dr. Achenbach (FDP) emphasized that the ultimate aim was and remained a federal State in Europe. Mr. Mattick (SPD) also defended the Federal Government's policy on Europe.

Foreign Minister Scheel emphasized that the Federal Government was doing all it could to strengthen and deepen the Community among the existing partners. As regards political cooperation, the Minister felt that pragmatic solutions were the best way to arrive at a united Europe; a conflict of dogmas had blocked this development for several years now. A solution had, however, been decided upon which made a unified policy its objective but did not include supranational institutions in the first phase.

The Foreign Minister then made a detailed statement on the meeting in Paris:

- (a) The Federal Republic and France agreed that everything must be done to achieve an economic and monetary union within the suggested period of ten years. The link between economic and monetary processes had been fully recognized by France.
- (b) There was agreement on the guidelines for future discussions, in particular on the powers of the Community which were needed for the economic and monetary union to be coherent and effective. The Community institutions must be able to exercise these powers quickly and smoothly.
- (c) Both Governments felt that the experience gained in the first stage would prove particularly valuable for subsequent developments. It would then be necessary to discuss and decide what future steps should be taken and whether the Treaty would need altering.

Finally the Foreign Minister noted that ideas had drawn closer together on the negotiations with applicant countries, the dialogue between the Communities and the USA, and economic and commercial policy.

Mr. Schiller, the Minister for Economic Affairs, then returned to the main subject of the second day of this debate and called the Werner Plan a bold vision and a challenge to the Community in which the progress of European unification in the near future was at stake. The economic and monetary union must be a Community of stability and growth. A Community of permanent inflation would be a fatal step backwards. Nothing could dis-

credit the European idea more than an inadequate economic structure. The delay on the schedule laid down in The Hague was regrettable but a sound fabric for economic and monetary union was more important than a gain of a few weeks or months. An inadequate structure built today could easily turn out to be 'a \$100,000m mistake' tomorrow with all its inflationary consequences. Soundings of opinion in the Community in the first weeks of the New Year had considerably improved the prospects for early agreement without making concessions of substance; this was particularly true of the latest discussions in Paris.

Mr. Schiller summarized the Government's position on economic and monetary union in 8 points:

- (a) There was broad agreement that the first stage lasting for three years was not an end in itself. This stage was only meaningful if the Governments confirmed from the outset their political will to complete the economic and monetary union in a period of about ten years.
- (b) It was essential to ensure effective parallelism between measures of economic and monetary policy.
- (c) Fundamental principles must already be formulated in precise terms, even for the final stage. This included giving the Community the necessary powers, e.g. for common money and credit policy, taxation policy, budgetary policy and capital policy. As regards the distribution of powers between the Community and Member States, the principle of 'subsidiary authority' should apply.
- (d) The Community institutions must be enabled to take quickly and effectively the decisions of economic and monetary policy which are essential for the cohesion and operation of the union. The powers of the European Parliament would of course have to be extended accordingly.
- (e) In the final stage a central bank system with adequate responsibility of its own would be indispensable. A phased arrangement would be desirable.
- (f) The measures for the first stage in the creation of the union should be embarked upon at the earliest possible date. This was particularly true of the monetary measures on which agreement in principle had been broadly reached. These measures included:
  - (1) a narrowing of the fluctuation bands of exchange rates in the Community;
  - (2) joint intervention by the central banks of the Community on the currency markets;
  - (3) provision of medium-term monetary support, e.g. assistance with balance of payments problems;
  - (4) the establishment of a currency balance or reserve fund if the necessary conditions were met.



- (g) Certain safeguards must already be built in to ensure effective parallelism of economic and monetary measures. There were two ways of doing this: the 'prudence clause' implying that a country would be excluded from common currency support if, in spite of lasting necessities of monetary policy, it failed or was unable to draw the necessary conclusion for its economic policy. A safeguard clause seemed more effective. The same time-limit or period of validity would be laid down for all monetary policy measures. In the event of failure to agree on economic aspects of the phased plan, the monetary measures and establishments would automatically lapse.
- (h) Having regard to its enlargement the Community should formulate decisions on the economic and monetary union in such a way that the applicant countries could already opt at the end of the first stage for the common transition to the following phase and for the form which that phase should take.

Mr. Schiller concluded by stating that the Federal Government had not departed from its original concept based on the Werner Report. Flexibility was necessary in the individual phases but there must be a firm commitment to the ultimate objectives.

The Federal Chancellor signified his agreement with these remarks at the end of the debate; no one could seriously assert that the Federal Government was neglecting Western European cooperation and failing to do all it could.

(Deutscher Bundestag, 93rd sitting, 28 January 1971 and 94th sitting, 29 January 1971;  
Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamts der Bundesregierung, 2 February 1971)

(b) On agricultural policy and the Federal Government's 1971 report on agriculture

(a) Debate on agriculture held on 9 February 1971

The reading of the Federal Ministry of Food's budget in the Bundestag was followed by a lively debate on agriculture.

The rapporteur, Dr. von Bülow (SPD), made the following observations: 'The budget of the Federal Ministry of Agriculture, budget 10, provides for expenditure of close on DM7,000m in 1971. Comparison with the value of the agricultural budget in previous years shows an increase from DM2,068m in 1960 to DM4,586m in 1965 and almost DM7,000m this year.

The impression is widespread among the general public that this is simply a fund from which German agriculture draws subsidies. But this sum of DM7,000m includes both domestic expenditure and funds which are sent to Brussels for use by the European Communities; this money helps to finance European agriculture from the North Sea coast down to the southernmost tip of Italy. These supranational funds account for DM2,800m in 1971. Only about 30 per cent of this total will be used for market intervention and structural operations. In other words an amount of DM800m could be charged up to German agriculture if we accept this interpretation.

The subject of price increases for agricultural products may well be discussed today and in the next few days in Brussels; this is due to two factors: the rise in prices throughout Europe (in other countries the rises have been considerably higher than in Germany), and the utilization of about DM800m last year to prevent the butter and wheat stocks from growing; indeed we even managed to cut surplus stocks of both products substantially.

Last year our rate of increase was exceptionally high, owing in no small measure to EEC expenditure, but this year expenditure on the European market organizations will fall off again slightly; the overall ceiling has therefore been reduced by 9 per cent. This has given rise to some criticism which I believe is unjustified. One cannot constantly and vociferously claim on the one hand that expenditure on the EEC market organizations should disappear from the agricultural budget because it misleads the public, while on the other hand demanding that this fund should be available solely to national agriculture when there are advantages to be gained.

The funds for improving agricultural structures will be increased in 1971 by DM56m to DM1,154m. DM64.92m will be allocated for the modernization of farm equipment. In addition there will be DM249m for special measures to improve agriculture structures. It is worth pointing out that expenditure on agricultural social policy now standing at DM980m falls only just short of the thousand million DM mark.'

During the debate Mr. Struve, the spokesman for the CDU/CSU group, said that consideration should be given to the fact that compensatory arrangements for revaluation were degressive and would disappear altogether after January 1974. He asked the Government and in particular Mr. Schiller, the Minister for Economic Affairs, what they intended to do after that date. Investment in agriculture was declining. The programme for economic development was the worst which had ever been offered in the investment sector ...

The 'green dollar', which had initially been intended as a means of facilitating integration of the European Economic Community, had turned out to be an 'explosive charge'. And the common unit of account was now generally rejected by agricultural interests. This meant that the common agricultural policy had already largely lost its function as a factor in promoting integration of the EEC. In support of this theory he drew attention to the fact that agricultural income in France was increasing while it was declining in real and apparent terms in Germany.

The CDU/CSU group supported the farmers' demand for an average increase of 10 per cent in agricultural prices. The Government should establish equilibrium in the Federal Republic by measures with a real effect on incomes if it was impossible for it to meet the demand for higher agricultural prices.

Mr. Peters (FDP - Poppenbüll) replied to Mr. Struve that an un-informed observer of this debate would gain the impression that the CDU/CSU group had not been in opposition for only 15 months but for 15 years and had no responsibility for agricultural policy developments in the recent past. In reality the CDU/CSU group was responsible for EEC agricultural policy with the green dollar, for customs and market policy, and for the rise in agricultural costs and prices. He drew attention to the contradiction inherent in the opposition's criticism. On the one hand, according to its party programme, the CDU wanted - like the Government - to establish an economic and monetary union as quickly as possible, but on the other hand it claimed to be completely in favour of abolishing the green dollar. The CDU was choosing to forget that even if the green dollar were abandoned national agricultural prices would still have to be fixed on the basis of common criteria and would require approval in Brussels according to the terms of the EEC Treaty.

Mr. Paul Röhner (CSU) called upon the Government to use the savings made from EEC market organizations to finance a national structural policy. In fact national development funds were lower than in previous years. Mr. Röhner regretted the fear felt by farmers of the erosion triggered off

by structural changes. No attention was being given to structural changes, social problems and the 'sacrifice of German agriculture on the altar of the EEC and stability'.

(b) The Federal Government's 1971 report on agriculture

On 17 February the Federal Government submitted its report on agriculture for 1971.

The report on the state of agriculture (Doc. VI/1800), previously dubbed the 'green report', is now known as the 'report on agriculture'. The name has been changed because the effects of EEC agricultural market organizations are now being dealt with in addition to the previous content of the report.

The following aims and centres of emphasis in EEC agricultural policy are mentioned in the report:

- matching production to consumption;
- improvement of agricultural price levels by carefully planned price rises so as not to endanger incomes in farms capable of further development;
- elimination of distortions and obstacles to competition by harmonizing legal, administrative, fiscal and support regulations;
- creation of an economic and monetary union as an urgent prerequisite for safeguarding the degree of integration already achieved in agricultural policy;
- development of common rules for the policy on agricultural structures in Member States to prevent distortions of competition;
- guaranteed supplies of reasonably priced food for the public, while maintaining the necessary flexibility in trade with non-member States.

Presenting the report, Mr. Ertl, the Minister of Food, said he would lay national price proposals before the Government and Parliament if the EEC countries were unable to reach agreement at least on milk and meat prices by 1 April. He drew attention to the worsening position of agricultural incomes in the current economic year. By comparison with the previous year a loss of income amounting to some DM1,300m could be expected (down by 7.5 per cent), DM1,000m of this total being accounted for by pigs alone. However, Mr. Ertl saw no signs that farmers' livelihood was threatened.

(c) Debate on agriculture held on 10 March 1971

Presentation of the 1971 report on agriculture was followed by a debate in the Bundestag.

During the debate, Federal Chancellor Brandt assured the farmers that the Government did not intend to leave them in the lurch. He said they would take immediate measures on agriculture if the Brussels price negotiations did not have a satisfactory outcome. Mr. Brandt declined to give details so as not to weaken Mr. Ertl's negotiating position in Brussels.

The Chancellor confirmed the Government's intention to refuse any package deal for price increases and European policy on agricultural structures. Mr. Brandt said: 'We have told Mr. Mansholt quite clearly that we will accept no package deal if it might lead to unforeseeable financial consequences for the Federal Republic.' He thought the policy on agricultural structures should remain a matter for the individual nations.

Mr. Ertl said that agricultural price levels must be improved in the EEC, distortions of competition eliminated and a common basis developed for the policy on agricultural structures. If the EEC unit of account (green dollar) were abolished, the whole common agricultural market would be called into question, and there would be political consequences for European integration.

The negotiations between the Ministers of Agriculture in the Council in Brussels were 'under heavy strains', Mr. Ertl said. All the Member States wanted to reach decisions on prices by 1 April. But this would be impossible without common structural measures. That was the 'hard reality'.

Mr. Ertl said he had submitted a phased plan providing for structural measures to be linked closely with progress towards the economic and monetary union. He had emphasized that in the first instance agreement had merely to be reached on principles. If details were already discussed at this stage the debates would become endless. But the principle that structural policy should remain a matter of national responsibility remained unchallenged.

Criticizing the Chancellor's speech, Mr. Rainer Barzel, Chairman of the CDU/CSU group, said that nobody could live on plans for the future and good intentions; practical measures were needed. Mr. Brandt had not said what the Government intended to do to improve the farmers' position. The

farmers were in the dark about what they could expect after 1974 by way of compensation for revaluation losses.

Mr. Barzel, who also spoke briefly on European cooperation, considered that there could be no economic and monetary union without a parallel and simultaneous plan for political union. In the absence of such a parallel plan, no one would be willing to grant additional responsibility for monetary and economic matters to Europe. The debate on agriculture was not merely concerned with the situation confronting the farmers; it had wider implications. The development of agricultural land and all the people living on it was now at stake. Mr. Barzel thought that however close cooperation became in Europe, German policy must still maintain in future 'an adequate share for domestic production'.

Mr. Wehner, Chairman of the SPD group, warned against interference with the EEC accounting system, i.e. the green dollar; that would surely lead the EEC into a 'fatal crisis'. On the other hand everyone must realize that the green dollar could not be maintained if the process of integration failed.

Mr. Georg Ehnes (CSU) spoke of the farmers' fear about the future in face of current developments in Europe which seemed to be moving towards an inflationary community rather than a European community as such. It seemed that the farmers alone would have to bear the burden of this. Agriculture was apparently ruled by special laws. It was expected to bear the double burden of rising costs and falling profits and so 'foot the bill'.

Mr. Martin Schmidt (SPD) strongly criticized the 'return to a nationalist spirit in agricultural policy' which was taking place in the EEC States. All the countries were granting support of different kinds, so that disparities in competition were growing all the time. It had already become practically impossible to define these disparities in numerical terms. He therefore called for consolidation of the European agricultural market.

Mr. Walter Peters (FDP) said that in the present discussions on the price situation in the agricultural sector 'everything should be done initially to raise EEC prices'. It was illogical to start talking about 'substitute solutions' while the negotiations were proceeding in Brussels. A discussion of that kind would not strengthen Mr. Josef Ertl's negotiating position in Brussels. Mr. Peters thought that one of the 'major causes' of the difficulties which arose in the trend of agricultural prices in the autumn of 1970 was the 'pig cycle', which produced some 5.5 million pigs in the EEC.

Mr. Georg Gallus (FDP) criticized past agricultural policy based on the idea that anyone who wanted to remain a farmer could remain a farmer. He regretted the lack of a clear statement by the Opposition on the green dollar.

Mr. Hermann Höcherl (CSU) said that Mr. Ertl's differences of opinion with Mr. Mansholt were 'calculated window-dressing' which Mr. Ertl had 'staged with considerable skill' for the debate on agriculture. Mr. Höcherl was afraid that the latest currency realignment would lead to structural changes in the EEC to the detriment of German farmers.

(Deutscher Bundestag, 99th sitting, 9 February 1971;  
Deutscher Bundestag, 106th sitting, 10 March 1971;  
1971 report by the Federal Government on agriculture, Bundestags-drucksache VI/1800;  
Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamts der Bundesregierung, 20 February and 12 March 1971)

#### 4. Interview with Mr. Focke on German policy on Europe after the recent Franco-German consultations

In the opinion of Dr. Katharine Focke, Parliamentary Secretary of State in the Federal Chancellor's office, it was quite wrong to suggest that during the recent Franco-German consultations in Paris the German Government had moved over towards the European policy outlined by President Pompidou a few days earlier at his press conference. That matter had not been discussed. The Paris consultations had definitely been a step forward towards European integration.

Dr. Focke made the following remarks in an interview published in the February edition of the periodical 'Europa-Union': 'The conclusions of the Hague summit conference were confirmed in Paris. Our French partners clearly expressed their intention of creating economic and monetary union with us. We are not simply entering on a first stage; we have an ultimate objective in mind about which a great deal was already said in Brussels in December when we discussed the necessary powers of the Community in connection with the Werner Plan. The French President clearly stated that when we move further towards economic and monetary union certain amendments may be necessary to the Treaty, not only in relation to its material content but also as regards the institutions of the Community which must be in a position to exercise their powers effectively. The French President

said that this was something that could be taken for granted and required no special emphasis. To that extent the French position came closer to the position of the Five who had repeatedly drawn attention to this necessity.'

Speaking of a European confederation, Dr. Focke said: 'I can see no foundation for the opinion that our policy has veered towards the French formula of confederation as a prospect for long-term European development; we are well aware, from the experience of the 1950s that formulas such as a confederation or federation are not able to do justice to the new character of the Community. As I have said, these matters were not discussed in Paris. We were concerned with making real progress towards economic and monetary union. The Werner Plan was already based on the assumption that institutional problems likely to arise in the course of the general development cannot be solved by a perfectionist approach today before the whole undertaking is embarked upon. Important decisions will have to be taken on this point when we reach the transition from the first to the second stage. But Federal Chancellor Brandt and President Pompidou confirmed certain principles such as the need for all the Community institutions to be effective.'

Asked whether German policy on Europe was pragmatic, Dr. Focke made the following comments. 'We had to live with different objectives when General de Gaulle became President of France. And the whole development of Europe has always had a pragmatic character. The ideas of Mr. Schumann and Mr. Monet were pragmatic through the functional method of concrete measures taken in stages. I believe that the word pragmatism has recently been used too often with a misleading effect as though we were concerned with a hand-to-mouth policy. Objectives linked with clearly defined successive stages are the correct definition of the process of integration towards which we are still working.'

Dr. Focke also touched on the subject of democratization of the Communities: 'On this matter we have known for many years what the true positions are; there has been the French attitude and that taken up by the other five countries. It would be surely Utopian to assume that during the last Franco-German consultations it has suddenly proved possible to obtain the agreement of our French partners to the ideas of the Five on the matter of the development of the European Parliament, which is still referred to in France as the European Assembly. In Paris we were only concerned, in the context of economic and monetary union, with emphasizing the need for taking the European Parliament into account in the framework of institutional development under economic and monetary union - because certain powers must be transferred from individual States to the Community. We clearly referred to this matter.'

(Europa-Union-Dienst, 4 February 1971)



5. The Federal Government welcomes the agreement reached by the Council of Ministers of the European Community on the establishment by stages of an economic and monetary union

On 10 February 1971 the Press and Information Office of the Federal Government issued the following statement: The Government welcomes the agreement reached on 9 February 1971 by the Council of Ministers on the establishment by stages of an economic and monetary union during the next ten years.

This decision completes a further significant part of the task decided upon by the Heads of State and Government in December 1969. The European Community will assume a new dimension with the economic and monetary union. New powers and responsibilities will have to be progressively transferred to the Community and will be subject to parliamentary control at Community level.

In the opinion of all the Member States the Community must become a Community of stability and growth and strengthen its contribution to the international division of labour.

As regards the shape of the Community in the final stage, certain important principles have already been laid down on the basis of which a decision will have to be taken, when we reach the transition to the second stage, on further progress towards completion of the economic and monetary union.

In the interests of the policy of stability, particular importance attaches to the need to ensure effective parallelism between progress in economic and monetary policy. The necessary measures have been taken to maintain this indispensable parallelism.

The creation of the economic and monetary union is not only a factor of great political significance but also a decisive step towards unification of Europe. The Federal Government notes with satisfaction that all the Member States helped in Brussels to create, on the basis of the proposals contained in the Werner Plan, the conditions for ensuring that the union becomes a harmonious and rational development of the Common Market.

(Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamts der Bundesregierung, No. 22, 12 February 1971)

## Italy

### 1. Parliamentary debates

#### (a) On the common agricultural policy

In November and December debates were held in both houses of the Italian Parliament on the ratification of the Treaty providing for 'own resources' for the Community and the delegation of powers to the Government to enact decrees having the force of law and to ensure compliance with obligations arising from:

- (a) Regulations, directives and decisions issued by the organs of the European Communities in application of the Treaty and of the decision of the Council of Ministers of the Community relating to the replacement of financial contributions from the Member States by the Communities' own resources;
- (b) Community regulations relating to the financing of the common agricultural policy.

Many speakers dealt in particular with the latter issue (1).

Speaking in the Senate for the Republican Party, Senator Cifarelli asked the Government to provide details regarding the extent of the delegation of powers requested for carrying out the commitments entailed by Community regulations on financing the common agricultural policy; it had become a matter of urgency to make a distinct change in certain aspects of this policy, while recognizing the need for pursuing European integration.

Senator Fabbrini (Italian Communist Party) pointed out that the Treaty rule on own resources, which laid down that all the agricultural levies of the Community should be paid over, would seriously prejudice Italy which imported many agricultural products and would thus have to pay considerable sums to the Community.

The adverse effects of the common agricultural policy on Italian agriculture would not be limited to this one aspect: they stemmed from the

- (1) The debates were the subject of a special edition of the Quarterly Survey of European Documentation, in which, however, speeches relating to the financing of the agricultural policy did not appear.

whole drift of this policy which was directed primarily at supporting prices rather than at modernizing agricultural structures. It was therefore more beneficial to countries which were producing surpluses than to Italy whose agriculture was structurally weaker. More than 94 per cent of the EEC budget for 1971 would be used to finance the EAGGF, the bulk going to the Guarantee Section; the Guidance Section would only get the crumbs which would, however, be set aside to carry out the Mansholt Plan, which had already caused so much concern in Italy.

The Communists therefore called upon the Government to give up the idea of entering into any definite new commitments for the common agricultural policy, and to try to secure a change in the regulation on financing the EAGGF reversing the ratio between the two sections of the Fund.

Senator Soliano (Italian Communist Party) discussed the contents of Article 3 of the Decision of the EEC Council of Ministers. The result of this was that the real reductions secured by the Italian Government in the quota to be paid to the EAGGF would be restricted to 1970 and that this benefit would be withdrawn as from 1 January 1971, when all income from agricultural levies would be included in the budget of the Community.

Senator Rossi Doria (Italian Socialist Party), Chairman of the Agricultural Committee, said that the anomalous structure of the Community budget - in which the proportion of the expenditure regarding which decisions had already been taken amounted to 96 per cent and nearly all of which was earmarked for financing the common agricultural policy - reflected on the powers of the European Parliament which, as regards the expenditure concerned, acted purely in a consultative capacity. In his opinion, therefore, national parliaments should call for a complete overhaul of the common agricultural policy. This had so far been based on support for agricultural prices and had been proved incapable of adjusting the agricultural sector to an industrial society. Senator Doria concluded by stressing the need for a planned and balanced overhaul of the most backward sectors of the Community's economy.

Senator Pegoraro (Italian Communist Party) said that the common agricultural policy had entailed major sacrifices for Italy and created serious anomalies both in economic and social terms. He stressed the need for a searching debate to be held in Parliament on the regulations for financing the common agricultural policy, which formed the basis for any choices that might be made in the agricultural sector. The present system of customs duties and levies needed to be completely overhauled. With more specific reference to the financing regulations, the apportionment of the sums available between the Guidance and Guarantee sections of the EAGGF should be changed.

He pointed out that different support prices should be adopted for various types of farms. Community support should be directed towards bringing about changes in agricultural production in favour of those sectors in the Community that were lagging behind or not producing enough.

He went on to say that radical social reforms and sweeping changes in the type of farming carried on were needed in Italian agriculture. To achieve this, large-scale public support was needed together with technical assistance that was both effective and of the right standard. Lastly he stressed the need for plans for transforming, irrigating and caring for the soil as well as a policy for promoting associations of producers and direct farmers.

Senator Cipolla (Italian Communist Party) considered that the provisions to the effect that all incomes deriving from the agricultural levies should be allocated to the Community gravely harmed Italy's interests because of the structure of its agricultural imports. This was one source of income which should be excluded from Community finance. There were three reasons for this: (1) It was bound up with a protectionist system which had proved incapable of resolving the problems of agriculture; (2) It was solely dependent on decisions by the EEC Commission, and (3) These decisions were liable to come under the influence of the major lobbies and were not subject to any democratic control by the national parliaments or the European Parliament.

He criticized the constant pressure to scale down the Guidance section of the EAGGF and deplored the fact that the total amount available from this Fund was limited to 285m units of account. He found it regrettable that the interventions to be made were subject to increasing delays and that the total amount available under this section of the Fund was being used to finance Community operations decided upon under and by reference to the misguided policy of surpluses.

After hearing the reply of Mr. Pedini (1), Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the Senate approved the following two resolutions:

The Senate,

- Noting that Italy has always had an adverse balance under the EAGGF and that this has had serious repercussions on its balance of payments;

---

(1) See page 53

- Bearing in mind that Italy is the Community country with the lowest per capita income, with the highest percentage of its working population engaged in agriculture, with a net agricultural product representing the highest proportion of the gross national product, and with the most out-of-date agricultural structures;
- Bearing in mind that the system financed by the EAGGF - Guarantee section - only marginally concerns Italian agricultural production, whereas the levies collected in Italy are growing because of a considerable deficit in Italy's balance of trade in food;
- Since this situation could get worse in the years ahead as a result of the application of the agreements relating to the creation of own resources for the Community whereby agricultural levies will be the main source of Community receipts;

calls on the Government to begin negotiations - in relation to the introduction of 'own resources' - with a view to a revision of the criteria for dividing up the resources of the EAGGF so as:

- (a) To set a limit to the market support in countries where there are surplus productions beyond the point at which the principle of national responsibility comes into operation;
- (b) To allocate a growing proportion of resources to the Guidance section so that this comes to constitute 50 per cent of the whole fund;
- (c) To set aside, for a special sector dealing with regional policies, a major proportion of the said financial resources for the purpose of carrying out systematic agricultural development plans including provision for soil maintenance and irrigation, the marketing and processing of agricultural products, and agricultural producers' cooperatives, as required for updating and overhauling production.

Senator Rossi Doria (Italian Socialist Party),  
 Senator Albertini (Italian Socialist Party),  
 Senator Bartolomei (Christian Democrat Party)

The Senate,

- In view of the decisions that the Council of Ministers of the EEC is getting ready to take with reference to the Regulation on the Guidance section of the EAGGF for 1971;
- Bearing in mind that this Regulation provides, inter alia, for 270,000m lire to be set aside and not used until the Mansholt Plan is approved;
- Given the confusion that this provision has caused among the various groups in the European Parliament;

calls upon the Government

- To do everything in its power to get that provision deleted from the Regulation so as to make this money immediately available for financing irrigation works and facilities for processing and marketing products.

Senator Giraudo (Christian Democrat),  
Senator Albertini (Italian Socialist Party),  
Senator Cipolla (Italian Communist Party), and  
Senator Iannelli (Italian Social Democrat Party)

In the Chamber of Deputies Mr. Cantalupo (Italian Liberal Party) pointed out that the equalization of contributions laid down in the Bill would have a special effect on the common agricultural policy, and although it might not bring any great benefits to Italian agriculture it would at least entail less harm and fewer sacrifices than had been the case so far. One had, however, to avoid the danger - inherent in the structure of the present Community machinery for agriculture, which was based mainly on the unification of agricultural prices - that the EEC might become a closed and self-sufficient Community. This danger would be heightened by the bid to enlarge the Community to include other countries such as Britain, for this would inevitably involve problems of adjustment which could adversely affect the economies of the individual Member States.

The speaker concluded by saying that the measures planned would help to consolidate the Community's agricultural structures; but these must not have a punitive effect on the United States or else the USA would have a pretext for persevering with the protectionist policy initiated by the Mills Bill.

Mr. Sedati (Christian Democrat) pointed out that in the long session held by the Council of Ministers in the last month of 1969, two key problems were tackled, one of which was that of completing the regulations for agriculture, in which Italy had a special interest: issue of regulations for citrus fruits, wine, and tobacco, and a review of the other regulations already issued.

During the first difficult period when the common agricultural policy was taking shape, situations certainly arose - inevitable in the first phase of the organization of markets - that could not, in the long run, be tolerated - especially by Italy which was to a large extent an importer of agricultural food products and which was suffering, and might continue to suffer from a system of contributions not based on just criteria. It was also true that the Italian delegation had been extremely active in endeavouring to ensure that there was an adjustment in Italy's financial participation. Hand in hand with

this, efforts had been made to increase the Community's support for the structural sector. Whatever one's opinion of the Mansholt Plan might be, there could be no doubt that the programme of support for the restructurization of agriculture as a whole should particularly help areas put at a greater disadvantage by social or natural conditions, e.g. the Italian Mezzogiorno.

Mr. Sedati concluded by stressing the need to overhaul the agricultural structure of the Community so as to make farming economically productive and ensure that social conditions were satisfactory.

Mr. Marras (Communist Party) pointed out that the underlying reason for the Communist opposition was the use the Community intended to make of the enormous sums that would be placed at its disposal. The Communist fear was that these would continue to be thrown into the bottomless pit of the EAGGF to finance exports of French and Dutch surpluses, to continue with a protectionist policy which kept the prices of agricultural products up for consumers without benefiting the majority of farmers, to support a policy which had not allowed for any expansion of the first class Italian products on the Community market and which kept types of farming which were vital for the Italian Mezzogiorno at the subsistence level.

Available funds were still being concentrated almost exclusively on supporting prices whereas structural investments were only an eighth of those used for protectionist support. Unless the Government regarded as a new policy the latest guidelines of the Mansholt Plan which thought of settling the agricultural question by chasing five million farmers from the land and concentrating production in some 100,000 capitalist farming enterprises. Until this policy were changed and the structures-market relationship reversed, with limits set on surpluses and assistance and integration differentiated according to the situation of the producer, the money paid to the Community would be money taken from Italian farmers.

Speaking for the Government in both houses of the Italian Parliament Mr. Pedini, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, replied to the various comments concerning the burdens of the common agricultural policy and on the effects that these would have on the national budget. The incompleteness of the information provided by the Government was due not to the fact that secret decisions had been taken on the Council of Ministers of the EEC but to the fact that the data available were often purely provisional.

He challenged the argument that the agricultural policy was weighing most heavily on one of the most needy classes, i.e. the small farmers, and said that it gave protection, albeit in an imperfect way, to the incomes of the

whole farming Community and that the burden was borne by all consumers. But this was the price that all consumers were paying to support an agricultural system which was in the process of change and whose structures had to be overhauled. It was thus contradictory to want to guarantee farm incomes by stabilizing prices at the most profitable level possible without agreeing that the burden of prices had to fall on the whole national Community and on consumers in particular.

Mr. Pedini then gave details of Italy's contributions to, and drawings from, the EAGGF from 1963 to 1969. While he was the first to acknowledge that the speech on the overhaul of the EAGGF was today highly pertinent, in future the Italian figure would be closer to balance, so that the most difficult phase of Italy's contributions to the financing of Community agriculture could be said to be over. But any statement on the advantages and disadvantages that Italy had gained from agriculture and from its participation in the Common Market had to be a comprehensive one, taking into account the real benefits gained by Italy from the Community from the political economic and cultural viewpoints too. It was indeed difficult to deny that Italy's participation had had, and would continue to have an advantageous effect on the status and citizenship of the Italians that a united Europe constituted a factor for stability and mediation in the international political balance, and that the Italy of today was certainly not poorer or more backward than the one that had entered the Common Market.

(Senato - Resoconti stenografici del 27 November and 1 December 1970;  
Camera dei deputati - Discussioni del 10, 11 and 14 December 1970)

(b) On foreign policy

On 21 January Mr. Moro, Minister for Foreign Affairs, explained the Government's position on the main issues of international politics to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chamber of Deputies.

He referred to the three main guidelines of Italian foreign policy: making the most of the United Nations as an organization for world peace; membership of a defensive alliance to ensure balance, détente and therefore peace in the geographical area in which Italy was a partner; participation in building a live and united Europe as an adequate response to the needs of the times.



As regards relations with the East European countries, Mr. Moro said that although encouraging progress had been made with the European dialogue in 1970, there had still been no decisive change in East-West relations. He stressed that Italy fully approved, and wished to encourage Germany's bid to normalize its relations with Eastern Europe.

With reference to European unification Mr. Moro said that the entry into force, on 1 January 1971, of the Treaty increasing the supervisory powers of the European Parliament over the Community budget and inaugurating the system of 'own resources' was of fundamental importance. He then discussed applications to join the EEC and pointed out that broad agreement had already been reached on certain individual problems; the negotiations were now focussed on the essential fields of Britain's contribution towards the Community's expenditure and the rate of adjustment of British industry and agriculture to Community regulations in a single transitional period.

With reference to his visit to London, Mr. Moro said he had taken advantage of the opportunity to stress the desirability of getting down to essentials at the negotiations which seemed politically certain to be successful despite the technical and economic obstacles. 'But we must get a move on. On the one hand we cannot hold back the development of the Community because of the negotiations and, on the other, the British and European public need to see clearly where they are going, after such a long period of waiting and uncertainty.'

Mr. Moro then discussed economic and monetary union ('the crucial point in Community integration') and political developments, pointing out that the machinery for consultations devised at The Hague and subsequently put into practice through the work of the Davignon Committee had undoubtedly proved valuable, especially in the light of enlarging the Community.

There was a full debate on the Minister's report on 22 January.

Mr. Ferri (Unitary Socialist Party) said his group fully agreed with the report- he stressed the following points: an endorsement of the Ostpolitik of Chancellor Brandt, the European federalist obligation to enlarge the Community but also to strengthen its powers and its functions. He also pointed out that the main commitment of Italian foreign policy was European unity in conjunction with the Atlantic Alliance.

Mr. Bersani (Christian Democrat) was glad to note that the Italian Government had been more decisive than the governments of the other Western countries and had come out in favour of the Ostpolitik and of enlarging

the Community. This should suffice to dismiss the idea that Italian foreign policy had no specific objective. In Europe everything was in movement 'and we are the active protagonists'. The weeks ahead could bring decisive events; for example, on 8 and 9 February the first phase of the plan for European monetary union could take shape and steps be taken towards a common industrial strategy. 'Here we need to bear in mind how much the world situation depends on the ability of Europeans to solve their problems and unite.'

Mr. Bersani also drew the attention of the Minister to the need for Italy to make a greater effort towards solving the technical and economic problems of the underdeveloped areas and to promote practical agreements between the EEC and Latin America.

Mr. Cantalupo (Italian Liberal Party) agreed about the need to move ahead rapidly towards European unification even though one had to bear in mind the efforts of France to delay progress.

Discussing European problems Mr. Granelli (Christian Democrat) pointed out that the path to a new European reality was not an easy one and that optimism would be out of place; the enlargement of the Community raised obstacles, both on the part of France and the United Kingdom, which were difficult to overcome at the technical level and for which ministerial meetings were necessary. He thought the main issue was that of the supra-national powers which the united Europe had to have, and of the cession by the Member States of some of their own powers. Today the revival of Europe was a different proposition from what it had been in the days of the cold war; the action to be taken had to be more open, beginning with greater independence of the USA in the West and of the USSR in the East European countries with respect to their internal regimes.

Mr. Compagna (Italian Republican Party) stated that the Ostpolitik was at the cross-roads between the Atlantic commitment and the political reorganization of Europe, because it was not possible to support the action taken by Chancellor Brandt if there was a political void in Western Europe. He also hoped that the Minister would be able to persuade France to be more European, pointing out that while in France the general public was favourably disposed and the government was not, the situation was the reverse in the United Kingdom.

(Camera dei deputati: Bollettino delle giunte e delle Commissioni parlamentari, 21-22 January 1971)

(c) On the convention for mutual customs assistance between the EEC countries, and the exclusion of Greece therefrom

On 11 February the Senate approved a Bill for the ratification and implementation of the convention for mutual customs assistance between the Member States of the European Economic Community with the additional protocol and the protocol for the accession of Greece to this convention signed in Rome on 7 September 1967.

With regard to the merits of the convention submitted for ratification by the Senate, Senator Giraudo (Christian Democrat), Rapporteur, pointed out that it met an undoubted need, especially in view of the customs union that had been established between the Member States of the Economic Community. He added that the ratification of the protocol for Greece's accession to this convention was surrounded with difficulties and confusion.

The convention and the relevant protocols were primarily technical. In view of the political aspects of the question, the argument that had come to prevail on the responsible committee was that by suspending approval of the protocol for Greece's accession the Italian Parliament would have a way of expressing its aversion to the present totalitarian regime in that country. A similar position had been adopted by all the Member States of the EEC with the exception of Belgium. Senator Giraudo then called upon the Senate to approve the Bill under examination in the version amended by the committee. He trusted that a democratic regime would be restored in Greece so as to allow of reappraisal of this and other forms of cooperation with that country which was indeed a part of Europe and needed Europe in the same way as Europe needed it in order to consolidate its stand for peace in the world.

Senator D'Andrea (Italian Liberal Party), Senator Calamandrei (Italian Communist Party), Senator Anderlini (Independent Left) and Senator Nardini (Italian Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity) endorsed the arguments put forward and the conclusions reached by Senator Giraudo.

In particular Senator Calamandrei said that the Communist Party would vote in favour of the Bill. It was its intention thus to stress the political importance of the amendments made by the committee which had cut out any reference to the protocol concerning Greece; hence the latter was rejected and Italy's approval of the protocol would stand suspended for as long as the fascist regime of the colonels continued in that country.

Senator Anderlini said that apart from one or two technical reservations the Bill was of considerable importance in that it offered an opportunity to reaffirm the duty of the Italian Republic, which had come into being as a result of the Resistance, of not neglecting any chance of expressing its own condemnation of the fascist regime in Greece.

Lastly Senator Nardini said that his group would vote for the Bill; he stressed the importance of the anti-fascist union which would come into being in the Senate as a result of this vote.

(Senato della Repubblica. Resoconto sommario, 11 February 1971)

## 2. Senate motion on the Mills Bill

On 28 January the Senate's Foreign Trade Committee approved a motion on the Mills Bill to limit imports, which had been laid before the American Congress a second time. In the text of its motion the Committee approved the Government's action and stressed the need to seek at every level, especially within the EEC, ways of avoiding the adoption of neo-protectionist measures by the United States which would inevitably result in retaliatory measures.

The motion goes on to advise the Government to take steps to ensure that foreign trade has the necessary 'flexibility' to cope with the disequilibrium prevailing on certain markets.

Mr. Zagari, the Minister for Foreign Trade, reported in detail on the Mills Bill: 'The Trade Bill was only shelved for a few days - for little more than the Christmas and New Year holidays. In fact the protectionist proposal, still in its original form, has been reintroduced by Senator Mills in Congress for the first day of the new session. It seems that Mr. Mills does not intend to bring the Bill up for discussion again in the Ways and Means Committee for six months so as to enable the Administration to study the matter and conclude negotiations on textiles with Japan. Nevertheless Mr. Mills, deaf to all the objections and arguments of the free trade lobby, has shown forcibly enough that he is the exponent, or at least the representative, of protectionist forces in the United States which are still very much alive. The only positive aspect is that the negotiations between the United States and Japan have been brought to a successful conclusion.'

After dwelling on the background to this initiative and certain interpretations which might be placed on it, the Minister said that 'trends, controversies and pressures from all quarters do not lessen the gravity of this frontal attack which calls for extreme vigilance on our part.' The Minister went on to speak of the prospects and hopes stemming from the US Congress, and felt that this setback might give rise to general agreement on the need for a dialogue with the main trading partners. 'We must find support among leading American politicians who stand side by side with worldwide opponents of protectionism, and decide what must be done to stem this disastrous tide. The idea of negotiations is not only Italian. Thanks to certain repeated initiatives, to which I referred at our previous meeting, the discussions will now be conducted at Community level. The recent statement by Mr. Dahrendorf, a member of the EEC Commission, in the European Parliament, is significant. We must negotiate before engaging in a commercial war.'

(Senate, Sedute delle Commissioni, No. 249, 28 January 1971)

3. Statement by the President of the Council to the Chamber of Deputies on European policy on the occasion of his visit to the United States

On 26 February the President of the Council, Mr. Colombo, reported to the Chamber of Deputies on his visit to the United States with Mr. Moro, the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Referring to European policy Mr. Colombo said:

'I must stress above all that I took into account not only the Italian positions but also the whole reality of Europe of which we are a part: this reality is destined to become increasingly important, as is proved by the encouraging decisions taken in Brussels in recent weeks.

We therefore discussed, as Italians and Europeans, with our American friends the problems which are gradually and inevitably arising with the continuation of the process of integration which we hope to see shortly extended to Great Britain and the other democratic States of our continent.

These problems are serious and sometimes complicated by economic repercussions on the two areas. Appropriate solutions must be worked out patiently by the two parties. But we agreed that solutions can be found if we take into account the principal objective, which is a political one, name-

ly European unification. It was clear from our discussions in Washington that protectionism, wherever it occurs and whatever form it takes, is an extremely dangerous phenomenon and may have the most serious political consequences. We were able to note with pleasure that America supports the idea of a partnership between equals and hopes - President Nixon repeated this yesterday during his message on foreign policy - that an original and organic European power will be introduced into world affairs and assume independent responsibilities.

I would add that this is our problem and not an American problem. We noted considerable respect on the part of the Americans for the work of unification of nations like those of Europe with a long standing civilization; the Americans are certainly not indifferent to European affairs. We must now take decisions to work towards a community endowed with its own individuality and with increasing powers. It must be based on friendship with the United States. We must have a political and economic union which is not inward looking but open to the demands and aspirations of other nations.'

(Camera dei Deputati, Resoconto sommario, 26 February 1971)

4. The Senate's Consultative Committee discusses the activities of the European Economic Community

On 11 March 1971 the Consultative Committee on the affairs of the European Communities met to discuss the report on the activities of the European Economic Community for 1970.

Senator D'Angelosante asked that the Italian Parliament should be informed in time about the general line of policy that the Government intended to follow in Community affairs and that to this end the report to the two Chambers should assume a more explicitly political character. He also asked for details regarding the Werner Plan, the agricultural policy and the common commercial policy.

In reply, Mr. Pedini, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, said that on the contrary the concern about this institutional point was one of the constant preoccupations of the Italian Government which had made it one of the pivots of its Community policy; this had also been the case during the negotiations on the monetary union; contributory factors here had been the effective cooperation of the Malfatti Commission and the improvement in the Community climate.

He pointed out that the Government had recently again been at work to secure an increase in the powers of the European Parliament; he pointed out that the Community had now entered the phase of economic union; he said the Italian Government was therefore working to secure the gradual development of the agricultural structures provided that this went hand in hand with progress in economic and regional policy. He then dealt with various aspects of the common commercial policy including the difficulties still standing in its way in regard to relations with the state-trading countries. With reference to each of these points he explained the attitude of the Italian Government which had always been in favour of a greater liberalization of trade relations including those with the East European countries and of putting them on a more multilateral basis.

Senator Bermani stressed the importance of direct elections to the European Parliament, the need for a clear definition of Italy's position on agriculture and the need for the Italian Government to change the attitude that had made it the one that had fallen short of the Community mark most often as was borne out by the number of appeals pending against Italy at the Court of Justice of the Communities.

After a speech by Senator Giraudo, the Chairman, who again emphasized the commitment on direct elections to the European Parliament and on increasing its powers, Mr. Pedini pointed out with reference to Italy's regrettable shortcomings that it had encountered special difficulties, one of the reasons for which was the imbalance between the regions; he trusted that in future these shortcomings and delays, such as that in the reform of taxation and the introduction of value added taxation, might be avoided.

Senator Boano then dealt with the Community's Mediterranean policy which had been strongly criticized by some Italian members of the European Parliament as well as the priority to be given to relations with Africa or Latin America with regard to which the Community bodies had to make a choice.

Senator Boano asked whether the EEC could initiate a profitable dialogue with the COMECON and whether this could bring about favourable solutions which some argued could more easily be achieved by means of the established bilateral approach. He also asked whether the Italian Government had raised the issue of the recognition of the EEC by the USSR; this was to be seen in relation to the planned conference on European security. He went on to ask what were the connections between the Community's agricultural and commercial policies, at which the accusation of protectionism had been levelled both by the United States and the state-trading countries; he also asked what was the opinion of the Italian Government regarding the recent

Community proposals for a new agricultural policy. On the basis of one or two points in these proposals he argued that there should be a gradual increase in the amount of the EAGGF and, at the same time, a percentage increase in the proportion of EAGGF resources allocated to the structural sector; it would be hard to secure compliance with the Italian request because the sums allocated to Italy in the past had only been employed to a ridiculously small extent.

Senator Scoccimarro stressed that the time had come for a full-scale attack on the problem of the growing imbalances in the internal development of the Community between the stronger and weaker economic areas and for imparting a coherent direction to the economic policy of the Community: here the Werner Plan should offer a further stimulus.

Speaking for the Foreign Affairs Committee, Senator Tolloy, the draftsman for the Opinion of the Committee, noted with satisfaction that the Italian Government had recently taken a much clearer stand on Community affairs. If Europe were to be regarded as a means of achieving real economic and social progress, this could prove the focal point of a great feeling of national unity. The accession of deeply democratic countries, such as the four that were at present applying for membership, would certainly give a greater impetus in this direction to the Community.

After expressing his misgivings about the irreversibility of economic and monetary union, Senator Tolloy stressed the need for the Italian Government to think in terms of a comprehensive approach to individual problems at Community level rather than one limited to the specific sectors involved: for this purpose it should always be the Minister for Foreign Affairs or someone appointed by him who represented Italy on the Council of Ministers of the Community.

He then stressed the need to go beyond the principle of unanimity and for the Italian Government to take a clear stand on this point at Community level.

Mr. Pedini replied first to Senator Scoccimarro; he agreed there were good grounds for stressing the need for an organic regional policy: this could be achieved in the new phase the Community was entering, and this could be very much to the advantage of the Italian Mezzogiorno. After stressing Italy's political interest in the accession of the United Kingdom and after stressing that the Mediterranean axis was essential to the Community, particularly from the point of view of energy supplies, Mr. Pedini said in reply to Senator Boano that when the Davignon Plan for political union was



being drawn up at the meetings in Munich, they were unanimous in adopting a favourable attitude towards negotiating with the East on a conference on European security, provided that this did not serve as a pretext for holding back the integration of the Community: the background to this was the conviction that Europe could not make an effective or profitable contribution to détente unless it was united. In any event it did not appear that any recognition of the Community on the part of the USSR was in the offing.

He agreed with Senator Boano that the Community's agricultural and commercial policies were incompatible; industrial development was at present dependent on a certain feeling of security in the agricultural sphere. In a second phase, the reorganization of structures should ensure that agricultural prices were no longer artificial as they were at present and that the common agricultural policy ceased to assume a protectionist character. After saying that he doubted whether the system of majority voting on the Council of Ministers of the Community could be reintroduced in the near future, he concluded by confirming that the Italian Government was fully committed to the Community and looked to the Parliament for support and encouragement in this aspect of its work.

(Senato della Repubblica - Resoconto sommario - sedute delle Commissioni - 268, 11 March 1971)

5. Mr. Emilio Colombo, President of the Council of Ministers, says that the work of European unification must be speeded up

In an interview published by Le Figaro on 29 January 1971, Mr. Emilio Colombo, the President of the Italian Council of Ministers, commented on the present policy of European unification with which he was not entirely satisfied. 'We should prefer quicker progress. We are going to embark upon the first stage of monetary union as your country wishes but we should like a few assurances on the targets towards which we are moving as well as a clearer idea of the institutions which will be responsible for joint action.

As regards enlargement of the Community the questions under discussion at present must be dealt with seriously, but now that technical difficulties have been encountered, emphasis must be placed on the political stakes and on our desire to see Britain and the other applicant countries join the Community, which is in our own interest.

Speaking of political Europe, Mr. Colombo felt that 'What is being done is only a beginning, a small beginning, and we are willing to go a great deal further in accordance with the terms of a passage in our Constitution: "Italy agrees, on a basis of equality with other States, to such limitations of sovereignty as may be necessary for an order of peace and justice to be established among nations. It will assist and support international organizations created with this aim in mind."

The renunciation of certain areas of sovereignty amounts simply to renunciation of commitments which we can no longer honour individually; such as the stabilization of our currency or the assurance of our defence.'

Finally Mr. Colombo recalled that Italy viewed the task of building Europe as a prime objective. 'During the crisis when France walked out, I stressed that there could be no Europe without France. Similarly I believe that there can be no Europe without Britain.'

(Le Figaro, 29 January 1971)

6. Mr. Pedini, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, discusses the position of the neutral countries vis-à-vis the Europe of the Six

Mr. Pedini, the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, gave an interview to 'Il Sole-24 Ore' on the position of the neutral countries in Europe vis-à-vis the Community.

'Sweden, Finland, Austria, Iceland and Switzerland undoubtedly have an important function to play in the whole balance of Europe, especially when we consider that some of these countries stand at the frontier between two worlds which are ideologically divided, even though contacts between them are increasing and the outlook is promising. The neutral countries are in fact spiritually and culturally bound to Western Europe; but they can also speak credibly to the countries in the East.

.... Europe must therefore be seen in a broader context in the future, allowing for the complementary nature of the two zones in Europe which, while their internal structure may be different, can still cooperate and gradually draw closer together. A neutral Europe on its frontiers is useful to the Community, just as a Community with growing economic and political

strength is useful to the neutral countries: it serves as a zone of general balance, as an area whose development can lead to dynamic growth and greater security of the neutrals while providing a solid basis for their neutrality in the interest of all concerned.

.... It would therefore be desirable to promote closer ties between the Community and the neutral countries even though their neutrality implies political disengagement and therefore an absence of institutional links with the Community. Military neutrality must not prevent the possibility of establishing, over and above purely commercial agreements, areas of cooperation which will not impinge upon political and military neutrality and will allow joint progress both in the commercial sector and in broader areas of common interest.'

Mr. Pedini concluded: 'It is difficult to imagine that the neutral countries could become, at least for the time being, effective members of the Community. It is equally difficult to believe that they could accept the status of associate countries both because of the distinct political connotations involved and also because that status is better suited to other countries whose economic and social level is very different from that of the Community. However, this should not prevent the possibility of finding a special cooperative arrangement for the neutral countries - provided that imagination and good will are shown in the conviction that every nation can be useful to others - within the framework of the Treaty and in a broader context than that of simple trade relations. This arrangement must be adapted to their individual requirements and based on a coherent plan which would take in other regional groupings such as NORDEK, while it would also be useful to more general European cooperation.'

(Il Sole-24 Ore, 25 February 1971)

7. Mr. Colombo, Prime Minister, discusses the common agricultural policy

At the International Agricultural Fair held in Verona on 14 March 1971 Mr. Colombo, Prime Minister, made a speech from which the following are extracts.

'The common agricultural policy is without doubt one of the fundamental achievements of the economic integration of the Six, with common

market organizations now covering more than 90 per cent of the agricultural products of the European Economic Community and with common prices that are both remunerative and stable.

In this first phase of its application, however, the common agricultural policy has proved to have certain serious disadvantages which we must make a serious effort gradually to put right.

.... One fact which has been prejudicial to the whole of the achievement of the common agricultural policy is that market and pricing policy has not been coupled, as Italy requested, with a vigorous policy for overhauling the agricultural structures of the Community.

This remains an objective to be achieved despite the many discussions that have so far taken place. The Commission in Brussels is now putting this forward for the attention of the governments.

.... There has been a tendency on the part of many governments to take quick decisions about prices and to put off decisions regarding structures. This is not the line taken by Italy, which fully agrees with the Commission in not wanting to perpetuate an unsatisfactory situation.

It would be wrong to imagine that the task of improving and stabilizing the incomes of the producers is a matter for the structures policy alone, but it is also emphasized - and the Commission does this in the explanatory statement attached to its document - that a prices policy alone cannot ensure comparable benefits for all the farmers, bearing in mind how hard it is to devise a general policy for prices which gives all farmers an adequate income.

A prices policy which left a policy for structures on one side would be an illusory guarantee of a lower-cost common agricultural policy because the increase in agricultural surpluses and the policy of export subsidies would spread in such a way as to become a heavy burden on the Community's resources.

The Italian Government ought therefore to express its firm conviction that the prices policy and the Community policy for structures must be dovetailed, and that this idea must be accepted both in practical terms and at the institutional level. This dovetailing can make the common agricultural policy into one of the main forces for change and innovation in Euro-

pean unification. The Community measures could also be dovetailed with those laid down in the various "green plans" of the Member States. Finally, national policies for helping depressed areas should continue.

Each country will carry out the policy suggested by the Commission according to the rules and principles laid down in its own legislation.

These prospects opening up in the Community are to a large extent bound up with the domestic problems involved in the development of this sector.

This stands at a turning-point in terms of precise deadlines, such as the introduction of the common agricultural policy and of practical systems for the regions enjoying ordinary status, and the definition of a new national planning context.'

Mr. Colombo then said that the renewal of the 'green plan' would be subject to an overall review of the policy for this sector, and consequently the Minister of Agriculture had submitted a new plan not only providing the financial means but making arrangements so that the various regions could assume responsibility for the management of matters within their competence. The governing principle would hence have a dual purpose : (i) to continue to distribute subsidies in the former way for some time and (ii) at the same time to study plans to provide market support.

(Il Popolo, 16 March 1971;  
Il Sole-24 Ore, 16 March 1971)

8. Statements by Mr. Carlo Russo, the Minister for Relations with Parliament, on the election of members to the European Parliament

In an interview published in the fortnightly magazine 'L'Europa', Mr. Carlo Russo expressed his support for the direct election of members of the European Parliament not merely as a personal opinion but as a firm belief which the present Government shared with its predecessors.

After recalling that the Treaty of Rome provided for the direct election of members of the European Parliament, he added that a Community

decision on this matter could solve a problem which was becoming increasingly serious with the passage of time.

Referring to the Bill presented by popular initiative, in accordance with the second paragraph of Article 71 of the Constitution, which was now being considered by the Senate, he said that the proposed text should be substantially amended in particular as regards the date of voting. In fact Article 2 of the Bill stipulated that the electoral committees would be called at the same time as the regional elections and not later than 31 December 1969; that date had now passed. It was therefore necessary to determine the date on which European elections would be held. He thought the best time would be 1973 to coincide with the general elections.

He went on to signify his agreement with the provisions of Article 3 of the Bill, i. e. that elections should be held on the proportional system with a single national constituency.

Finally he emphasized the value of the fact that the initiative on the subject of direct elections to the European Parliament had its origins in an expression of popular will.

(Il Popolo, 31 March 1971)

## Luxembourg

### 1. The Chamber of Deputies passes a motion on the raising of agricultural prices in the Community

Mr. Buchler, the Minister of Agriculture, defended his budget proposals for 1971 in the Chamber of Deputies during the sittings on 15 and 16 December 1970. He referred to the increase in agricultural prices in the Community:

'In my opinion there must be a reasonable and balanced increase in agricultural prices without delay. At the same time social and structural measures should be taken; they would be financed both by the Community and by national governments.

This would re-establish a measure of social justice, and farmers who wish to practise their profession under more favourable production conditions and with better prospects for the future could regain confidence; the same applies to farmers who would like to leave agriculture and whose resolution should be strengthened by active retraining measures, early pension payments or compensation for giving up farming.

If this overall solution is not decided by the EEC authorities, the Government would propose suitable instruments compatible with the Rome Treaty at national level. These instruments would consist primarily of the agricultural orientation law whose provisions must be partly adapted to the new objectives and also of the project for the departure and retraining of farmers with unprofitable holdings. In both cases the criteria for applying support measures must be both simple and effective.'

Miss Lulling (Luxembourg, Socialist Workers' Party) said that the raising of farm prices in the Community should be accompanied by structural and social measures. 'The Minister of Agriculture knows very well that the Brussels Commission is making its proposals for increased agricultural prices dependent on structural and social measures. If milk prices are increased next year, and if the weather conditions are unfavourable, another mountain of butter stocks will build up; it took \$900m to eliminate the last one. This amount could certainly be better invested on rational structural reform.'

Mr. Elvinger (Democratic Party) tabled the following motion on behalf of several colleagues:

'The Chamber,

having noted the report on agriculture and vine-growing in 1969/1970, presented by the Minister of Agriculture and Vine-growing indicating

- a continuous reduction in agricultural income because of the price ceiling maintained for two years and the substantial rise in production costs;
- the increasing disparity between income in the agricultural sector and income in the other sectors;

having regard to the claims put forward in all the Member States of the European Community for an increase in the present agricultural prices fixed at Community level;

drawing the Government's attention to the need to apply an overall incomes policy;

invites the Government to do all in its power to ensure that the Council of the European Communities fixes at an early date for the 1971/72 season agricultural prices at a higher level than those agreed upon at present;

if prices for certain products, in particular milk, beef and veal and pigmeat, are not increased within the next few months, and at the latest on 1 April 1971, calls upon the Government to take measures at national level to contribute to an improvement in agricultural income.

Signed Elvinger (DP), Winken (CSP), Ney (CSP), Schaffner (DP), Vantz (DP).'

(Summary record of the proceedings of the Chamber of Deputies, Nos. 9 and 10, 1970/71 Session)

2. Statements by the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the pace of negotiations between the Community and the United Kingdom

Following the meeting of the Council of Ministers of the Communities on 2 February 1971, Mr. Thorn, Minister for Foreign Affairs, made a statement to the press about the progress and the delays in the negotiations



with the United Kingdom. 'Mr. Rippon rightly told us that it is time the Community said what it wanted. Since December we have made no progress. I do not see how we are going to make any; we are still at the point where the Permanent Representatives drew up their proposals for the Council of Ministers. We have reached the stage when the Ministers must settle the matter. But we did nothing at this meeting. In fact we held back and once again referred the problem back to the Permanent Representatives.

Now a political decision is needed. I doubt whether this is possible between the Permanent Representatives when nothing is achieved at meetings of the Ministers. I feel sorry that we did not pursue the discussions between the six of us after we had met with the British.

We shall be meeting with the British again on 16 March. We shall have had another meeting between the six of us one week before, but it is so difficult to arrange meetings between the Six that I doubt whether much can be done in a month ... I should not like my words to be misinterpreted. Nothing irreparable has happened but I am sorry that we do not make a more rational use of the rare moments when we foreign ministers are able to meet together... I had the impression that some delegations did not want the negotiations to go ahead, feeling that the time has not yet come for concessions. They said let us not talk about figures, preferring not to quote any than to put forward any which would not suit the British.

I, on the other hand, quoted figures proposing five per cent to begin with, and then four times three per cent; not that I find these figures ideal - on the contrary - but to take the discussion a stage further.

But Mr. Rippon made it quite clear that he was not joking and that his country was absolutely unable to make a higher initial contribution than three per cent ...

The British seem convinced that we shall never ask for 25 per cent. They are liable to be surprised. We must take them at their word. No great increase in the final year, but no great increase during the course of the five years either.'

On 17 March Mr. Thorn once again noted the lack of any progress at the negotiations: 'We reached agreement on nothing ... as for financing, I asked for a discussion of the proposals of the Commission and of Belgium whereby precise figures would not be put forward but new criteria would be established on the basis of which calculations could be made and, by reference

to principles, certain figures worked out. But France said that it was too early and asked that this question be referred back to the Permanent Representatives. There were two or three other attempts to revive the discussion. The French then stated that the British had not replied to our proposals.

I asked the French representatives which precise questions we had asked. We then found that we had asked no questions but had simply made statements. I then proposed that we should at least tell the British that their figures of three per cent for the financial contribution at the beginning and 15 per cent at the end were unacceptable ...

Mr. Schumann does not want to make any concessions. There is a split between France and the Five ...

The only positive point is that we decided to go more quickly ... One has the impression that everything has to be decided at the level of the French Government, unless it simply wants to increase the pressure.'

(Le Républicain Lorrain, 3 February and 18 March 1971)

## Netherlands

### 1. Written Questions

#### (a) Parliamentary procedure on proposed trade agreements between the EEC and non-member States

Mr. Westerterp (Catholic People's Party) put the following question to the Government on 19 November 1970:

'Is the Government willing to ensure that the EEC Council applies in future the Luns procedure to trade agreements based on Article 113 of the EEC Treaty? In accordance with this procedure, the Chairman of the Council must notify the content of the draft agreement to the appropriate committee (committees) of the European Parliament after initialling but before signature of the agreement.'

In the explanatory statement accompanying his question Mr. Westerterp draws attention to the European Parliament's resolutions of 16 November 1970 in connection with (i) the Boano Report on the EEC-Spain Trade Agreement and (ii) the Westerterp Report on the EEC-Israel Trade Agreement. Application of the Luns procedure in the case of the association agreement with Malta had enabled an element which the European Parliament considered vital to be added to the draft agreement after its initialling.

Mr. De Koster, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, replying on behalf of the Government, said that he was willing to ensure that this procedure is applied to agreements based on Article 113 in all appropriate cases.

(Second Chamber, 1970-1971 Session, Appendix 909)

#### (b) The European Community and development aid

On 17 December 1970 Mr. Vredeling (Labour Party) asked the Government whether it shared the opinion of the European Commission on the task of the European Communities in the sphere of development aid. This

opinion was explained by the Commission in its reply to a written question (\*) on 18 November 1970, and read as follows: 'The association agreements concluded by the Community with different countries or groups of developing countries are certainly a proven and privileged instrument of cooperation between the Community and these countries. However, the Community's task in the sphere of development aid is not confined to the procedures laid down in the Association Agreement or to the developing countries associated with the Community through such Agreements. The Community has always made ample use of the possibilities available to it in the sphere of tariffs and trade by lowering the common customs tariff on a number of tropical products and also by concluding a series of trade agreements with certain developing States, by acceding to international agreements for specific basic products and also by playing a decisive part in the development of the system of generalized preferences for manufactures and semi-manufactures exported by the developing countries.

The Community also signifies its solidarity with the developing States by granting substantial food aid. Moreover the Community plays a coordinating role in development aid and technical support under the agreement between the EEC and the Lebanon.

Finally the Commission has helped to lay down development policy for the next ten years. It will have to take a number of steps to ensure that the objectives set out in this policy are in fact met.

The member of Parliament will probably be aware that a detailed report was submitted to the European Parliament and the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe on the different aspects of relations between the Community and the developing States, and this subject was debated at the joint meeting held on 17 September 1970 at which the Commission was represented.'

On 8 January, the Foreign Minister, the Minister without Portfolio responsible for Development Aid, and the Ministers of Finance, Economic Affairs and Agriculture, stated that they shared the opinion of the European Commission. They added, however, that the Commission's position related to direct financial aid. In the written question reference was also made to a relevant passage in Document No. 10 606, No. 6, of the States General concerning the approval of the Second Yaoundé Convention.

---

(\*) No. 253/70, Official Gazette of the European Communities, C 138

In the case of other forms of assistance e.g. technical aid, food aid, and allowance for the interests of the developing States when determining trade policy, the Ministers believed that the Community had a task to perform even beyond the framework of an association agreement. The Community had indicated its awareness of this task in the reply given by the European Commission.

(Second Chamber, 1970-1971 Session, Appendix 1081)

(c) Trade relations between the United States and the European Community

Replying to a written question (11 January) by Mr. Van der Mei (Christian Historical Union), the Minister of Economic Affairs, Mr. Nelissen, made the following statement on 1 February:

'In an aide-mémoire to the Netherlands Government, the American Government has expressed its anxiety over the agreement reached in principle during the negotiations on the United Kingdom's entry into the EEC to offer commercial policy arrangements similar to those concluded with the Yaoundé States to a number of African Commonwealth countries. This anxiety stems from the position already expressed by the United States that agreements of this kind are contrary to GATT provisions. The American Government has therefore once again expressed its reservations on the EEC's association policy. This does not, however, mean that there is an immediate worsening in trade relations between the United States and the EEC. Nevertheless, a situation has arisen in which a serious threat is likely to develop to free world trade.

The Netherlands Government has repeatedly drawn attention to this problem in the EEC. The EEC has taken part in informal discussions between leading partners in world trade held in Geneva at the initiative of the Director-General of GATT. The Government will make efforts to ensure that discussions on all the problems now being considered in the context of trade relations between the EEC and the United States and other trade partners are continued. It believes that all the possibilities for further liberalization of international trade should be fully exploited. A realistic practical approach should be made to agricultural problems and non-tariff obstacles in GATT. It appears that ideas differ both within the EEC and outside on the desirability of steps in this direction. Nevertheless the Netherlands will continue to support such measures in the EEC.'

(Second Chamber, 1970-1971 Session, Appendix 1275)

2. Amendment to the Westerterp proposal on the direct election of Dutch members of the European Parliament

Mr. Westerterp, a member of the Second Chamber (Catholic People's Party), amended his draft law on the appointment of Netherlands deputies to the European Parliament by direct election in the light of certain objections made by the Electoral Council. In a detailed Memorandum of Reply Mr. Westerterp examines the opinion of the Electoral Council.

The original draft is changed and Mr. Westerterp now proposes that European elections should not coincide with elections to the Second Chamber. In this way he answers a number of technical objections put forward by the Electoral Council. Mr. Westerterp now suggests that European elections should be held at the latest six months after elections to the Chamber.

Another amendment relates to the proposal contained in the original draft for nationals of other Member States of the European Community resident in the Netherlands to exercise voting rights. Mr. Westerterp announces with regret that it will not be possible to allow such persons to vote. The Electoral Council's objections to this measure were again primarily technical.

In his Memorandum of Reply he defends the proposal that the first elections to the European Parliament should be held in the Netherlands in 1971.

(Amended Draft Bill and Memorandum of Reply, Second Chamber Session 1970-1971, Doc. 10 696, No. 9 and 12, 29 January 1971)

## Switzerland

### Statements by members of the Government on relations between Switzerland and the European Economic Community

(a) During his official visit to Vienna Mr. Graber, Federal Councillor and Swiss Foreign Minister, gave a press conference on 22 January 1971 at which he made known his views on integration questions.

He gave a full account of the integration efforts of the neutral States. Here Switzerland and Austria were cooperating particularly closely, and both sides were determined to reach a mutually satisfactory agreement. The two Governments were also keenly interested in cooperating with the other neutral States, Sweden and Finland. Against the background of the present efforts to achieve détente in Europe neutrality assumed special importance, said Mr. Graber. In Brussels, therefore, Switzerland and Austria had laid special stress on what was needed to preserve the credibility and international effectiveness of their neutrality. Maintaining their independence in the field of foreign policy must therefore be regarded as one of the main requirements.

Mr. Graber thought that at present it was impossible to foresee how the exploratory talks, which were theoretically not to last more than six months, would end. Nevertheless Switzerland was fairly optimistic about the negotiations now in progress in Brussels. The prospects of success were favourable on all sides and there was at present no reason to doubt the goodwill of all those taking part. In reply to one question, however, Mr. Graber conceded that a great deal would depend on the progress of the negotiations of the United Kingdom with the EEC. Their failure could lead to a completely new situation, but even then the problem of European integration would still be there.

At a press conference in Paris on 16 February Mr. Graber stated that his country was very keen to conclude a treaty with the EEC provided it did not prejudice Swiss neutrality in any way. He stressed that the EEC was more than a straightforward economic organization; its political future was of course still uncertain but it was becoming more significant all the time. Mr. Graber said that it would be difficult to find a working basis for a treaty but he was confident because Switzerland's neutrality was useful to the whole of Europe.

(b) Addressing the Land Peoples' Assembly of Zurich in Winterthur on 17 January, Mr. Brugger, Federal Councillor and Head of the Economic Affairs Department, stressed that agriculture was one of the main obstacles to any Swiss accession to the EEC; for Switzerland to adopt the EEC agricultural system would challenge the very existence of the Swiss farmers. At the same time he drew attention to the fact that Switzerland was predominantly a customer of the EEC in trade in agricultural products.

(c) At a meeting of the Free Democratic Party held in Basle on 19 January Mr. Nello Celio, Swiss Finance Minister, explained why it was impossible for Switzerland to become a full member of the EEC at present.

The Minister went into the political aspects of the Common Market which were inconsistent with the Swiss policy of neutrality. A further reason, he said, was the federalist structure of Switzerland. 'There can be no question of our restricting the competence of the Parliament and the people in favour of an international authority, nor of our giving up our domestic federalism so as to transfer the competence of the cantons to an international authority. It is not the material and technical difficulties such as the agricultural market and the question of foreign workers and so forth that stand in the way of our accession but these two basic principles of the organization of our State, which we cannot and must not abandon.'

All this did not mean, however, that Switzerland rejected the idea of reasonable cooperation with the EEC and the rest of the world. He said the primary purpose of Switzerland's negotiations with the EEC was to secure exemption from customs duties with a wider Community, which would include the present European Free Trade Area.

(Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 17 and 24 January 1971 and 10 March 1971)



## United Kingdom

### 1. Debates in the House of Commons

#### (a) Speech by Mr. Heath, Prime Minister, on British foreign and defence policy

During the foreign and defence policies debate on 2 March, the Prime Minister, Mr. Edward Heath, stressed that the British application for membership of the EEC must not affect British interests in the rest of the world: 'We reject a narrow regionalism in defence, just as we reject regionalism as such in other fields, because we are convinced that it runs counter to the interests and to the character of Britain.

Some times this argument for the almost complete concentration of defence in Europe is based on the so-called need to demonstrate our Europeanism in our application to join the European Economic Community. At others, it is said that the Community, whether it is enlarged or not, and the countries around it, are concerned only with Europe and ought to be concerned only with Europe. There is no contradiction between the views which I have expressed about the wider interests of Britain and the fact that there may be times and places where we should safeguard these through forces. There is no contradiction between that and our desire to find acceptable terms for entry into the European Economic Community.

In the 10 or more years in which I have been closely and deeply involved in European matters, I have never heard the arguments of Europeanism or of regionalism used amongst those whom we wish to join. They recognise that our interests run beyond Europe - indeed, many of them welcome that. France is a country in a similar position to our own, and we have seen the tenacity and skill with which she has maintained her great interests outside Europe. She has found no conflict between that and membership of the Community. This, therefore, is not an argument of substance.

We can safeguard key British interests, often jointly with friends and allies, in other parts of the world at the same time as we fulfil our obligations and maintain our security in Europe. In Europe the foundation of our security is the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance, and in it our role is a major one. Among the European members we alone make a contribution to the strategic nuclear forces, and without that contribution the strategic nuclear forces of NATO would be a United States monopoly. This is significant

not only for us and for Europe but for the Alliance as a whole.'

(Hansard, Issue No. 850, 26 February - 4 March 1971)

(b) Problem of the United Kingdom's accession to the European Communities

On 20 January 1971 a major debate began in the House of Commons in which Mr. Rippon, the Minister responsible for European Affairs, outlined the Government's policy and the progress of negotiations on Britain's application to join the European Community.

This debate provided an opportunity for Mr. Rippon to clearly reaffirm his Government's desire to bring the negotiations to a successful conclusion. He stated in particular:

'... Britain has been involved in the business of integrated alliances, of collective economic and monetary management between nations, for more than 20 years. The preservation of British interests has long depended on sharing control with others, and that is already, in practical terms, an irreversible trend.

The founders of the Economic Community faced up to this reality. They decided that their purpose would be best served if the member countries could steadily grow together by sharing certain specific interests in the common enterprise. They did not lose national control over this process, and they do not intend to. The vital decisions remain with the Council of Ministers. But within the fields and limits laid down by national governments, the life of the Community has developed. So talk of dramatic options between national sovereignty and federalism is simply not relevant.

As President Pompidou said at Strasbourg on 28 June last year: "Of what Europe can it then be a question, if not of a Europe grouping together sovereign States that freely agree to lower the barriers which separate them and gradually harmonise their policies, agricultural, monetary, industrial and social, in order to advance with realism, that is cautiously and step by step, towards a union which, when it has sufficiently become so, both in fact and in the minds of the peoples - and only then - will be able to have its own policy, its own independence, its own role in the world?"

Everyone acknowledges that Europe must be built upon respect for the individuality of the States which form part of it. Thus, the Community is now beginning to work gradually towards an economic and monetary union. They have not yet agreed on the first stage, let alone the second and the third. We on this side of the House share the views expressed by successive governments and successive chancellors of the exchequer that there is no need for us to have anxiety about this matter. Indeed, joining would give us the opportunity to participate, like the others, in their decisions.

Our belief is that further developments in this and other fields are highly desirable. Nothing would be done against the wishes or vital interests of each Member State. We should be joining the Community not just as shareholders but as directors. We could have a major influence at every stage of both control and direction, and inevitably - I think that we must note this - we should have far more control inside than if we remained outside ...

Further developments in regional policy as a result of joining the Community are one of the purposes, and I spoke about that in relation to the budget. Whatever happens in Community Europe in any case will profoundly affect our interests and our future. I have said that the development and enlargement of the Communities are closely interdependent. If we join, there will be a number of fields in which, I hope, our influence will have a significant effect.

I refer, first, to the democratic content of the Community. The previous Government were right to take advantage of the State Visit of President Saragat of Italy in 1969 to sign the Joint Declaration that Community Europe should be firmly based on democratic institutions. The Council of Ministers contains the democratically elected representatives of democratic countries, but in those spheres in which the Community has a legitimate interest then, I think, the European Parliament also has a vital role to play. As my Rt. Hon. Friend the Prime Minister has said: "I frankly cannot imagine the Community developing beyond a certain point without a corresponding advance in democratic functions."

This work is essential if European nations are to have an effective say in any of the great world issues. The start we have made here with the Six in Western European Union has been most useful. The Foreign Ministers of the Six and the Ten, working in the spirit of The Hague communiqué, have also made a good beginning.

My Rt. Hon. Friend the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary left his colleagues of the Ten in no doubt at their meeting in December that our contribution would be a vital one.

But unless our underlying economic interests are consolidated in an enlarged Community it is difficult to see how steady and substantial progress could be achieved in this wider field.

Yet another area of European action in which progress is attendant on enlargement is defence.

Of course we and the Six are already committed to each other in Western European Union.

Of course we are all members of the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance which must remain the basis of our security.

But we must remember that the military potential of the Warsaw Pact Powers - despite détente - is even more formidable than it was 10 years ago.

We must remember also that political pressures and trends in the United States seem certain to require that Europe should be more self-reliant and should accept greater responsibilities in defence. Failure on the part of Western Europe to understand these two developments and prepare for them in time, could be very serious ...

I agree nevertheless fully with the Rt. Hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition that there can be no question of joining the Community in any rush through economic weakness.

For us, as for our negotiating partners, it is a moment for steeling our will - for reaffirming our determination to achieve terms fair for all - terms which in due course we can justifiably bring before this House for its approval.'

(Transmitted by UK Delegation to the European Communities)

2. Speaking in The Hague Mr. Davies, President of the Board of Trade, discusses the costs of Britain's entering the European Communities

In a speech to the Federation of Dutch Industry in the Congress Building at The Hague on 22 January, Mr. John Davies, British Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, emphasized the need for the United Kingdom to be fully alive to the changes necessary in the organization of industry if it was to cope with the requirements of an enlarged European Community.

Britain was reconciled to the fact that some of the costs of membership would probably rise before any profits start to come in. The gradual introduction of the common external tariff would naturally mean a change in Britain's foreign markets. The snag was that these changes might not balance each other out. The application of the European Community's agricultural policy during the transitional period would send up food prices, and that would have an adverse effect on the balance of payments and labour costs. It was realized that Britain's contribution to Community funds, even under the introductory system the British had proposed, would lead to a huge outflow of currency unaccompanied by a corresponding direct inflow.

Other aspects of membership of the European Community would probably be hard to adjust to at first, both in financial and budgetary terms. The main counterweight to these high costs would lie in the stimulation of national growth and prosperity the Community offered. While one could count on this, it was as well to be cautious and bear in mind one or two reservations as to whether this would happen at the same speed as the attendant rise in costs.

Britain faced difficult negotiations. Nothing could be more irresponsible, as regards either the British people or the Community, than to take on more than we could cope with. The inevitable result would be that Britain would be forced to give up the necessary expansion of its economy because it could not afford to finance this expansion and meet its commitments to its partners at the same time.

At a press conference Mr. Davies explained that he was more than ever convinced that British membership of the Community had to come.

As regards the latest statements by the French President, he agreed with Mr. Pompidou that as regards the road to the ultimate goal -

economic, monetary and political union - nothing could yet be laid down with complete certainty because anything could happen between now and then.

(Handels & Transport Courant, 23/25 January 1971)

3. Mr. Rippon, Minister responsible for European Affairs, and Britain's entry into the Common Market

At the annual dinner of the Young European Management Association on 26 February 1971 Mr. Geoffrey Rippon, the British Minister responsible for European Affairs, said that France and Britain took a similar view of the future structure of the European institutions.

He agreed with Mr. Pompidou that the quarrel about supranationality was a false quarrel and added that if France recognized and accepted the need to share control with its neighbours in certain fields he did not see why there should be any fear that European integration might lead to a loss of national identity and influence. On the contrary, it could be concluded that the Community was perfectly consistent with France's national interests and that this was equally true of the other Member States of the Community.

Mr. Rippon repeated that Britain's membership of the EEC was not inevitable. Although he was convinced that none of the problems which was the subject of negotiations was such that it could not be solved, he recalled that Britain could only enter the Community if it obtained fair conditions for its contribution to the common budget during the transitional period.

On 9 March Mr. Rippon was the guest at a dinner given by the Harvard Business School in New York. In an address to students on the problems raised by Britain's application to join the European Community he said: 'American support for the idea of the European Community and its enlargement has always been based on its political content.

Some have looked forward to the foundation of a United States of Europe on the American model. That, I believe, is a mistaken vision.

Certainly the Europeans, whose glory is their diversity and whose strength rises from the roots of their national particularities, are not at present thinking in such terms.

The current debate between Federalists and Confederalists has its fascinations as an intellectual exercise but is, at the present stage of European development artificial and irrelevant.

The reality is elsewhere. What is happening in Europe is a growth - an organic growth - in political cohesion and harmonization across the whole range of policy.

This growth may be unspectacular, but of small things great things come, and the pace has quickened since the Summit Meeting of The Hague.

As President Pompidou has rightly said:

'It is a question of making progress in deeds rather than words and of testing change as one goes along.'

Cohesion means many things. It will, I think, be characterized in the Community by a sharing of functions in the political as well as economic fields.

The existence of a Community budget which will have its own sources of income is of immense significance.

Already the present Community has gone one step further in its recent agreement to move, albeit cautiously, towards the long-term aim of economic and monetary union.

The British Government shares this aim and will make its full contribution if the enlargement negotiations succeed.

We see no problem over the reserve role of sterling and look forward to the evolution of a common monetary policy and perhaps in the long run a common European currency.

The constitutional historians know that he who controls the money controls the power.

At present the money in the Community budget is controlled by the representatives of the national governments concerned and in the last resort will continue to be so. But there is already a need for another balancing sort of control. Hence the movement, foreseen in the Treaty of Rome, towards an increase in the powers of the European Parliament.

There will also be movement towards harmonization of social and regional policies.

Where common standards in such fields are agreed, as I hope they will be, the process will be one of levelling upwards, to meet the highest standards obtaining in the enlarged Community and not of levelling down.

The whole process must allow flexibility. There must be constant respect for the authority of national parliaments as well as regional autonomy and tradition. This is vital not only because of Europe's varied past: it is also in keeping with the contemporary need, shared by you, to avoid excessive centralization and to encourage local initiative and participation ...

Undoubtedly the enlarged Community would have a defence aspect. There are many Americans who feel that for too long the United States has shouldered a disproportionate share of European defence. You supported the idea of a European defence community in the 1950s, and I have no doubt that your present administration would welcome the development of something comparable now or in the future.

That is also our view. Without in any way wishing to imperil the Atlantic Alliance or diminish the American commitment to Europe, we think that the instruments of the Alliance need re-examination and that Europe should assume greater responsibility than she now does for her own defence.

Frankly I doubt if we shall get very far in that respect until the central issue of enlargement has been decided. Only then and in those circumstances could we hope to find the necessary political will to establish new methods of working together, new means of dovetailing our resources and new possibilities for something commensurate with our political and economic potentialities.



Unless the Community is enlarged, the dangers of conflict will remain. Indeed they could take on classic proportions. The history of Europe has too often been one of continental blocs versus coalitions of the maritime and other powers on the periphery of Europe. Failure this time would surely reopen the wounds of the past and engender a bitterness which could gravely damage the unity and strength not only of Europe but of the free world as a whole.'

(Le Monde, 28 February/1 March 1971 and UK Delegation to the European Communities)

4. A British Member of Parliament calls for the transfer of the European Parliament to London

In a short speech at the end of the conference of the Parliamentary Council of the European Movement at Lancaster House, on 12 and 13 February Mr. Norman St. John-Stevas, Conservative MP for Chelmsford, said that at some time in the future the European Parliament would have to have a permanent home. He suggested that if Britain entered the EEC, the European Parliament should be in London 'close to the mother of Parliament itself'.

(The Times, 15 February 1971)

## United States

### 1. British application to join the Common Market given fresh US support

Mr. Philip Trezise, US Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, gave an assurance that Washington continues to support British entry to the European Economic Community. It was a development, he said, desirable for the whole world. Mr. Trezise was speaking, on 19 January, at the end of a two-day visit to Brussels, during which he discussed various difficulties between the United States and the EEC. Some of these are related to British entry or could be aggravated by it, he said, but they did not affect Washington's policy of support.

The issues were mainly commercial and economic, and he hoped that it would be possible to find constructive solutions. Washington had already made known its views on some points, and it would continue to do so, largely in private conversations with those concerned.

The main American concern, Mr. Trezise said, was with the EEC's common agricultural policy and the prospect of its extension to Britain. There was also anxiety over the prospect of developing countries in the Commonwealth being included in the EEC's system of association agreements, and he had discussed this with members of the European Commission.

Mr. Trezise's visit was the latest in a series by officials of both sides. The visits began when the differences between the United States and the EEC became acute and the exchanges acrimonious. The aim has been to try and lower the temperature by going into the differences in detailed discussions.

At a press conference, Mr. Trezise conceded that trade between the United States and the EEC continued in general to thrive. However, the trade problems were 'not inconsiderable'.

In his talks with the Commission, he said, he had discussed such questions as the international grain trade and the competitive subsidies given to poultry exports by both the United States and the EEC. He had also raised recent American complaints that exports of tobacco and citrus fruit were likely to be hit by EEC policies.

The United States, he said, was prepared to take these points up in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in Geneva, and regarded the discussions in Brussels as a necessary preliminary. On the other hand, it still preferred to deal with such problems on a bilateral basis and would have further discussions with the EEC.

(The Times, 20 January 1971)

## 2. Speech by President Nixon to Congress on US foreign policy

On 25 February, President Nixon made an important speech in Congress on US foreign policy in the decade 1970-1980. After a general introduction the President immediately turned to European matters.

In a paragraph entitled 'The Challenge of European Unity', he said: 'The European Community is on the threshold of a momentous advance. Last year, the Commission of the Community began negotiating with Great Britain, Norway, Denmark and Ireland for their full membership. It opened talks with Sweden, Austria, Switzerland, and other members of the European Free Trade Association looking toward some form of relationship. The prospect of an expanded Community - and the determination which emerged to move toward monetary and economic union - make the Community a potential economic giant. If these come to pass, the major economies of the continent will be combined into a vast industrial power second only to the United States.

Our friends must soon decide, then, how they see Europe's role in the world and its relationship with us. The form and degree of its unity is for Europeans to settle. The United States has always supported the strengthening and enlargement of the European Community. We still do. We welcome cohesion in Europe because it makes Europe a sturdier pillar of the structure of peace. Regional cohesion contributes to world stability. And America's and Western Europe's fundamental interests are parallel in most areas of policy.

For years, however, it was believed uncritically that a unified Western Europe would automatically lift burdens from the shoulders of the United States. The truth is not so simple. European unity will also pose problems for American policy, which it would be idle to ignore.

For our closest friends are now developing a collective identity and collective policies separate from us. And unity happens to be coming fastest in the economic sphere - the area of policy in which competition seems to have the least immediate penalty and our common interest will take the most effort to ensure. Each of us maintains restrictions on agricultural trade which limit the export opportunities of the other. America's main restrictions are on dairy products; the European Community's common agricultural policy restrains our exports of grains. The Community's preferential trading arrangements with Mediterranean countries are a problem for American citrus exports.

The common interest requires the prosperity of both. This means freer and expanded trade and restraint in protecting special interests. We must negotiate a reduction in our trade restrictions. We must work toward a more equitable worldwide trading system which is based upon most-favored-nation treatment among all industrial nations and in which all of them accord the same tariff preferences to the entire developing world. In short, we must define our self-interest in the widest terms and fix our sights on our fundamental rather than tactical purposes.

Both sides have a heavy responsibility, therefore, we meet in the informal regular consultation which began in 1970 between the Commission of the European Community and the United States. There have been suggestions for expanding our consultation, including the possibility of higher-level Community representation in Washington. We would welcome the implementation of any such suggestion the Community might propose - because of the importance of close consultation.

In political and military relations as well, wisdom and statesmanship will be required on both sides of the Atlantic as Europe moves toward unity.

The further evolution of European unity into other areas of policy is logical and natural; its supporters, including ourselves, have never regarded economic cohesion as an end in itself. In November, foreign ministers of Community members began semi-annual formal political consultations looking toward common positions. Ultimately we may see a single entity making policy for Western Europe in all fields, including diplomacy and defense. We would welcome this, because we believe that Western European and American interests in defense and foreign policy are complementary:

(a) In defense, geographic proximity makes the linking of our allies' defense

systems logical and feasible; their collective power makes it advantageous. But a coherent strategy of European defense, today and as far into the future as I can see, will require mutual support across the Atlantic,

- (b) In diplomacy we share basic objectives: Western security, European stability, East-West détente. Two strong powers in the West would add flexibility to Western diplomacy. Two strong powers could increasingly share the responsibilities of decision.

This will not be automatic. To link together the foreign and defense policies of a uniting Europe and the United States will be another test of our sense of community and of our ability to perceive and pursue our common interest.'

(USA documents, US Mission to the European Communities, 25 February)



## II. PARTIES AND PROMINENT POLITICIANS

### 1. The manifesto of the Belgian Christian Social Party

In January 1971 the Executive of the Christian Social Party submitted a manifesto to the general public in Belgium; this was drafted by Mr. Pierre Wigny, a member of the Chamber of Representatives and a former Minister. The manifesto was entitled 'Hunger and Thirst? - Another society'. Strictly speaking it is not a party programme but rather 'a basic appraisal of the development of modern society, the new problems it has thrown up, and the fears and hopes to which it gives rise'. In the fourth part of the manifesto dealing with 'modernized institutions' Mr. Wigny discusses European problems in these terms:

'A constant and rapid expansion of the economy presupposes large units. Europe is the only effective framework for our security, as it is for our prosperity, because it enables us to invent the most advanced technology.

But what kind of a Europe are we talking about? The Christian Social Party considers that it can only be a federal Europe - a politically united Europe that respects the personality and independence of its member groups, a political organization in which Belgium would have its say without losing its identity or becoming a subject State, and in which in association with its partners, it would enjoy the advantages of being a great power, through action taken by a genuine common political authority in fields lying, as it were, beyond the national capacity.

Such a European political authority has become necessary in order to complete, consolidate and democratize the Common Market which, unless a minimum of federalism is accepted by the Six and their future associates, cannot avoid stagnation or technocracy or be able to work out common policies in the financial, monetary and technological fields, or pass from the stage of a simple economic area to economic and monetary union.

As soon as possible the European political authority must also be entrusted with responsibility for foreign affairs and defence. For the purpose of its security and its modernization Community Europe is the smallest unit compatible with independence and a determination to play a part in the world.

Policy is circumscribed by the means of carrying it out. A federal organization is the prerequisite for any policy of Atlantic partnership, of an opening to the East and of genuine détente. Only this will make the introduction of a regional system of collective security in Europe credible.

The full application of the federal formula obviously presupposes that the European spirit should prevail over national interests in deciding on the policy to be followed. This implies a psychological revolution which will take time. But all recent public opinion polls show unmistakably that such a revolution has to a large extent already taken place in all six countries and that the general public is taking a, to say the least, permissive attitude to the idea of a genuine political federation. Unfortunately the psychological revolution has progressed much less - except in words - among the political leaders. Only when the attitude of the European public passes from permissiveness to commitment and becomes militant, will it be able to shake the conservatism and pusillanimity of the national governments.

This European opinion will be aired and strengthened when the electorate has the right to choose its own representatives in the Parliament in Strasbourg. Belgium must take the initiative here, if necessary unilaterally.

In the meantime it must take steps to ensure that the Community institution operates on supranational lines. Indeed the present system, if honestly applied, will guarantee efficiency and fairness: it is the ministers and politicians responsible who decide; but where a majority is enough, their decision must be based on a proposal from the European Commission, which is the supranational body, that is a body which is independent of the Member States and represents the European interest.

Immediate institutional reforms should pave the way for the necessary progress towards a federation: greater influence on the part of the Commission (a greater freedom of initiative, closer dialogue with the ministers, management of an autonomous budget); effectiveness of the Council (majority voting); control by the Parliament (appointment of the Commission; presence of one member of the Council of Ministers at sittings to be obligatory; a greater number of opinions with which the decision of the Executive, if it is taken, must comply; a vote on the budget at least in so far as it is financed from the Community's own resources).'

In this manifesto Mr. Wigny again looked into the regional problem and the universal aims of Europe.



He concluded: 'The Christian Social Party trusts that the Community will spread to the extreme limits of geographical Europe; but this cannot be done if it means diluting our ideals or weakening our institutions. Those who are not content to be "associated" with certain benefits but who wish to join the Community Europe, that is to share in the determination of its policy, must accept its democratic ideal and the Community mould. Enlarging the Community will only make sense if it increases the ability of the peoples of Europe to control their fate and exert an influence over the future of mankind.'

(Document furnished by the Christian Social Party)

## 2. The Italian Social Democratic Party (PSDI) and European problems

At a conference in Florence on 5 and 6 January, the PSDI examined various aspects of European policy and more particularly the progress being made by the Community institutions towards integration.

In a resolution drafted during the conference and unanimously adopted on 14 January by the Foreign Affairs Section of the party, the Italian Social Democrats, while pointing out the 'major gaps which still impede the process of European unification especially as regards the powers of the European Parliament, the enlargement of the Community, social policy, aid to the associated developing states, technological and transport policy', declared their support 'for the work which the Commission and European Parliament are trying to do and for the aims they have set themselves which must be achieved before it is possible to move on to other, more effective objectives.'

The resolution goes on to pledge the PSDI's support for defence of the Commission's independence, the granting of wider powers to the European Parliament, which must be made more democratic through its election by direct universal suffrage, and the limitation of the powers of the Committee of Permanent Representatives, which are all essential conditions for material progress towards economic and monetary union, technological co-ordination and the enlargement of the Community to include the applicant countries.'

Confirming that economic integration was a prerequisite for political integration, the PSDI invited the Italian Government to be consistent with the repeated affirmations of faith in Europe made by its members and to take

into account the process of integration in working out and implementing its policies for reform in the sphere of taxation and education as well as in the regional and social sectors.

It was 'convinced that the defence of democracy in Italy is a prerequisite for progress towards a united Europe' and had called upon the Government 'to show its political will by stimulating and encouraging popular participation in the construction of Europe within the framework of the democratic traditions of the member countries of the Community'.

Meeting at Rome on 6-9 February, the first national congress of the PSDI passed a motion:

'denouncing national resistance, which is still retarding the process of European unification;

drawing attention to the gaps in the present Community structure, above all as regards the powers of the European Parliament, the enlargement of the Community, and technological and transport policy;

pledging its full support for the work of the Commission of the Community and the European Parliament and the objectives these bodies are pursuing.'

The congress therefore authorized the delegation which will represent the PSDI at the VIII Congress of Socialist Parties of the European Community:

'to support the independence of the Commission, the granting of wider powers to the European Parliament, the election of its members by direct universal suffrage and the limitation of the powers of the Committee of Permanent Representatives of the Member States, so that it will be possible to work in a more effective spirit of harmony and create the conditions for more profitable activity linked with the solution of the serious social problems which now exist, the implementation of an economic and monetary union, the coordination of scientific and technological policy and the enlargement of the Community to include the applicant countries;

to stress the fact that the European Social Democrats cannot under any circumstances tolerate any limitation or delay in the process of European integration and unification.'

The PSDI, as a popular international party, must encourage the Eighth Congress to strengthen the links between European Social Democrats and grant certain powers to the new liaison office to determine the policy of

the parties in the Community: as a workers' party representing a State with certain serious factors of disequilibrium and heavy emigration, the PSDI must call upon the European Congress to lay down the principles and action for a valid harmonized social and community policy.

Convinced that the defence of democracy in Italy was essential to the achievement of a united Europe, the Congress:

'authorizes the new Executive to lead the Party with renewed energy in a policy of reform which will accelerate the process of deprovincialization of our country and start an irreversible upward movement towards the European level;

invites the Italian Government to live up to its repeated affirmations of faith in Europe and contribute towards the reforms and process of Community integration which are now under way;

finally, calls for a firm undertaking by all the parties in the majority group of the Centre and Left to approve in Parliament Bill No. 706 providing for the unilateral election by direct suffrage of the Italian representatives in the European Parliament, so that the peoples' participation in the work of European unification can be encouraged within the framework of the democratic traditions of the member countries.'

(Proceedings of the National Congress 'The PSU and European Problems'  
5-6 January;  
Umanità, 17 February 1971)

### 3. The Italian Liberal Party is committed to Europe

The 12th National Congress of the Italian Liberal Party was held in Rome from 9 to 15 January.

Problems dealt with included the policy of European integration.

The participants in the Congress passed a resolution calling upon the executive bodies of the Party to 'continue the action already undertaken to obtain approval in Italy for the bill for direct election of the Italian members to the European Parliament; this campaign is part of the more general struggle to defend and strengthen democracy in modern society.'

The 'New Liberty' motion, adopted by a majority, goes on to state that the PLI subscribes wholeheartedly to the policy designed to establish conditions for peaceful co-existence between the nations of the world on the basis of freedom, independence, and respect for human dignity, and considers it essential to strengthen the moral authority and prestige of the United Nations Organization as a universal assembly in which the nations can meet to settle their disputes and conflicts of interests. In this context it approves the Ostpolitik of the Federal German Republic, provided that this policy is pursued in a context of solidarity with democratic Europe - for whose political and economic unification the PLI has been working - while at the same time hoping for enlargement to include the other democratic countries of Europe. The PLI considers it equally indispensable to maintain the Atlantic Alliance as a political and military structure to promote civilization and freedom.

Finally the 'Liberal Italy' motion calls upon the Party to facilitate further development of the organization of the European Community through monetary and financial unification and above all by campaigning for election by direct suffrage of the European Parliament which, given the necessary constituent powers, can draw up the constitution of a federal State on democratic and liberal lines so as to progressively eliminate national barriers, without destroying the special characteristics of the different nations, and prevent the resurgence of nationalist or racial aberrations.'

( La Nuova Tribuna, February-March;  
Posizione Liberale, 10 February 1971)

#### 4. CDU policy on Europe

In an article published in 'Deutschland-Union-Dienst' on 12 January 1971 Mr. Ernst Majonica, CDU member of the Bundestag and Chairman of the German Council of the European Movement, discussed current European questions.

'For 1971, there are three great problems that must be solved if Europe is not to relapse into the state of inactivity from which it was aroused by the summit conference at The Hague. The Werner Plan must assume a binding form with definite time-limits. The negotiations for entry must be concluded and cooperation in foreign affairs must be taken a stage further. All three problems are closely interrelated. If the Werner Plan provoked a serious crisis, that would adversely affect the negotiations. If the Community

were then to become so involved in its own affairs that it had hardly any time for the applicant States, the resulting crisis would strengthen the forces opposing entry in the United Kingdom. Such a crisis would also destroy the small beginnings of cooperation in foreign policy. 1971 will thus decide whether the many speeches made were meant to be taken seriously or whether they were simply a shabby substitute for action.

The Werner Plan takes pride of place. An economic and monetary union would give the Community the dynamism it needs to deal with the tasks facing it. To ensure the Plan succeeds, it must be pegged to definite time-limits. This conclusion is borne out by experience with the Common Market. If this were not the case there would be no pressure to move on from one phase to the next. The measures and coordination machinery scheduled for the first (experimental) phase might be enough but the second stage must be so well prepared during the first one as to allow for the transition to the final stage.

To this end the necessary powers must be transferred to the Community bodies for them to take the necessary measures to establish an economic and monetary union. Unless the European bodies are able to operate efficiently it will be unsuccessful. The directly-elected Parliament must be allowed to participate and have appropriate supervisory powers. There must be serious discussions with France about these points. If France opts out here it will not be keeping the promise it made at The Hague. It would be a serious mistake not to take the institutional problems seriously. We know how hard it is to pursue an economic policy geared to cyclical trends within the context of a nation-State, although here the necessary tools are to hand. How much more difficult it is to carry through such an economic and monetary policy in the European context where there are not only the interests of private groups but also those of the partner States to coordinate and balance off against each other. Logically, therefore, the central bodies must be even stronger than they are in the nation-State. If they are weaker, however - and this unfortunately is what we must expect initially - the participating States will have to exercise much greater discipline to achieve coordination and stability...

Under the Werner Plan, moreover, a European central bank must be set up that is independent both of Community bodies and of Member States. Its measures should tally with the economic policy guidelines of the Community bodies, and its status should be similar to that of the former Bank of German Länder. To achieve this, national central banks should cooperate more and more closely during the experimental phase. In the final phase there would have to be a European central bank whose federal character would have to be protected by requiring the presidents of national central banks to sit and vote on the executive, whose function would be to centralize monetary

policy decision-taking.

The implementation of the Werner Plan calls for progress in other areas of the Community, particularly in the institutional field. This would ensure that the accession of the four applicant States does not weaken the Community. The broader the Community is, the stronger its institutions must be. Hence the practice of majority decisions on the Council of Ministers must finally be introduced. The unanimity principle has a disintegrating effect; it would become disastrous if the Community comprised ten countries. With ten countries it is hardly to be expected that unanimous decisions will lead to the best solutions. Solutions would then be found at the unacceptable level of the least resistance and would, in practice, be no solution at all.

A dynamic Community strengthened by new members and economic and monetary union would be under increasing pressure to pursue a common external policy... If the foreign policy were to become a Community matter this would mean pressure in favour of coordination of external trade. The institutional basis for such a common external policy is still negligible and must be developed. The next step should consist in preparations of the conference of foreign ministers being transferred from national administrations to a European body which would work out an "all-European" approach on the basis of proposals.

1971 is the decisive year for Europe. Decisions in and for Europe have world-wide implications. The policy of détente will only be successful - having regard to American problems and the line pursued by the East European States - if it is pursued, from the ground upwards, by a united Europe. One should not overlook the power policy aspect of efforts to achieve equality. But power only grows from unity, and not a single European State possesses it. Western European integration is the answer to the questions facing us ...'

Discussing the decisions of the EEC Council of Ministers and the establishment of the European economic and monetary union in 'Deutschland-Union-Dienst' on 11 February, Mr. Erik Blumenfeld, Chairman of the Coordinating Committee on European policy, stated on behalf of the CDU/CSU Group that the initiation of the stage-by-stage plan was to be welcomed even though the Council decisions were in the form of a resolution and not binding. The way things would go depended decisively on whether it was possible in the next few years to coordinate the economic and cyclical policies of the individual Member States and to entrust them increasingly to Community institutions because cooperation restricted to monetary policy cooperation would be scrappy and could not survive on its own indefinitely. The 'safety' clauses agreed under pressure from Mr. Schiller were no doubt useful although it was doubtful whether they would actually work. The European

agricultural policy, which had come to a dead end, could yield useful lessons here. Mr. Blumenfeld advocated efforts to achieve economic and monetary union hand in hand with political unification; that was the basis of the European Community.

(Deutschland-Union-Dienst, 12 January and 11 February 1971;  
Informationsdienst des Deutschen Rates der Europäischen Bewegung, No. 1  
25 January 1971).

##### 5. Agricultural Congress of the Dutch Labour Party

On 21 January the Labour Party organized an agricultural congress at Zwolle at which Mr. Mansholt, Vice-President of the European Commission, Mr. Vredeling, a member of the European Parliament, Mr. van der Ploeg, the representative of the Agricultural Workers, and Mr. Den Uyl, Group Chairman in the Second Chamber, were among the speakers.

As regards his own mandate Mr. Mansholt said that the European Commission should not let the Council set aside its structural proposals for agriculture and deal exclusively with increases in prices for the third time running. Discussing the way that agricultural incomes were lagging behind those of other branches of the economy in the EEC, he said that it was a question of whether the process of catching up was to go on being a long drawn-out process or not. Over the next twelve years real incomes in industry and in the service sectors would double so that, to catch up and keep pace, agricultural incomes must triple during this period. Price policy was not the most appropriate means to that end. The great handicap facing farmers was high interest rates. Many investments in agriculture were furthermore unprofitable. Mr. Mansholt pointed out that 88 per cent of the agricultural units in the European Community were too small. Hence, the aims of the Commission's proposals were (i) to induce a further drift of manpower away from the land (ii) cooperation and an increase in scale and (iii) lower cost prices and greater profitability. Mr. Mansholt warned that price increases would only benefit the larger enterprises already operating; they would hardly help the smaller ones at all. Price increases would furthermore bring with them the risk of production surpluses. Besides, if Britain joined, the fact that the Council would have to be unanimous would mean there would be no chance of an increase in prices because the lower British prices would first have to be brought up to the currently higher Community levels. Finally Mr. Mansholt discussed the proposal, which he agreed with, to set up an agricultural bank in the Netherlands.

Mr. Vredeling said that the agricultural bank envisaged by the Dutch Wellen Committee had been forced through by the younger groups because the Dutch Government was not in favour of it. In the proposal reference was made to an interest rate of four per cent which seemed to Mr. Vredeling to be rather high, bearing in mind the need to improve agricultural incomes. He furthermore warned that the Government could not go on losing money through the agricultural bank. For one of the aims of Mr. Mansholt's proposals was to make agricultural enterprises profitable.

Mr. Van der Ploeg said that the structural improvements, with appropriate retraining regulations and so forth, had to take the place of a price policy geared mainly to budgetary considerations; later, the creation of employment opportunities (under a European regional policy) should be the driving force behind the rationalization of agriculture.

At the end of the Congress Mr. Den Uyl emphasized that production control and an agricultural bank had to be established; this boiled down to greater responsibilities for the Communities and the national administrations. He added nevertheless that the more the government interfered, the more the farmers should have a say. In future the Labour Party proposed direct elections to the agricultural product and trade organizations.

("De Boerderij", 3 February 1971)

6. Mr. Jean de Broglie indicates his support for a 'real rather than constitutional Europe'.

'From emotions to efficiency in Europe' is the title of an article by Mr. Jean de Broglie, President of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the National Assembly, published by the journal 'Economie', in which the author analyzes European problems one year after the Hague conference.

Mr. de Broglie believes that the Hague summit conference 'was a kind of political package deal. France gave its agreement to Britain's application for membership in return for final consolidation of the agricultural market of the Six. By accepting the bargain proposed by the French, the Six, whether they were aware of it or not, lowered the temperature and removed an element of passion and emotion from Europe and the Europeans. The trend shifted from progress of the supranational idea to progress of the spirit of compromise. The first effective result of the Hague conference was the burial of Robert Schuman's Europe.'



The Hague was also a recognition of the success and inadequacies of the Common Market. As a result of this recognition it was agreed to establish an economic and monetary union. This plan led to the Werner Report. The authors of this report, who perhaps did not fully realize what had happened at The Hague, thought they could draft a plan leading not only to the transfer of responsibilities from national to Community level but also to the transformation of a number of Community bodies, i. e. to institutional reform.

The Brussels Commission, which is better informed, has already pruned and watered down the plan. The reaction in Paris is nonetheless reserved and only limited decisions are likely. The true direction suggested at The Hague is that of monetary cooperation and not of a monetary merger, just as tomorrow it will be that of meetings on economic and social policy instead of integration in these areas.

The same holds good for political Europe. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs met and adopted the Davignon Report. Let us recall the terms of their mission as it was defined at The Hague: the Heads of State expressed "their common belief in a Europe grouping together States which have united in their national diversity". The fact that these States will retain their individual character is stressed. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs therefore simply established machinery for political consultation. The spirit of The Hague is certainly closer to the concept which French Governments have long held of Europe.

The truth is that at The Hague the French negotiators obtained a change of emphasis after carefully evaluating the new direction and different rate of progress which would inevitably result.

This drift towards a Europe which is real rather than constitutional, has looser ties and is voluntary rather than forcibly merged, is no doubt desirable in itself. It takes into account the complex interests at stake and enables us to wait for opportunities. It puts us in a better position to await Britain's entry and avoids external reactions. A Europe built too hastily with a superficial structure would provoke political reactions in the East and economic reactions in the West.

The path which leads from The Hague to Europe allows for enlargement; but above all it leads to a Europe based on consultation. One is reminded of that specifically French form of hospitality which opens the drawing room to guests but does not let them enter other parts of the house.

Nevertheless it is possible to do a great deal in a drawing room: to meet and cooperate; perhaps, in the last resort, it will be better for Europe to present a united but at the same time diversified image of itself. Europe's true influence in the world will not necessarily result from its uniformity.'

(L'Economie, 25 January 1971)

#### 7. Mr. Pierre Mendès-France on the problems of European monetary union

Late in February several newspapers printed an article by Mr. Mendès-France, former President of the Council, on the prospects for a successful monetary union in Europe.

In his opinion the decisions taken by the Council of Ministers on 8 February were 'heavily mortgaged'. Some basic decisions: 'merely repeat old declarations which have so far proved idle while others call for further clarification so that it is impossible to reach a final verdict for the time being. It is apparent that the basic parameters of the monetary problem will be completely changed if Britain joins the Community.' The success of the monetary union will also depend on 'a real agreement on the final nature of the unified structure and a genuine will to cooperate, accept discipline and work towards progressive integration in political and economic terms'.

Examining the Council's decisions, Mr. Mendès-France felt that they were infinitely more prudent and modest than the European payments union proposed only recently. 'Consideration is now being given to the establishment of a system which is all in all much less of a Community system. In the Werner Plan the terms of reference of the European Monetary Co-operation Fund are only vaguely sketched in, no precise obligation is imposed on its members and it will only become an institution to manage the reserves of the Member States in the distant future. A report is to be prepared on these points by 30 June 1972.'

Referring to the reduction of the range of parity fluctuation between the six currencies, the former President of the Council writes: 'As the governors of the issuing banks themselves stated this will in no way ensure success for a progressive common economic policy. At all events if fluctuations in parity are in future to be held between closer ceilings and floors the issuing banks will have to intervene more frequently on the market; this means that

some countries will use up their money reserves more quickly and implies support by other Member States in one form or another with inevitable political consequences.

For several months now the French Government has been hoping that a decision to limit margins of fluctuation would be taken rapidly and unconditionally so that France, if it is threatened, will be supported by Community intervention in particular from Germany, because the Federal Republic today has substantial monetary reserves. The German Government on the other hand is urging the need for common economic discipline to be established at the same time. The Federal Republic hopes in this way to exert pressure and control over the countries which tomorrow will be aided financially by it.

Until Europe has a more homogeneous and coherent economic policy, it will inevitably continue to be the centre of confrontation between two distrustful attitudes:

- distrust on the part of the countries whose economic policy is weak and are afraid that they will be subject to domination by their rich and more powerful partners;
- distrust on the part of those countries whose economy and currency are strong and are afraid that they may be obliged to give voluntary support to their less 'serious' partners.

(Tageblatt, 26 February, 1971;  
Il Giorno, 28 February, 1971)

8. Position of the Italian Communist Party on the European Community:  
the Party's experience in the European Parliament

On 2 February Mr. Amendola explained to international press representatives in Italy the Italian Communist Party's position on the European Economic Community, on the basis of its experience in the European Parliament.

Mr. Amendola stressed the Parliament's lack of effective power by comparison with the Council of Ministers and Economic Commission, within which relations are organized on diplomatic principles, i. e. on the basis of respective strength. Under these conditions it was meaningless to

talk about supranationalism: there was merely a measure of political and technical coordination at executive level.

In reality the idea of supranationalism centred on the transfer of powers from individual States to a kind of centralized super-State which would reproduce on a larger scale the difficulties encountered at present in controlling economic phenomena. Faced with realities such as the formation of multinational companies and the phenomenon of inflation exported by the United States, it was essential to create new powers to dominate these processes. They should also deal with matters such as the protection of nature, scientific research, etc.

'It would be completely idle to propose targets such as full economic integration by 1980 while the imbalance between the level of development of different areas of the Community continues and even deteriorates.' A more realistic approach was needed. For example it was desirable to propose the coordination of monetary policies as a defence against the dollar. What was needed for this purpose was not so much a single currency as effective coordination of banking and credit measures. Realistic, cooperative steps must therefore be proposed without sudden leaps forward. Mr. Amendola went on to speak of relations between the Community and the rest of the world. The idea that there was a complete identity of interests and objectives between the Community and the United States was now being replaced by the concept of a separation of interests which was particularly clear at the monetary level but also had political repercussions.

Relations with socialist countries of Eastern Europe also seemed to be on the point of changing. The Italian Communist Party had called upon the Community to take part in the process of détente, e.g. by making a contribution to the discussions leading up to a European security conference which had been proposed by the socialist countries. Mr. Brandt's policy was moving in that direction. A *modus vivendi* must be found with the socialist countries of Europe at every level, ranging from the development of bilateral and inter-State relations to relations between the Community and individual socialist countries and between the EEC and COMECON.

The Communists therefore thought it would be desirable to associate the security conference with a European economic conference in order to enlarge the framework of cooperation and the international division of labour, taking in the two Communities and non-associated countries.

Replying to questions by journalists, Mr. Amendola referred to other problems:

Great Britain's entry: the problem was to determine what Great Britain's motive was for joining the Community: did it wish to pursue a genuine Community policy (which would mean the end of its 'special relationship' with the USA and its 'East of Suez' policy) or did it want to disturb Community life in the name of those foreign interests?

Powers and election of the European Parliament: the Communists wanted the European Parliament to be elected by universal suffrage, provided that a single electoral system was adopted to guarantee maximum representativeness. The Parliament could then become the centre of a process of unification of the Left with a democratic programme at Community level.

(L'Unità, 3 February 1971)

9. Resolution of the Congress of the Dutch Labour Party on democratic control in the European Communities

The Congress of the Labour Party held in Rotterdam on 6 February passed the following resolution:

The Congress,

- considering that in the process of economic integration and the emergence of power the social democratic movements in the European Communities are lagging far behind in integrating and cooperating with each other;
- considering that effective democratic control in an expanding Europe presupposes first and foremost wider powers for the European Parliament and a transnational alliance of like-minded political movements;
- considering that the social democratic groupings in the European Communities should receive considerable reinforcement from the accession of the United Kingdom, Norway and Denmark;
- instructs the Party Executive to draw up a proposal in 1971 for a European Congress of the Social Democratic parties, to be convened if possible in 1972, and to submit this proposal as soon as possible to the parties cooperating on the liaison bureau of the Socialist parties of the European Communities, to the parties cooperating in the Socialist Group of the European Parliament, and to the Socialist parties of the countries that have applied for membership of the Communities;
- calls on the Party Executive to draw up, as the Dutch contribution to the decisions of the Congress, a draft plan for a European social democratic

emergency programme and submit this for discussion, through associated parties, to all who wish to achieve a union of the progressive movements in Europe on this basis;

- believes that this European Congress must be able to secure the agreement of all the parties present to the taking of decisions binding on the parties and groupings represented there, and that it must lead to a federative partnership with the acceptance of majority decisions as a transitional phase towards the creation of a progressive European party;
- instructs its Executive to put forward proposals to a party congress, before the European Congress is held, concerning the emergency programme to be drawn up at the European Congress and the line to be followed by the Party's representatives.

(Partijkrant van de Partij van de Arbeid, February 1971)

10. Speech by Mr. Enoch Powell, a former Conservative Minister, against British membership of the European Communities

While the Prime Minister, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister responsible for European Affairs were vigorously asserting Britain's will to join the European Community, opposition to the British application was growing.

Mr. Enoch Powell, the leader of the anti-Marketeters in the Conservative Party, visited the European Community countries to publicize his categorical opposition. He made the following statement to the Association of Free Enterprise Managers in Lyons on 12 February:

'One of the subjects of negotiation is the size of the British quota of the Community's common budget, which will presently accrue automatically from the yield of certain defined taxes in all the member countries. One of these taxes is the value-added tax, a percentage of the yield of which is to be paid into the Community revenues, to be applied by the Community centrally. It follows that there would not only have to be a value-added tax in Britain but that it would have to be precisely the same tax, with the same exemptions and the same incidence, as in the other countries. Now at present Britain has no VAT and the questions whether this new tax should be introduced, how it should be levied, and what should be its scope, would be matters of debate in the country and in Parliament. The essence of parliamentary

democracy lies in the power to debate and impose taxation: it is the vital principle of the British House of Commons, from which all the other aspects of its sovereignty ultimately derive.

With Britain in the Community one important element of taxation would be taken automatically, necessarily and permanently out of the hands of the House of Commons. This is something quite different from an undertaking by Britain to subscribe, for instance, so much to the various agencies of the United Nations: no one in consequence takes out of our hands the decision what taxes to levy and how and on whom.

Here, in microcosm, is the logic of that harmonization which none can deny to be inherent in the nature of the Community. What is true of the value-added tax, applies, with parity of reasoning, to every other subject of harmonization. Those matters which sovereign parliaments debate and decide must be debated and decided not by the British House of Commons but in some other place, and by some other body, and debated and decided once and for the whole Community.

There is no need to resort to theory and speculation to ascertain whether membership of the Community means the loss of national sovereignty: the fact is implicit in the very negotiations themselves as they proceed at Brussels through a mass of seeming detail. The popular instinct in Britain, that this is what it is really all about, is right.

Whether the answer should be yes or no, for accession or against accession, depends on whether the people of Britain will accept the voice of the people of the whole Community as binding upon them - at first in some, then in more and more, and finally in all the essential matters of fiscal, social, economic and political determination. When I say "accept", I mean accept heartily and willingly, no less than the people of all parts of the United Kingdom today accept as self-evidently binding upon them the fiscal, social, economic and political decisions of Her Majesty's Government and of the British Parliament, resting upon the electorate of the United Kingdom.

In brief, can we be, and will we be, one electorate, one constituency, one nation, with you and with the rest of the people of the Community? I do not believe that anyone who knows Britain can doubt that the answer to that question is no.

It may be said that neither would the electorate of any of the founder members of the Community answer that question in the affirmative at this moment, and that consequently the fact that the British cannot is irrelevant.

Even if this were true of your own countries - and it is no business of mine to judge whether it is or not - I believe there are several reasons why the argument is not valid. In what I am about to say I mean no slightest depreciation either of the institutions or of the national identity of any of the nations of the continent or the tenacity with which that identity has been formed and defended. Nevertheless, it is a fact that the British Parliament and its paramount authority occupies a position in relation to the British nation which no other elective assembly in Europe possesses. Take Parliament out of the history of England and that history itself becomes meaningless. Whole lifetimes of study cannot exhaust the reasons why this fact has come to be; but fact it is, so that the British nation could not imagine itself except with and through its parliament. Consequently the sovereignty of our parliament is something other for us than what your assemblies are for you.

What is equally significant, your assemblies, unlike the British Parliament, are the creation of deliberate political acts, and mostly of recent political acts. The notion that a new sovereign body can be created is therefore as familiar to you as it is repugnant, not to say unimaginable, to us. That deliberate and recent creation of sovereign assemblies on the Continent is in turn an aspect of the fact that the Continent is familiar, and familiar in the recent past, with the creation of nation States themselves. Four of the six members of the Community came into existence as such no more than a century or a century-and-a-half ago - within the memory of two lifetimes. You will not imagine that I am treating with less than profound respect the historical and human background to the *risorgimento*, or to the rise of the modern German State, or to the establishment of the two kingdoms in the Low Countries. I say only, what I believe cannot be contested, that it is far more natural for nations with this kind of experience to imagine and participate in the further creation of new sovereign political entities in Europe than it is for us. An outside observer is not therefore surprised that the French, who of all the Six most resemble ourselves in the duration and natural evolution of their national identity, appear to have more difficulty than the other five members in giving an affirmative reply to that question which the British instinctively answer in the negative.

It would be wrong not to add one thing more which contributes to the British response. An essential element in forming a single electorate is the sense that in the last resort all parts of it stand or fall, survive or perish, together. This sense the British do not share with the inhabitants of the Continent of Western Europe. Of all the nations of Europe, Britain and Russia alone, although for opposite reasons, have this in common; they can be defeated in the decisive land battle and still survive. This characteristic Russia owes to her immensity. Britain owes it to her ditch. The British feel - and I believe that instinct corresponds with sound military reason - that the ditch is as significant in what we call the nuclear age as it proved to be in the air age and had been in the age of the Grande Armée of Napoleon or



the Spanish infantry of Philip II. The proposition is not one to be developed here; I must content myself with barely stating it. Error or truth, myth or reality, the belief itself is a habit of mind which has helped to form the national identity of the British and cannot be divorced from it. I began by mentioning that I personally had been and still am a fervent advocate of Britain's military commitment on the Continent. I am not contradicting this when I say that the British commitment on the Continent, psychologically and materially, must always be limited; it can never be total. Yet total commitment is implicit in the merging of sovereignty in the unification of an electorate.

That assertion brings me to the last thing that I want to say, which is indeed the reason for my speaking at all. It is often urged in Britain that one need not take too seriously the commitment of the Community to political unity, and that because the realization of that Community, if it is realized at all, will be gradual, there is no reason against taking into membership of the Community a Britain which is not merely neutral but positively hostile towards political unification - if unification comes, the British will have grown used to it (in the jargon this is disguised as "the habit of working together"), and if it does not come anyhow, no harm will have been done. I totally dissent. It is not for Britain to gauge the sincerity of the Community's member governments and of the public opinion behind them. It is not for us to judge what you ought to want to do. What would be as dishonourable as foolish would be for Britain and her people to allow the Treaty of Rome to be signed on their behalf with mental reservations.

The enterprise of the Community is on so lofty a plane, the commitment of those who join is so solemn, that we dare not enter upon it, and you on your part dare not accept us into it, unless we can do so ex animo, with a genuine and hearty intention that in the fulness of time political as well as economic union shall come out of it. Therefore it is right that you should have no illusions about the true state of mind in Britain and not be misled by that unanimity and show of confidence which all who speak officially are in duty bound to maintain. There is a saying which we have that "the Queen wants no unwilling subjects". I cannot believe that you of the Community can want unwilling partners.'

#### 11. Statements by Mr. Jean Monnet on European unification

Mr. Jean Monnet, Chairman of the Committee for the United States of Europe, expressed the conviction that civilization in Europe is advancing toward the point where even nations that had been hostile with each other, are beginning to accept the idea of common rules and common institutions. He

was speaking on 16 February in New York at a dinner held in his honour when he accepted the special award from the Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies.

Mr. Monnet said nothing is more important for the future of mankind 'than to establish the forms which will govern relations between men'. He said the European Common Market 'is only a beginning' of the transformation taking place in the relations between the States of Europe. He said Great Britain is about to join the market and 'in a few years' there will be a European Economic and Monetary Union.

Mr. Monnet added, 'all this necessarily leads to a political authority among the nations concerned. Of these developments, President Nixon pointed out in his report to the Congress on foreign policy last February "that a truly unified Europe will be a gain to the political vitality of the West as a whole".'

Calling cooperation between the United States and Western Europe 'an essential element in the world balance', he continued: 'it must take on new form as progress is made in the integration of Europe. These developments are the best hope of mankind in the preservation of peace and the advance of civilization as we know it. But it must deal effectively with difficulties we face, and for this concrete actions are necessary.'

Mr. Monnet said 'the Kennedy Round' tariff arrangements have tackled partly the economic problems between Europe and the United States. There are still other problems to be dealt with.

'The problem of common defense, for example - while advanced through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization - has yet to be solved. This also goes for many other problems, such as the monetary problem. I believe that no separate nations in Europe can bring adequate contributions to the common task. Only Europe as a whole can satisfactorily contribute.'

'I hope for the peace of the world and for the United States itself, the great entities will be created in the world which can deal on an equal footing - Europe is beginning to do so - and I hope that in a few years of effort our European countries will have created the United States of Europe.'

By pursuing the concept of equality, Western Europe was able to accept fundamental changes in the principles of nationalism and begin to adopt

common rules and common institutions and to transfer national power to these created institutions, Mr. Monnet noted.

'It was essential to prevent the return of nationalism and of the spirit of domination which had led Europe to catastrophe ... The European Community emerged as the context in which the citizens of our countries could live in equality and obey the same rules, under common institutions, just as they lived within their national frontiers.

By the creation of common rules, the creation of common institutions - to which the powers of decisions were transferred from the national countries - we are now beginning to accept in the relations between our old and often hostile nations, the very principles that guided us within our frontiers. All that is the process of civilization. Nothing is more important than to establish the forms which will govern the relations between man.'

At the awards dinner, Mr. Monnet was cited for his contributions towards a united Europe and for recognizing that 'changing conditions in the search for peace required new concepts and new conditions.'

(USA documents, US Mission to the European Communities, February 18, 1971)

12. Mr. Rey discusses the responsibilities and means of action of the Community

The former President of the Commission of the European Communities, Mr. Rey, presented a report on 20 January 1971 to the Bank of Brussels on the responsibilities and means of action of the Community.

'With the prospect of an economic and monetary union in the near future, the Community will have to play an increasingly important role in the international monetary system. The exaggerated reign of the dollar is coming to an end. In ten years time the European currency will no doubt become a reserve currency. The monetary responsibilities of Europe are evident in that sphere.

But the former President of the Executive Commission then raised the following question: does the EEC have the necessary means of action to

assume the great responsibilities outlined above?

Mr. Jean Rey pointed to the enormous disparity between the responsibilities of the EEC and its means of action. The Community was still managed as it had been at its beginning whereas it had undergone enormous changes since. Mr. Rey believed that the Six could no longer be controlled by international conferences. The whole Community structure must be managed like a government.

There were three reasons for this disparity: first acquired habits which are not easily changed; secondly the stubborn resistance of national administrations and thirdly the opposition to what some people consider as an attempt to establish supranational control. In fact as soon as any mention is made of a common decision-taking centre (as was recently the case with the Werner Plan) a crisis arises. Mr. Rey considered that this concept of 'supranationality' was completely false. What was needed was a 'Community'. And this inevitably supposed a sole authority as was already the case on tariff and agricultural matters.

This archaic management had many unfortunate consequences, he explained. First of all disputes were only solved very slowly and then there was the ridiculous veto system imposed after the Luxembourg agreement of 1966. Mr. Rey wondered whether this agreement was still valid and if so whether it would be applied to the four new members. This was a major problem which had to be solved before the end of the negotiations otherwise many conflicts would arise as soon as new members were admitted.

Another consequence of this cumbersome administration was the delay in finalizing a statute for European companies. Work began in 1965 in the Commission and led to the publication of an original plan for a statute in June 1970. Unfortunately this plan was returned to the national experts for further study. In short it would take some time before the question was examined again.

Mr. Rey once again opposed the idea that the Council of Ministers should itself negotiate with the applicant countries. He thought this was a bad method.

Mr. Rey advocated several different courses of action to remedy this state of affairs. First of all it was necessary to return to the rules laid down in the Treaty and abolish the right of veto. Then the powers of the Executive Commission should be increased following the current pattern for

agricultural policy, i.e. there should be daily management committees stating opinions to the Commission. If the latter adopts these opinions the decisions will be binding. This system could be widened without modifying the Rome Treaty.

Mr. Rey also suggested that the EEC should appoint ambassadors in foreign countries. An official diplomatic representation for the Community in Washington would prevent a great deal of misunderstanding. In the special sphere of relations with the United States Mr. Rey recommended the establishment of a permanent cooperative body similar to those which the United States already has with Japan and Canada. This body would enable the officials of both sides to have regular contacts and meetings at a high level once or twice each year.

(L'Echo de la Bourse, 21 January 1971)

13. Mr. Willis C. Armstrong, President of the American Council of the International Chamber of Commerce, calls for liberal trade policy

In a speech to the Board of Directors of the Greater Philadelphia Chamber of Commerce on 22 February Mr. Willis C. Armstrong, President of the US Council of the International Chamber of Commerce, called for a constructive US trade policy that would reject 'the siren song of the protectionist'.

Mr. Armstrong said protectionism would increase costs, diminish exports, injure consumers and reduce payrolls. 'Our object should be to increase our integration with developed countries and to increase our openness to developing countries. This integration or coordination should be in trade, finance and monetary affairs. A close and growing link between domestic and foreign economic affairs is envisaged...

Fundamentally our trade position is strong, and assertions to the contrary sound ridiculous to our trading partners abroad. Our technology and basic production plant are excellent by every standard. But Japan and Europe also have strong economics and this is a relatively new factor which has not been quickly recognized. We find our best customers there and in Canada, and we are their best customers.

The key to future prosperity is to trade with and invest actively within these developed countries. How possible is this? Japan is a real problem in terms of our access to their market for goods and investment, but pressure is beginning to have its effect on the Japanese - a little - and more pressure needs to be applied, so that their unique system may not be so monolithic. Furthermore, an increasing number of American companies are engaging in joint ventures in Japan and this trend may well continue.

Europe, however, is the key, because it is a larger area than Japan, it is potentially more productive, and also because it can and does recognize for reasons of economics and security the essentiality of good reciprocal trading and investing relations with the United States ...

We cannot and should not try to arrest or reverse the growing integration of Western Europe, but rather we should seek to expand the integration of the United States, Canada, Western Europe and we should similarly seek to involve Japan ...

Increasing economic integration of the developed countries means a continued flow of foreign investment to the United States. It means an effort to reduce trade barriers reciprocally. It means adopting national economic policies and goals which take account of the foreign impact. It means extensive consultation, cooperation and collaboration on the problems all industrial countries have in common such as inflation, environment protection, monetary and fiscal policy, wage and cost pressures, political pressures for social expenditures, treatment of minority groups, and agricultural policy ...

In intergovernmental relations, the United States should move toward this goal by keeping pressure on the EEC not to be protectionist, diminish its agricultural support, to abide by GATT on preferences and MFN (most-favoured nation principle), and to continue to encourage American investment. The same pressure should - and will - be applied by Europeans on the United States. No great round of new trade negotiations should be expected, but rather renewed agreement among industrial countries to work toward the goal of the freest possible exchange of goods and services.. '

(USA documents, US Mission to the European Communities, 23 February 1971)

14. Mr. P. W. Spaak: Political Europe will not be built by technical organizations

'President Pompidou and Europe' is the title of an article published in the press by Mr. Spaak on 23 February.

'Has President Pompidou given us any grounds for hope by suggesting that the Europe of the future will be confederal?' he asks, and gives the following answer: 'It is not easy to follow President Pompidou's reasoning since he says that the European Confederation which should result from our joint efforts is without precedent in history and cannot be arbitrarily defined in the future.'

'It would be easy to comment ironically on this policy, which does not know where it is coming from or where it is going, but no doubt it is better to show a more comprehensive and patient attitude. It is better to hope than to denigrate.

"The confederation of states as a legal concept is endowed with specific institutions and governed by international public law; it results from an agreement between states which remain independent and propose to achieve jointly common, universal goals many of which are political."

This definition is given by Karl Strupp in his work entitled "Elements of international public law".

In practice his definition could give rise to many different solutions. They have not been specified by the President of the Republic and at first sight his suggestions seem somewhat contradictory. He believes that the quarrel of supranationality is misguided, but if one day the European confederation becomes a reality it will be necessary to have a government whose decisions will be binding on all Member States.

And the quarrel will begin again when we have to determine how these decisions will be taken, i. e. by unanimous vote or if this is impossible by a weighted majority vote.

Although I am rather sceptical I believe it would be unwise to refuse to enter into discussions. I believe that anything is preferable to the long status quo in which we have been living for more than 10 years, especially

as I am convinced that political Europe will only be achieved in stages and not without some hesitation.

On one point I agree with President Pompidou: political Europe will not be built by technical organizations. It must assume a special form of its own which is not laid down in the Treaty of Rome.

To sum up, without showing excessive pleasure or confidence, there is still room for hope. Yesterday France said "No" to European unification. Today its opposition has ceased. It believes that unification is a fatal necessity, although it continues to repeat a number of outmoded formulae. As soon as the negotiations with Britain are brought to a successful conclusion the Seven or Ten must consider again the problems raised by President Pompidou in his press conference.'

(Le Soir, 23 February 1971)

15. Interview with Mr. Scelba on the role of the European Parliament in the process of integration

Mr. Scelba, who completed his term of office as President of the European Parliament on 9 March, gave an interview to 'Il Popolo' in which he drew attention to the measures taken during his presidency to widen the role of the European Parliament. 'After my election in March 1969,' he said, 'I made it my aim to contribute to the development of a policy of European unity; I tried to use the authority of my office to obtain greater democracy in Community life by changing the balance of power between the Parliament, Council and Commission, based on the Treaties, and by strengthening the decision-making and supervisory powers of the European Parliament. Under the existing Treaties, legislative and decision-making power is almost totally reserved for the Council of the Communities consisting of ministers from the Member States, while the Commission has the main power of initiative and executive duties, and the Parliament has the right to be consulted on proposals by the Commission or Council.

Admittedly the Commission is answerable for its activities to the European Parliament and the latter can dismiss the Commission by a motion of censure, but Parliament's hands are tied by the fact that the real powers of decision lie not with the Commission but with the Council of Ministers which is not responsible to Parliament ... My first objective was therefore



to exert pressure on the Council in order to obtain practical application of the Treaty provisions, making greater allowance for the decisions and role of Parliament.'

After explaining the different sectors in which it had been possible to work out , between the Parliament and Council, procedures reflecting the institutional balance which has developed in recent years in the Community, Mr. Scelba stated that a turning-point in relations between these two institutions had been reached with the Treaty of Luxembourg which 'ensured the Community's financial independence and gave Parliament powers to decide on the Community budget. These powers were, however, still far too limited. That is why the European Parliament came out against ratification in the national parliaments, and the Council, adding a clause which I suggested, undertook to change the provisions on the powers of Parliament within two years, in accordance with indications to be given by the national parliaments during their debates on ratification.

The Parliamentary debates revealed that no reduction in the powers of national parliaments would be acceptable without the simultaneous transfer of similar powers to the European Parliament; and it will be necessary to lay down new standards intended to strengthen the decision making and supervisory powers of Parliament at a later date.'

Referring to the trend in relations between Parliament and the Commission, Mr. Scelba recalled the Commission's undertaking to submit its programme of activity at the beginning of each year: 'Parliament will have the right to debate, approve, reject or amend the programme as it thinks fit ... It will make good use of this right and play an important part in the formulation of all Community policy.

The Commission also undertook to refer specific measures adopted to implement the approved programme to Parliament at regular intervals during the year.

This new undertaking together with the other traditional instruments for parliamentary control over the executive, will enable the European Parliament to exercise continuous and more decisive supervision over all the Commission's activities.

In the past the Commission was free to accept or reject Parliament's decisions on draft legislation submitted for its opinion. The result was that not only the Council of Ministers but also the Commission were practically

free to disregard Parliament's decisions.

The agreements which I have arrived at mean that when a vote is taken in Parliament the Commission must signify whether it accepts Parliament's decisions, rejects them, or accepts them solely as a recommendation to be presented to the Council. The result is that Parliament is now able to take its decisions with advance knowledge of the Commission's attitude and may, where necessary, persuade the latter to change its position, unless the Commission, disagreeing with Parliament's point of view, decides to make the matter a question of confidence on which Parliament will have to decide.

The important aspect of this commitment is as follows: if the Commission accepts Parliament's decisions and submits them to the Council the latter can only reject them by a qualified majority.'

Mr. Scelba went on to discuss new objectives for the European Parliament. 'The first aim might be the recognition of legislative powers. By extending the practice which led to the transfer from the Council to the Parliament of power to approve the latter's budget, it might be possible to agree with the Council that all proposed Community legislation on which Parliament is now required only to deliver an opinion should be discussed in the presence of the Council, and that amendments may only be rejected by the Council by a qualified majority or else will be binding on the Council only if they are adopted by a qualified majority in Parliament.

In practice it would be necessary to extend to all proposals, and especially those which have financial implications, the procedure laid down for approval of the Community's budget; while leaving the basic arrangements unchanged, the new procedure would apply them in a manner more consistent with the democratic character of the Community institutions.'

Mr. Scelba concluded by saying that if the national parliaments agreed to the policy of economic and political unification of the democratic States of Europe no conflict could arise with the European Parliament, because its powers '... are exercised only in areas which have become the subject of Community policy and can no longer be decided by national bodies. The only risk is that if these matters are entrusted to institutions like the present Council of Ministers the democratic function of the parliamentary system would be impaired. In this sense there is a community of interests between the European Parliament and the national parliaments.'

(Il Popolo, 23 March, 1971)

16. Mr. Rumor stresses the irreversible nature of the process of European unification

Addressing an international congress of young Christian Democrats, Mr. Rumor, Chairman of the European Union of Christian Democrats, stressed the importance of the commitment to European unification after the start of the process of monetary unification decided in Brussels on 9 February.

In his opinion, the start of effective economic and monetary unification marked the second historical moment in the process of integration.

Even though obstacles and difficulties might still be encountered, an irreversible process had been set in motion whose final, logical outcome could only be political integration.

Political unification had now become a realistic prospect once again. And there was a real likelihood that the European ideal would be revitalized by the generations which would take over responsibilities in the 1970s.

United Europe was one of the structures underlying the multi-lateral equilibrium of the whole world; it was increasingly tending to characterize our period in history and was therefore re-emerging as a vision for men of our time.

'...If the Community wishes to leave its mark on world events its economy must be geared to world requirements, but it must not lose that essential human characteristic which has arisen from a long-standing humanist outlook which has instilled common cultural and civilizing values in the great European nations, in spite of all political differences and contrasts.'

...It was for example natural - in a context of lessening tension - for the Community to challenge the economic, social and political structure of the Communist world in order to help the latter to overcome its internal contradictions.

It would be short-sighted to disregard the Community's other main sphere of influence, i.e. the Mediterranean, in which the 1950s and 1960s brought many mistakes as well as dramatic confirmation of European presence and responsibility.

'Our presence in the Mediterranean region has been fragmentary, occasional and irregular.'

'...It would obviously be absurd to suppose that the Community could represent a kind of third force in the Mediterranean. The American presence in that area is not only an essential strategic factor but can also contribute to economic development which is so necessary for the underprivileged areas bordering on the Mediterranean. The latest statements in responsible quarters on the Middle East problems reflect a more comprehensive and realistic approach.

But it would be absurd to turn a blind eye to the reality which is one of political ethics above all and also of political strategy.'

'...In other words we are engaged in a vital strategic struggle in the Mediterranean for the political balance of Europe and indeed for our very survival; and our economic development is also at stake because in the next decade 66 per cent of the Community's energy requirements will have to be supplied by petroleum.

We cannot therefore remain content with abstract declarations and statements of principle. European action must include urgent and active mediation as well as bold initiatives in all directions.'

In conclusion Mr. Rumor stressed that Italy could have no effective weight in foreign policy except in the context of European reality.

'If we are to play our part - as we should - in this reality, we must turn our backs on that provincialism which is a barrier to an effective foreign policy.

We must therefore embark upon a vast constructive programme so that Europe can be completed with the weight of our presence; we shall then be able to influence our times, and the direction and objectives of our continent.'

(Il Popolo, 19 March, 1971)

### III. ORGANIZATIONS AND GROUPINGS

1. The Permanent Assembly of the Chambers of Agriculture states its position on the proposals for reforming European agriculture and on the future of the EEC

The Permanent Assembly of the Chambers of Agriculture held its second ordinary session in Paris on 3 and 4 December 1970. It passed a resolution on the 'future of Europe and European agriculture'. In this resolution the Assembly 'having regard to the Commission's proposals for reforming European agriculture,

- (a) stresses immediately that a number of reservations must be made on these texts;
- (b) recalls its constant refusal to be faced with the alternative of a price policy or a structural policy, since both these policies are essential and complementary and must be worked out and implemented jointly;
- (c) recalls that a price policy is a vital condition for the improvement of farmers' income in the immediate future and even for the implementation of a policy to improve structures which implies that the producers must have better financial resources;
- (d) stresses the immediate need for a regional development policy to promote the creation of jobs;
- (e) considers that no limitation on the total amount of land under cultivation in the Community should be considered until such time as a limitation on imports from non-member countries and international coordination of production policies have been brought about;
- (f) finds that the proposed directive on the modernization of farms in its present form concerns too few holdings because of the criteria of selectivity adopted;
- (g) requires aid of a purely social nature to be provided to farmers who cannot benefit from the economic encouragement for modernization of farms or immediately improve their income by other means;
- (h) asserts its support for all action designed to encourage the cessation of activity by old farmers by improving pensions paid to them and is pleased to note that the principle of such a policy has been laid down at European level;
- (i) considers that no socio-structural measures would be acceptable in the Community if they led to a deterioration in the conditions of develop-

ment granted at present to French farmers.

### The future of the EEC

- (a) having regard to the fact that tasks entrusted to the Community by Articles 2 and 3 of the Rome Treaty have not by any means been completed and that this makes the results already achieved rather precarious especially in the agricultural sector where, as already mentioned in the section on economic organization, some products are not covered by regulations while other regulations must be revised, in particular those covering wine, fruit, vegetables, poultry farming and pork;
- (b) welcomes the fact that in accordance with the conclusions of the conference of Heads of State and Government held at The Hague studies have been made on the establishment by stages of an economic and monetary union in the time provided for this purpose and that the Council of Ministers is now considering appropriate proposals made by the Commission;
- (c) reaffirms its desire for simultaneous progress in the next few months in the spheres of coordination of short-term policy, harmonization of fiscal legislation, abolition of barriers which still exist between the Six, strengthening of monetary solidarity between the Member States, free movement of capital and common transport policy;
- (d) hopes that the governments and European institutions will show the necessary political will to achieve political, economic and monetary union;
- (e) having regard to the risks which bilateral agreements between Member States and non-associated non-member countries, association agreements with non-member countries, preferential agreements between the EEC and non-member countries entail for the common agricultural policy;
- (f) requires greater vigilance to be shown in ensuring that the Community preference system is respected and that the exemptions granted to certain Member States in connection with supplies obtained from non-member countries especially in the maize, wine and beef and veal sectors are abolished;
- (g) and finally having regard to the applications for membership of the EEC,
- (h) notes the position adopted by the European Commission in the discussions between the EEC and Great Britain;

- (i) wishes to be associated with all negotiations which are directly or indirectly concerned with agriculture;
- (j) considers that the membership agreement must not throw into question the underlying principles of the common agricultural policy in particular Community preference, price and market unity and financial solidarity, implying effective protection of the enlarged Community against non-member countries and in particular against Commonwealth States.
- (k) believes that the transitional period must be the same in every sector for all the applicant countries;
- (l) stresses that the negotiations must not delay implementation of economic union between the Six;
- (m) considers that more regular consultations must take place between the professional organizations and European institutions as was the case at national level when the Rome Treaty was prepared.'

(Chambers of Agriculture, 15 December 1970)

## 2. The Chairman of the Netherlands Product Association for Meat and Cattle discusses the risk of technocracy in the European Community

In his New Year address the Chairman of the Netherlands Product Association for Meat and Cattle, Mr. Van Dijk, a former member of the European Parliament, expressed the hope that a form of organization could be found to ensure that market and structural policy assists European business interests. Mr. Van Dijk felt it was against the interest of democracy that of all the EEC countries only the Netherlands had Product Associations, and the latter had been obliged to transfer their powers to Brussels. He concluded that at present there was no direct participation by business circles in European agricultural policy. He believed something could be done by establishing organizations of business interests in the EEC countries on the lines of the Netherlands Product Associations. These bodies could liaise with Brussels and have joint responsibility in laying down policies.

There were hundreds of implementing regulations for the common agricultural policy but they were subject to no control whatsoever by any parliament. Mr. Van Dijk thought that the PBO (Business Organizations established under public law) could fill a major gap in the democratic process: representatives of business life must be consulted when implementing mea-

sures were drawn up.

'In Brussels the influence of experts from the European Commission and national governments is increasing day by day. Their influence is growing in our own country too. Because it is impossible for the peoples' representatives, either at national level or in the European Communities, to control anything other than the broad lines of agricultural policy, a situation is developing in which the experts in fact determine policy. The word technocracy has a real significance in criticism of Brussels.

A system of Product Associations both in Brussels and at national level could have been a useful additional factor. The European Product Associations could have been given important decision-making functions in their own particular spheres. But now the Council of the European Communities i.e. a political institution, must decide on hundreds of detailed regulations; to take an example from the cattle and meat sector, it must fix the conversion factor for pigs, the distribution of the GATT quota for chilled meat, and the reference markets for gauging the market for beef and veal.'

Mr. Van Dijk recalled that prior to 1962 the Product Association for Meat and Cattle determined market regulating policy within the broad lines laid down by the Netherlands Government for this sector. In 1962 the two major products in this sector, i.e. pig-meat and beef, became subject to common European arrangements. The open domestic European market which resulted enabled the Netherlands to increase their pig exports but the price paid for this wider domestic market was the concentration of powers in Brussels.

Officials of the six Governments and of the Community hold discussions in the 'Management Committees' in Brussels to prepare the decisions of the European Commission and Council. A member of the secretariat of the Product Associations, e.g. for meat and cattle, attended these discussions, not as a representative of the Product Association but as an unpaid official. He acted and spoke for the Dutch Minister and not on behalf of the Product Association. Ultimately therefore he had to adhere to the official position laid down in the Netherlands under the Minister's responsibility.

The right of the Product Associations to exist therefore depended on the value of the advice given by their Boards to the Netherlands Government. Mr. Van Dijk regretted that the Product Associations often had to discuss matters relating to the European Community in secret session, because discussions in Brussels were also held behind closed doors.



(*Nieuw Europa*, No. 2, 1971;  
*Handels & Transport Courant*, 7 January 1971)

### 3. Italian General Confederation of Labour comments on the Werner Plan

On the occasion of recent discussions in the Common Market institutions on the Werner Plan, the Italian General Confederation of Labour (CGIL) issued the following statement:

'In the present phase of development of the Community and individual member countries, the monetary union proposed by the Werner Plan strengthens the free-trade tendency in industrial policy. The Werner Plan in fact gives a predominant role to monetary manoeuvres and through stringent machinery for coordination at Community level it completely ties the hands of national economic policy.

It will help to isolate still further economic policy options from closer contact with trade union and democratic pressures at the very time when decisive powers are being entrusted to the central banks. In particular at a time when the Italian trade unions are facing the problem of unemployment and of the south of Italy, which requires massive new investments, there is an obvious contradiction between the achievement of this essential objective and the imposition of growing restrictions on the national budget and economic policy. Once again the option proposed in the Werner Plan lessens the value of any effective political undertaking in the form of regional policy based on structural considerations rather than measures of assistance, and it confirms the notion that social and employment policy are minor matters which are apparently to be totally subordinate to economic choices. We, for our part, have no ideological or political prejudices against economic and monetary union. Our negative conclusions are based on the real political significance of the Werner option, which is bound to increase economic and monetary dependence on the dollar and Euro-dollar - the cause of economic imbalance, monetary difficulties and inflation.

Our conclusions are inspired by a vision of a Europe which, rejecting the illusion of technocratic planning and the "free trade" policy of cartels is open to democratic pressure and to the interests of the workers in every country, and puts forward specific objectives for progress and social renewal which can be the only true basis for monetary equilibrium in Europe and for a contribution to a new progressive form of international economic relations.'

(*Rassegna Sindacale*, 12-14 January, 1971)

#### 4. Controversy in Great Britain over the effects of United Kingdom entry into the European Community on parliamentary sovereignty

While the British Government re-asserted early in 1971 its willingness to sign the Treaty of Rome and opposition to British entry was growing in all the political parties, 'The Times' opened a discussion of institutional problems arising from British membership. In letters to the editor many readers tried to mobilize public opinion on the question of the future of British parliamentary sovereignty and the role which the European Parliament would come to play once Britain joined.

The debate began after an article was published in the Times on 29 January under the title 'The ambiguity of sovereignty'. The author, Mr. T. J. O. Hickey, tried to define what is understood by 'sovereignty' in Great Britain. He wrote: 'It is alleged that accession to the Treaty of Rome entails some immediate loss of sovereignty and, if the advertised benefits are to be made possible, the eventual loss of much more. Europeanists, anxious to allay anxiety on that score, make two replies. First they deprecate talk of "loss" or "surrender" of sovereignty: the appropriate expression is "pooling of sovereignty". So Mr. Harold Macmillan in his tract "Britain, the Commonwealth and Europe", written for the Conservative Party Conference of 1962: "Accession to the Treaty of Rome would not involve a one-sided surrender of sovereignty on our part, but a pooling of sovereignty by all concerned ... In renouncing some of our own sovereignty we would receive in return a share of the sovereignty renounced by others."

One gathers from that that sovereignty is something which can be merged, exchanged, divided and shared, like the picnics of two or more families on a joint outing. And just as other people's picnics have a way of looking more appetizing than one's own, it might be nicer (who knows?) to have a little bit of Belgian and Italian sovereignty to eke out a smaller helping of one's own.

The other reassurance that is offered is that lots of limitations of sovereignty are already happily accepted and new limitations are coming into existence all the time. It is a familiar trend about which there is no need to get excited. We make alliances, we ratify conventions, we sign trade agreements, we pledge monetary cooperation. Alliances commit ... agreements, if honoured, limit freedom of action ... what happens to us partly depends on what others do ... no nation is an island ... All these familiar facts circumscribe sovereignty. As Mr. Harold Lever put it in last week's debate, "Members must realize that they either believe in international cooperation or they do not. If they believe in it, every act of international cooperation is a pooling of sovereignty".

Or Mr. John Mackintosh, "We do not have complete sovereignty outside the Market ... As I say, we cannot do exactly what we want to do even now. If anybody wants to see a lack of sovereignty let him consider the Macmillan memoirs and the way in which the United States vetoed our ill-fated invasion of Suez".

Or Mr. Roy Jenkins, "To pretend to a sovereignty which has ceased to be effective is to restrict and not to preserve national freedom".

The reason why these seemingly obvious truths do not instantly still anxieties about sovereignty is presumably that they do not refer to whatever it is the anxious have in mind. They know that British power has declined and that the list of international obligations lengthens. But they do not therefore believe that British sovereignty is diminished, any more than they believe that a person's civil liberty is diminished by his becoming less wealthy or his entering into commitments and contracts. ("It is a fallacious use of language to deny that a person is free just because there are certain limits imposed by the nature of things upon the directions in which he can exercise his freedom". - Mr. Enoch Powell).'

On 2 February a member of the House of Commons, Mr. Derek Walker-Smith (Conservative) answered Mr. Hickey's article: 'Mr. Hickey points out that "There is no common understanding of what the word sovereignty denotes". Ambiguity really derives from the fact that we are concerned with two different aspects of sovereignty. There is the normal concept of political sovereignty as understood in international law, but there is also the distinctively British principle of the sovereignty of Parliament - a dualism incidentally identified in your columns by Professor Xahm-Frcund in the early days of the dialogue. This dualism does not, however, produce different results because entry to the EEC would involve a substantial erosion of sovereignty in each sense.

It is true that, in the context of the first aspect, the act of making a treaty is normally considered to be not a surrender but an exercise of sovereignty. This would not be true, however, of the Treaty of Rome, which is unique among treaties. It differs from the normal run of treaties not only on account of its great scope and wide impact on municipal law, but because of its unlimited duration. This distinguishes it from other current international agreements to which Britain is a party, like NATO, GATT and EFTA, since it is subject neither to the right of withdrawal nor requirement of renewal. They conform to the normal pattern of an exercise of sovereignty, whereas signing the Treaty of Rome would be outside it.

So far as the sovereignty of Parliament is concerned, even a cursory reading of the Treaty - and in particular provisions like Article 189 - shows how deep the erosion would be. There are in effect two basic characteristics of the sovereignty of Parliament - the unfettered exercise of its will, and its right to be the sole law-making agency. Neither of these characteristics would survive acceptance of the Treaty. Over a large part of our economic and social life the law and practice of the Community would take precedence over our indigenous law. We should, for example, be bound to accept the Regulations of the Community, both as existing at the time of entry and for the future, and Parliament would be at most a conduit pipe.

The facts as to sovereignty are therefore, I would think, clear in both senses of the word. This does not, of course, end the argument. But it shifts it to a question of opinion; and matters of opinion can only be usefully debated on the basis of a true understanding of the facts. On the basis of a substantial loss of sovereignty in both its aspects, the question for decision is: can there be shown to be benefits, economic or political, which will compensate for this sacrifice? I for one have always recognized that this is a matter for debate and have respected the arguments of those who take a different view.

One constitutional point, however, they must answer more clearly than has yet been done. The Treaty contemplates that the signatories bind themselves in perpetuity, and so, having joined, Britain would be in breach of her international obligation if she seeks to withdraw. To renounce the right of withdrawal on the other hand, would be to breach the constitutional principle that Parliament cannot bind its successors. We should have to risk either a breach of international obligation or of constitutional principle.

This is the painful and unwelcome dilemma on the horns of which entry would inevitably impale us. '

On the same day another Times reader wrote: 'The Treaty of Rome requires that the Crown in Parliament shall fetter its future sovereignty. The Crown in Parliament cannot do so under our constitution. Even Blackstone wrote that "Acts of Parliament derogatory from the power of subsequent parliaments bind not". A fortiori if an Act of Parliament cannot derogate from the power of future parliaments - as required by the Treaty of Rome - nor can any treaty.

This is not denied by the Government. They admit that any Act applying the Treaty could be repealed at any time. Few people are aware of this partly because the opponents of the Common Market have concentrated on other matters.

The Government case - which very few people know about - is that the treaty would create a valid international obligation which would in practice prevent future parliaments from claiming their full sovereignty. The rule of international law on this subject states the reverse of the Government case. "Such treaties ... as violate constitutional restrictions, do not bind the State concerned." (Oppenheim, Volume I, page 887).

Only the judges can give authoritative opinions on these matters but the authorities are very clear and indeed unanimous on the basic principles set out above. I hope that such authoritative judgements will be heard as a result of my pending proceedings against the Attorney General which have been enlarged by a further writ and statement of claim asking for declarations that:

- (a) the provisions whereby this country could not withdraw from the Common Market without the consent of the other member countries are ultra vires both Her Majesty's Government and the Crown in Parliament and are null and void under the rule of law and in international law; and/or that
- (b) the Crown in Parliament will always have an absolute right to withdraw without committing any breach of international obligations; and/or that
- (c) the said provisions of the Treaty of Rome can be validly accepted only if a new constitution is adopted with the consent of the British people.'

On 18 February, Professor P.A. Reynolds broached the same subject in another letter: 'British politicians when abroad customarily do not seek to undermine the credibility of the British government, whatever its party complexion. The fact that Mr. Powell has thought it necessary to do so may well suggest to his European audiences that opposition within Britain to entry to the Common Market is not as he suggests, else why does he not fight and win his campaign at home? Mr. Powell does not speak for Britain.

He raises two issues - the nature of Parliament's role, and the question of sovereignty.

He asserts that the House of Commons debates and decides taxation, and that "the British nation could not imagine itself except with and through its Parliament". Both statements imply falsities. A few members of the Commons discuss some parts of taxation proposals, a few minor amendments may be accepted by Ministers, but if a division on a major question is forced the Government party majority will carry it. Effectively the Government (perhaps with its party) decides taxation.

As for the second assertion, such mystique as still attaches to Parliament may continue so long as it remains in existence (as it will), but what people care most about is not the detail of what powers Parliament exercises, but whether material conditions can be made a little better, and life can become a little less unsatisfying and undignified.

Then sovereignty. Mr. Powell will surely remember Parliament's sovereign role in launching the Suez operation in 1956, and Britain's sovereign power that enabled her to withstand the threatened run on sterling. He will be aware of Britain's sovereign control of her own defence, with the best part of her armed forces integrated under United States command in Europe and purchasing abroad the delivery systems for her strategic nuclear weapons. He may even be wondering what 35 cents on a barrel of oil means for Britain's taxes.

The formal and legal notion of sovereignty is not what counts.'

On 26 February the Times published a letter by another reader on the same problem: 'In this country,' Mr. Leolin Price wrote, 'we have become used to government in Parliament; government which explains in Parliament its policies and the manner in which it exercises its powers; government which is exposed to continuous examination and questioning by our elected representatives in Parliament.

If government in the EEC is to be organized on our Parliamentary pattern, do we recognize and accept that in any EEC parliament our representatives will be a small minority and that we will have abandoned for ever even that degree of control which, by representation in Parliament, we now have over all those important aspects of our life that will be subject to the dominant power of EEC?

But it becomes increasingly obvious that EEC is not likely to be organized on our parliamentary pattern. There is some talk of wonderful new constitutional forms, not yet invented but expected to grow empirically, that will (it is hoped) subject EEC government to the discipline, and its exercise of great powers to the checks and balances that we in this country provide in Parliament.

This sounds brave and exciting. But what if no such forms develop? And what if the forms that are developed seem to us unsatisfactory and alien? We will not be able to leave EEC. The Rome Treaty is "for ever". If, disliking the new forms of constitutional control, we veto their adoption, govern-

mental power in the Community will not be subject to any discipline, checks or balances equivalent to those which we have learnt to provide in Parliament.'

Finally on 6 March, Lord Gladwyn, a member of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe and former chairman of 'Britain in Europe' wrote: 'Mr. Price (February 26) wants to be assured that the new political entity that will surely emerge in Western Europe if we join the EEC will be one in which, through a Parliament, the British people will be able to exercise as much control over a European executive as they at present exercise over Her Majesty's Government.

Such an assurance can unhesitatingly be given. It is perfectly true (as Mr. Price suggests) that the EEC "is not likely to be organized on our Parliamentary pattern". There will certainly be no bewigged Speaker, nor any ceremonial opening by the Queen. But there undoubtedly will be a Parliament with power to interrogate Ministers; to throw out at any moment the instrument of the collective will of the (democratically elected) Ministers, namely the Commission; and to accept or reject a portion of the common budget.

And it is as certain as anything can be that within a few years of our entry this Parliament will be directly elected and its powers extended to cover the entire budget of the Community. In it the British will, as Mr. Price rightly says, be a "small minority". But so will the representatives of France and West Germany, countries fully equal to our own in power and importance.

In such a Parliament, representative of the entire group, the British people will thus be able to make their views felt just as effectively as, on matters touching the United Kingdom only, they now make them felt in the British Parliament. Indeed, more effectively. For how far can the British people be said to exercise any real control over her Majesty's Government at the present time?

If Parliament were reformed so as to acquire more power over the Government, things would be different. But apart from a sort of quinquennial plebiscite, neither the British people nor the great majority of MPs seem to have any very great influence on the course of events ...'

(The Times, January 29, February 2, 18, 26, March 6, 1971)

5. The Economic Association for Wholesale and Foreign Trade criticizes the EEC's preferential policy

On 18 January 1971 the Economic Association for Wholesale and Foreign Trade in Hamburg (WGA) warned against a division of the world economy into a number of preferential zones.

The annual report states: 'If as a result of British entry to the EEC this regional policy of preferences were extended to the former English territories in black Africa, and even to countries such as India and Ceylon, the result would be an enormous zone of reciprocal privileges which would undermine the vitally important principle of most-favoured nations and also lead to the risk of the establishment of further preferential areas.'

On the other hand the WGA welcomes the probable introduction in the second half of 1971 of unilateral non-discriminatory customs preferences to be granted by the industrial states to all developing countries. It considers that the measures planned by the EEC to grant freedom from customs duties to the developing countries for manufactures and semi-manufactures are highly desirable. The planned basic amounts for key products should, however, be increased year by year.

The WGA considers that these general UNCTAD preferences could neutralize the dangerous effects of the EEC regional preferences for manufactures and semi-manufactures. It suggests that the positive list of customs tariff reductions in the agricultural sector should be as wide as possible so as to reduce the disparities in preferences applicable to the Mediterranean areas and to the Associated African States and Madagascar. In the opinion of the WGA however, exemption from customs duties is not enough if exports of manufactures and semi-manufactures by developing countries are to be increased quickly and substantially.

It is more important to introduce modern marketing ideas in the developing countries as well as careful quality control, and to keep them informed of markets in the industrial States. The developing countries themselves could help to reduce the risks by issuing legislation to ensure that justifiable guarantee claims of importers can also be met by overseas exporters. The Association welcomes the fact that the Federal Association of German Wholesale and Foreign Trade set up a 'contact office to promote imports from developing countries' in Bonn on 1 January.



The WGA calls upon the Federal Government to eliminate or reduce all remaining protective measures while it is still able to take independent decisions on this matter. In this context the Association would like quotas for the Eastern bloc countries to be increased, self-limitation agreements with Far Eastern countries abolished and national quotas granted within the EEC. It suggests that no EEC country should be forced to narrow its liberalization measures, 'especially as this would be contrary to GATT.'

The WGA regrets that further products have been included in the EEC market regulation system and says: 'Unfortunately it is unlikely that the problem of surpluses will be alleviated if this common price system is merely taken over by the applicant countries. Agricultural production in the four States will, on the contrary, tend to be stimulated just as it has been in the EEC of the Six.' The WGA suggests that advantage should be taken of the negotiations to consider reform, and points to certain special regulations which might be possible.

The WGA also recommends that foreign trade should already be strengthened with the four applicant countries in order to exploit the possibility of duty-free trade which will arise in a few years' time. The WGA welcomes the fact that consideration has been given to the possibility of maintaining existing duty exemption between the EFTA States when the EEC is enlarged to ten members, and extending this system to the six original members. There were therefore possible solutions which would involve a customs union between these ten countries and Switzerland, Austria, Sweden and Portugal, involving certain components of a free trade area.

(Handelsblatt, 19 January 1971;  
Die Welt, 19 January 1971)

6. The President of the Federal Association of German Banks speaks of the 'struggle for stability' as a task for Europe

Mr. Alwin Münchmeyer, President of the Federal Association of German Banks, addressed the Land Federation of the Employers Associations of Lower Saxony in Hannover on 18 January 1971 on 'Positive and negative prospects for stability in Germany and Europe'.

The time had come to concentrate on the economic policy objective whose achievement was so remote, i.e. monetary stability. Price increases

of 3 or 4 per cent were too high. The considerable order backlogs suggested that there would be no sudden worsening of the short-term position. In addition, growth would be stimulated by private consumption and public spending.

Mr. Münchmeyer also called for stability in economic policy. The phase of consolidation required by industry presupposed that companies would no longer be disturbed by reform plans which went beyond the capacity of industry and paralysed its performance. 'We employers have a feeling of being increasingly let down by the responsible economic policy leadership in this country.'

Referring to European integration, Mr. Münchmeyer said that the future monetary union should not be degraded into a support club in which the Federal Republic would have to guarantee the stability of its neighbours. Progress in Europe could only be achieved by a community of stability. Since harmonization of European money and credit policy would be a strong impetus towards harmonization in other spheres, e.g. in taxation and short-term business policy, this was the aspect on which to concentrate. 'We must institutionalize this move towards integration and we are bound to succeed if we can overcome nationalistic ideas.'

Mr. Münchmeyer thought that a start could be made by eliminating obstacles to convertibility and liberalizing the money and capital markets while progressively shifting the responsibility for money and credit policy to an independent European Central Bank. A European Central Bank with the same measure of independence as the German Bundesbank would be a decisive factor in ensuring stability for the European economic and monetary union. The fluctuation bands of the exchange rates could be reduced and completely eliminated later on and a reserve fund established. A uniform money and credit policy would set increasingly close limits on the independence of the national budgets. Mr. Münchmeyer thought that some Community countries would only abandon temporary inflationary measures to achieve quicker growth and employment policy success if their structural problems could be reduced by a European financial arrangement. The Federal Republic would have to make an important contribution to a regional fund of this kind.

(Handelsblatt, 19 January 1971)

## 7. Italian trade unionists favour European integration

The Italian unions CISL (Italian Confederation of Trade Unions), UIL (Italian Labour Union) and CGIL (General Italian Confederation of Labour) stated their positions on European integration in an enquiry conducted by a weekly journal.

Mr. Storti, Secretary of the CISL, said that the three organizations agreed 'more or less completely' that European integration was a reality even if the 'workers were not enthusiastic'; 'rather than ignoring integration it should be accepted and facilitated'. He added that the trade unions had not so far drawn up a 'European policy' but were proceeding pragmatically.

Mr. Ravenna, Secretary of the UIL, hoped that 'we will soon see a European Parliament with an effective say in affairs'. It would be easier for the trade unionists to 'find a single channel of expression, and it would also be possible to establish relations with the other social forces and with the unified political and economic power'.

The Secretary of the CGIL, Mr. Didò, said that 'international policy has been the poor relation of European affairs'; he hoped that it would be possible to establish 'more direct relations between the Community and trade unions' because the representation of these unions on the Community's Economic and Social Committee was 'quite illusory'.

(Corriere della Sera, 21 February 1971)

## 8. Congress of the Belgian General Federation of Labour (FGTB)

The Belgian General Federation of Labour held a policy Congress from 29 to 31 January, at which it adopted the following resolution on European integration: 'Political, economic, financial and monetary power is exercised without democratic control in Europe. National action has become inadequate and must be extended at European level in order to ensure true democratic control in particular by:

1. Electing by universal suffrage a democratic European Parliament endowed with effective powers;
2. Creating economic, social and financial bodies to allow a measure of

control by trade union organizations;

3. Negotiating collective European conventions;
4. Democratizing the economy by instituting workers' control.

Faced with the united stand of the employers, the FGTB stresses the need for united action by the trade union organizations represented in the European Economic Community.

Capitalist Europe must be replaced by a Community of free men in an integrated Europe taking in all democratic States and capable of :

- (a) guaranteeing respect for the individual and allowing him to develop fully by freeing him from all forms of oppression and subordination;
- (b) abolishing conflicts which have existed for centuries and replacing them by an atmosphere of understanding and cooperation so that progress can be made as rapidly as possible towards the United States of Europe;
- (c) promoting at every level democratization of the economy and thus liberating the workers from a situation of economic and social dependence in the capitalist system which is at present the system of the European Community;
- (d) increasing economic efficiency by pooling the resources of the democratic states and thus taking up the economic challenge of the great powers;
- (e) proving its will to take social progress and full employment as its vital objectives to which economic and financial policy must be subordinate in order to give them an ultimate human content;
- (f) proving its exemplary value by its objectives and methods of development;
- (g) contributing through its unity to the avoidance of conflicts and the maintenance of lasting world peace;
- (h) asserting its solidarity with the developing countries through effective action.'

(Tribune, No. 3, February 1971)

9. Mr. Agnelli, Chairman of Fiat, discusses the problem of scale in European industry

The Chairman of Fiat, Mr. Agnelli, has written an article for the 'New York Times' and the 'Corriere della Sera' on the problem of scale in European industry and on relations between Europe and the USA.

'In order to create truly European productive units, the European Economic Community must become a real economic and monetary union instead of a mere customs union. In my opinion three basic ideas must be followed in approaching this problem of scale and relative economic strength of companies. In the first place, mergers with other leading world companies operating in the same sector amount to a confession of defeat from the European point of view because many European companies simply throw themselves into the arms of great American firms.

Secondly, the road of industrial concentration between national concerns is followed by industries with low expansion rates such as the textile or mining industry. Because of the prevalence of nationalist ideas, this solution is preferred by certain national governments even when they are dealing with industries with a rapid rate of expansion.

The third possibility lies in transnational agreements between companies. In this case progress towards a wider operating scale comes through the acquisition of operating concerns on a given foreign market, or by establishing new distribution networks on that market and then setting up two or more companies or specialized divisions there.

This has been the experience of the Common Market countries up to now. Between 1961 and 1969, 1035 industrial concentrations took place within the EEC between companies of one Member State and those of a non-member country, especially the United States. A further 1861 mergers occurred between companies in a single Member State, and only 257 between companies in two different Member States.

This means that the creation of the EEC has helped American concerns to gain a foothold on the European market by acquiring or merging operating companies within the Common Market at national level, but there has been little progress towards the creation of genuine European transnational concerns although this was one of the main objectives of the EEC. In my opinion it would be unrealistic to suppose that European financial resources will ever enable American companies to be acquired on a large scale, but

there is no doubt that European industry is sufficiently diversified to exert a useful stimulus on the enormous and homogeneous productive structure of the United States. As a result, the protectionist trends which are at present apparent in the United States are foreign to the industrial tradition of that country and also imply a failure to understand the realities.

Looking to the future of European industry, I conclude that we need a homogeneous continental market and the elimination of the present political and institutional barriers, so that it becomes possible to achieve a complete economic and monetary union in Europe. It remains to be seen whether the politicians will be able to translate into practice such a radical choice and whether there will be sufficient time to do so. '

(Corriere della Sera, 7 February)

10. The attitude of the Central Association of German Chambers of Industry and Commerce and of the Industrieinstitut (Industrial Institute) to monetary union

On 8 February 1971 the German Chambers of Industry and Commerce (DIHT) warned against any 'weakening' of the Werner Plan as a result of compromises. In a letter to Mr. Schiller, the Federal Minister for Economic Affairs, Mr. Paul Broicher, Chief Executive of the DIHT, wrote with reference to the Council of Ministers' meeting on 8 and 9 February, that the Werner Plan was under present circumstances the only way which held out any chance of achieving European economic and monetary union. Agreement on the basic features of the desired economic and monetary union had to be reached before any final decisions or measures were taken in the monetary field.

The DIHT and the Chambers of Industry and Commerce thought that in a European economic and monetary union economic, cyclical and monetary policies would have to be laid down by central Community institutions. The body that was to take Community decisions could not be the Council of Ministers, where the individual Member States had the right of veto. On the contrary, they would have to be institutions that could lay down a unified European economic, cyclical and monetary policy independently of any national directions. But for this purpose national powers would have to be transferred to the new executive to be set up, and these would have to be subject to parliamentary control.

The DIHT considered it essential in implementing the Werner Plan for economic and monetary policies to go hand in hand. Any compromise resulting in the abandoning of major features of the Plan would lead in the long run to a serious threat to the European Community.

In its 'Bericht 1970' the DIHT put the case for giving greater political responsibility to the Federal Minister for Economic Affairs and for his assuming a stronger position in relation to his colleagues in the Cabinet.

For 1971 the DIHT's attention focused mainly on the following unresolved issues: financial planning, cyclical policy, the introduction of the Federal Government's programme of reforms, social policy trends, and the future of European integration. The further development of the European Community into an economic and monetary union would obviously assume special importance because the questions of the European Economic Community would be discussed in the first technical report in conjunction with the statements on political principles. The DIHT agreed that Mr. Schiller had been remarkably successful in obtaining recognition of the principles of the market economy in the development of the EEC. The Werner Report was described as a great step forward which should not be watered down when translated into decisions.

On 15 February 1971 the German Industrial Institute in Cologne (representing industrial management) issued a statement on the latest decisions taken in Brussels with regard to monetary union.

The Institute praised the aims of the economic and monetary union but doubted whether the path outlined in Brussels was the right one. The first point criticized was giving up the idea of working out a detailed stage-by-stage plan. Only the necessary measures had been outlined for the first stage. The remaining steps, in the transition to economic and monetary union up until 1980, had been left in the dark. At a later stage it would be necessary to hold fresh negotiations, and by then the Community would presumably have been enlarged, which would make a compromise arrangement much more difficult.

The Institute saw the decisive problem as being the fact that the monetary theorists had prevailed. With the experimental narrowing of the bands of fluctuation scheduled for the first stage and the medium-term monetary stand-by arrangements to deal with balance of payments difficulties, the danger might arise, in the event of varying cyclical developments in the individual Member States, of the stable countries being obliged to bail out their inflation-prone partners. As a result, currency devaluation could become a Community phenomenon. This was the fear of the 'economists', who wanted to be assured of more balanced economic development in the EEC before

setting up a monetary union. They now had only the weapon of the 'precautionary clause' in their hands, by means of which the development of an economic and monetary union could be broken off if in the second stage there were no harmonization of economic policy.

The present stage-by-stage plan was of its very nature an experiment full of risks. If success were achieved in the aim of lending weight to the concept of currency stability in a permanently acceptable way, and in providing the Community with the necessary tools for this purpose, then the way to economic and monetary union would be smoothed out. If this experiment were to fail, however, then the hope of any successful or meaningful togetherness in Europe would have to be buried.

(Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 17 February 1971;  
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 25 February 1971)

#### 11. Forum in Leiden discusses the gas-centrifuge project

At a forum held in Leiden on 15 February to discuss the European gas-centrifuge project for the enrichment of uranium, Professor Kistemaker, the inventor, said that the United States would be taking part in the project within five years; the Netherlands, Britain and West Germany were now jointly building pilot plants. Professor Kistemaker foresaw future American participation because the European countries would later have to face up to lack of capital for the plant development, and because for America this was the only way of helping to forestall the spread of nuclear weapons through this European gas-centrifuge process.

During the discussions the risk was repeatedly stressed that with the industrial application of the gas-centrifuge method the technological threshold of the manufacture of nuclear weapons was automatically lowered. Professor Boskma of the Polemologisch Instituut in Groningen described it as a wasted chance for the Netherlands which had not offered its new enrichment method for international cooperation, for example via the United Nations. The main condition of peace and security in connection with the gas-centrifuge project could best have been fulfilled in that way.

Mr. Van der Stoel, Socialist member of the Second Chamber, said that the Netherlands was making an all-out effort in Euratom to remove the obstacles to a satisfactory system of controls being agreed on between Eura-



tom and the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, so that the European partners could ratify the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. If that went through there would be a double check on the non-proliferation of data, fissile material and installations by the three countries, in addition to automatic control by Euratom and unanimous decisions on supplies.

During the discussions objections were repeatedly raised about the fact that developments with the gas-centrifuge in the past ten years had been kept secret. As a result democratic discussion in the Parliament had been seriously hampered. Professor Kistemaker stated that classification had been imposed mainly for economic reasons.

Professor Boskma criticized the inventor of the gas-centrifuge process for the fact that physicists were still failing to discharge the responsibility of laying the facts before the public before a dangerous development reached the irreversible industrial stage.

('De Tijd', 20 February 1971)

12. The European Movement in the Netherlands puts forward a 'Blueprint for Europe in 1980'

The Executive of the European Movement in the Netherlands has put forward a 'Blueprint for Europe in 1980'. This emphasizes that the aims of the European Movement can and must be maintained, and indicates how they can be given a concrete content. 1980 is here described as a desirability because it is obviously in the nature of the European Movement to place the 'desirable' above the 'possible'. The Executive sees the blueprint as a touchstone for the developments that must take place in the years ahead in the direction of further European integration.

The report submitted by a working party headed by Professor H. H. Maas, Professor at Leiden University, is to be submitted to the sections of the European Movement and to the International European Movement and its member organizations. It asks for a 'committee of experts' to be set up to draw up a European constitution. The members of this committee, to be drawn from the six countries of the Community and the four applicant States, should be able to work independently of the governments.

After making a comparison of federal systems, particularly that of the Federal Republic, the report comes to the conclusion that foreign policy, defence, monetary systems and public finance, foreign trade policy, economic policy - as a whole and that covering individual sectors - means of transport, postal, telegraph and telephone services and the provision of energy, should come exclusively within the province of the federal authority.

The blueprint envisages a federal parliament with two chambers, but not an executive body directly elected by the people. The authors of the blueprint still consider it desirable for the time being to have an institution on which the national governments are represented at ministerial or official level.

(Informatiebulletin van de Europese Beweging in Nederland, 16 February 1971)

13. European questions discussed at the 26th Congress of the National Federation of Farmers' Unions

The National Federation of Farmers' Unions (FNSEA) held its 25th Congress in Nîmes on 24, 25 and 26 February 1971.

In a resolution on 'international questions' the Congress fully endorsed implementation of the programme for economic and monetary union in the Community. This union was essential to the operation of the common agricultural policy as was proved by the monetary crises of 1969 and the consequences which they led to, in particular in terms of agricultural trade.

The Congress hoped that this union would help to create a united political Europe which was ultimately essential and corresponded to the hopes of the European peoples.

But while the Congress noted certain decisions it also observed mistakes and grave shortcomings in the development of the common agricultural policy as well as the existence of negotiations which entailed serious risks for the future of European agriculture. '

- (a) The Congress reasserted that 'any settlement reached must aim at ensuring the normal marketing of products in the Community. This presupposes the solution to problems raised by distortions of internal

and external competition and by market support, i.e. the adoption of regulations which do not exist at present, the revision of inadequate regulations and the full application of existing regulations.'

- (b) On the question of prices, the FNSEA states that 'the effects of devaluation on French prices must be made good and compensatory measures (which penalize our exports) at the frontiers eliminated.'
- (c) A better price grid must be worked out comprising in particular a 30% revaluation of the price of animal products in relation to cereal products.
- (d) Agricultural prices must be fixed in good time on the basis of an annual report on the state of agriculture in such a way that they contribute to an improvement of farmers' income and form part of a genuine medium-term policy.

The freezing of agricultural prices and the delay in fixing the annual levels are absolutely inadmissible.

In addition the common prices proposed recently by the Commission for the 1971-72 season are unacceptable because they do not provide for compensation of the effects of inflation on agricultural revenue and do not sufficiently revalue the price of animal products.

The Congress protests vigorously against the profusion of commercial or association agreements concluded without coordination or underlying policy so that they are undermining the common agricultural policy. It notes that the agricultural clauses in these agreements always run counter to the interests of the Community and of its farmers who suffer the consequences without even being invited to state their opinion.

These continual one-sided concessions lead to unacceptable competition which is seriously impairing farmers' income by disorganizing agricultural markets.

The enlargement of the Community must not lead to the EEC's dilution into a more commercial formula of free trade. The Congress draws the attention of the public authorities to the fact that applicant countries must respect the achievements of the Community, that the transitional period must not exceed five years and that negotiations must cover every aspect of the problem and not delay European integration. The FNSEA is opposed to any recasting of the common agricultural policy with a sole view to facilitating enlargement. Finally the profession must be consulted and kept informed of

all aspects which directly or indirectly concern agriculture during the negotiations.

Agricultural trade unions are aware of the political importance of these negotiations but will nevertheless remain highly vigilant to ensure that certain economic aspects which to their mind are essential are not sacrificed to political considerations. Deploiring the almost total absence of a common commercial policy, the Congress denounces the disorderly condition of international markets. It finds that the effort made by farmers to understand each other and the coherent position they have adopted have so far met with no response. It calls upon the governments to coordinate their policy with more conviction and perseverance and feels that they should prefer more realistic and effective action to solemn declarations.

The Congress demands genuine consultation on all these subjects. In spite of the formal and pressing demands of COPA, the idea of systematic consultation of the profession has made little progress.

The Congress cannot accept the present situation and makes regular consultation one of the aims of the FNSEA's syndical policy.'

(Resolutions of the 25th Congress of the FNSEA, 'Information Agricole' February 1971)

14. The Association of Industry and Trade, meeting at The Hague, calls for a European currency

During a meeting of the Netherlands Association for Industry and Trade held at The Hague on 25 February and also attended by members of the Benelux Committee, the financial expert, Mr. L.S. Beuth, spoke in favour of establishing a technical advisory board for the creation of a European currency. The board would advise on matters such as the gold parity of the new European currency unit, the composition of new currency series, the name and design of the new coins, the number of coins to be minted, the allocation of the profit on minting, and the phases in which the new units would be introduced.

Mr. Beuth felt that for technical reasons the Benelux countries should introduce the new coinage first, followed by Germany and Italy, while

France would probably conclude the operation. England, which had just completed a costly monetary operation, namely the introduction of the decimal system, would not want to change its coinage again in the next ten years. This would probably be a task for the next generation. But Mr. Beuth felt this was not a real difficulty provided there was a fixed exchange rate between the European coin and the pound.

Referring to the gold parity of the new coin, Mr. Beuth said it could not be tied to an existing unit of coinage, and association with the American dollar would also be undesirable. The dollar was no longer a strong currency, and association with the dollar would be unacceptable in Europe, which is seeking a new, independent identity. He thought that the value of the European coin would be somewhere in the region of 1.5 to 2 Dutch guilders and the new cent would be the lowest denomination.

He felt that the best name for the new coin would be the 'phoenix' because the Greek letter phi is a symbol which could be considered equivalent to the pound sign and dollar sign. Use of the letter E with an oblique stroke through it would be mere plagiarism. On the other hand the name 'phoenix' could be a symbol of Europe torn by two world wars and now united again.

He felt that coins and bank notes need not be absolutely identical in the new system. In future coins circulating in European countries could be completely identical on one (European) face. This would be the face indicating the value. On the other face it would be possible to have, e.g. in the Netherlands a portrait of the Queen, in Belgium of the King, and in Luxembourg of the Grand Duke. The other countries could also use their own national symbols. But all the coins must have an identical value and be legal tender throughout the united Europe. The languages of the individual countries could also be used on the coins.

The introduction of European coinage in phases would be inevitable he thought, because old coins would have to be withdrawn from circulation when the new ones were introduced. If this were done simultaneously in all six countries there would be an enormous demand for coinage metal and its price would rise substantially. It was better to work in stages and the countries whose turn it was to introduce the new coinage would be able to borrow reserve coinage metal for minting their coins from the other countries.

(Handels & Transport Courant, 26 February 1971)

15. Statement on European problems by the National Council of the Italian Association of the Council of European Local Authorities

On 2 March the National Council of the Italian Association of the Council of European Local Authorities unanimously approved a document from which substantial extracts are reprinted below.

This document states that the National Council:

- considers the agreement reached by the Community on economic and monetary union not so much as the first stage in an irreversible process - the agreement gives no such guarantee - but as an important renunciation in principle of pragmatism in the sphere of inter-governmental negotiations in favour of an organic plan as had been requested by the Italian Government;
- expresses its dissatisfaction with the failure to consolidate the Community institutions as decided upon at the Hague summit conference, and with the delay in the process of democratizing the Community; in particular it deplores the delay in holding direct elections to the European Parliament by universal suffrage and giving it real powers which would enable it to supervise financial and political aspects of the Community's action;
- therefore notes the precise commitment of the Italian Government and of a large majority in parliament to move ahead with the plan for election of the Italian delegation to the European Parliament by direct suffrage;
- stresses the need to go beyond the proposals of the Davignon Committee by establishing supranational institutional structures which will give the European Community an active presence in world affairs;
- stresses the importance of Britain's entry into the EEC, not on the basis of short-sighted commercial negotiations but against a clear, political, supranational and democratic background and in the framework of an irreversible process which, in the long run, will guarantee that the benefits and disadvantages to all parties are evenly shared;
- referring to the common agricultural policy and to the recent Mansholt proposals which have been shelved, calls for the essential regionalization of this plan for restructuring and modernizing Community agriculture and for a range of suitable measures, without affecting the underlying principles;
- recalls that a structural reform of European agriculture necessitates an overall common economic policy, in particular in the industrial and services sectors, viewed in the context of essential social requirements;
- also recalls that a common industrial policy requires the backing of a common research and technological policy with supranational financing.

The document concludes by inviting the Parliament, Government and all local authorities to make 'their own decisive contribution to united action by the EEC, and to ensure that the local authorities are able to participate fully in the construction of European democracy.'

(Il Popolo, 3 March 1971)





At the Community and International Level



## I. COMMUNITY INSTITUTIONS

### 1. A speech by the President of the Commission of the European Communities: Europe takes stock

Speaking about Europe in Rome on 23 January, Mr. Franco Maria Malfatti, President of the Commission of the European Communities, stated: 'I think that we are all aware that although the Europe which is emerging in the seventies is proud of what has been achieved in the past decade, there are times when it is concerned about its future. And yet it is in this climate that the process of European unification has received a new impetus: the enlargement of Community Europe, its transformation into an economic and monetary union and the first steps towards political union are in fact challenges that it has set itself and which, if it meets them, will make Europe something very different from what it is at present. We must therefore ask ourselves why Europe, particularly at the beginning of the seventies, should have thought fit to set itself new objectives which are full of qualitative implications.

I believe that the answer must be sought in the external and internal realities of our continent. To begin with the international situation : in a world in which new influences are mingling with old-established demands, the law of international interdependence can henceforth be no longer disputed. The two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, operate within the framework of planetary policies: they have harnessed their resources to these policies, exploiting the logic of the technological revolution which sees power as the source of power on an ever increasing scale. Against this world background we must admit that Europe represents the terrain of a doctrine common to them, based - though with distinctions as to content and emphasis - on the status quo.

This leads to two realizations. First, the era of political visions centred on Europe is over and the pooling of resources and the launching of unified European policies are the prerequisites for real independence. Secondly, Europe, whatever shape it is to take, can only be made by Europeans. I believe that the spirit of The Hague, so often referred to, is both the cause and the effect of this realization.

... I think that we should all pay very close attention to a trend that has appeared in our society. I refer to the widespread concern with which large sections of the public view their individual and collective future. Its origin lies in the increasingly conscious dissatisfaction with the idol of econo-

mic expansion geared to the primacy of private consumption. The failure to satisfy collective demands, spiritual needs and the desire for a life fit for human beings, is the underlying cause of the unrest in our society. No one can deny that these matters must be satisfactorily dealt with.

But the concern felt by our citizens about their future is not the monopoly of European societies. I believe, however, that history has given Western Europe a privileged position.

... But once again a conclusion dawns on us: just as our societies will be what we all, in the exercise of our public or private responsibilities, are capable of making them, so too European unity will depend on the efforts of Europeans, of all Europeans. No government, no political or social movement today has any quarrel with the idea of a new European reality as such, but we are faced with other dangers: apathy, the unwieldiness of social structures, the combined opposition of a number of factors, and hostility towards innovations.' 'Here,' Mr. Malfatti concluded, 'Europe needs the support of the general public, the trade unions, the younger generation, the intellectuals, the political parties and the national parliaments.'

(Il Popolo, 24 January 1971)

2. Mr. Spinelli, member of the European Commission, discusses EEC technology

At a meeting with the press in Milan on 22 February, Mr. Altiero Spinelli, member of the European Commission, discussed the recent decisions of the Community to guarantee greater operational independence for the Joint Research Centre (comprising the four establishments of Ispra, Petten, Karlsruhe and Geel). In accordance with a prearranged schedule the European Commission is taking all the measures within its terms of reference so that the JRC can not only resume its activities in full but expand itself, in the light of new methods and criteria, avoiding the difficulties and mistakes which have been at the root of its previous crises.

Mr. Spinelli said: 'the Commission trusts that the Governments will act equally promptly and go ahead with the appointment of the general advisory committee so that the bodies planned in the reorganization of the Joint Research Centre can be set up in the near future.

The Joint Research Centre is at present preparing the draft of the pluriennial programme, which will also include non-nuclear activities. The Commission will act with all the means at its disposal to ensure that this programme is promptly approved by the Council of Ministers, so as to put an end to the unacceptable situation which we have had in recent years whereby the provisional programme of the previous year has simply been renewed.

The Commission also hopes to bring the present negotiations with the staff of the Joint Research Centre on the changes to be made in their service regulations to a successful conclusion as quickly as possible; these changes will be consistent with the new type of management of the Centre itself.'

Going on to deal with the general situation, Mr. Spinelli maintained that the Community should not consider its research policy as a substitute for that conducted by the Member States in isolation or through inter-governmental collaboration on a bilateral or multilateral basis. Instead it should be ready to intervene whenever the established forms of cooperation prove to be inadequate or ineffective. The scientific and technological research policy should also be permanently geared to the aims of the Community's economic policy and to the progressive integration of industrial structures, not forgetting the growing need to bring enormous pressure to bear - in the field of research too - to combat the harmful effects that result from modern industrial developments.

To deal with these many requirements we must have appropriate machinery, such as an agency endowed with funds of its own and able to ensure the execution of the programmes.

As to the action to be taken, we are not starting from scratch because we can use the plans that have emerged from the work of the ad hoc group set up within the Community and known as the "Prest" Group.'

Mr. Spinelli particularly referred to action which was obviously of Community interest in fields of data-processing, tele-communications, new means of transport, oceanography and environmental nuisances.

He drew attention to the note submitted by the Commission to the Council defining an overall concept for Community action in scientific research. In this paper the Commission proposed setting up (i) a European committee for research and development (CERD) which would be responsible for selecting and proposing joint programmes, and (ii) an agency endowed with funds of its own which would be responsible for ensuring the execution of programmes,

partly through direct action and partly by means of contracts awarded to industry and independent research centres. Mr. Spinelli said that the note would be followed by practical proposals; the Commission was in fact preparing a formal proposal to set up the committee referred to. It would be a highly versatile body comprising experts of high calibre in the scientific, legal and economic fields, and would have its own permanent staff.

'A European revival in a sector which is so important for modern industrial economies,' he concluded, 'far from constituting an obstacle to the accession of applicant States will provide a further incentive, especially if the Six are able to offer the new members a scientific and technological policy which is one of expansion and not one of structures in a state of crisis.'

In reply to questions, Mr. Spinelli pointed out that consolidating nuclear research would have its counterpart in the new industries. Now that new increases in the cost of oil were likely, the spread of the use of nuclear energy could be developed still further in the years ahead. Hence the need to build new reactors whose use would not be limited to the country which is the first to build them but which would be geared to the needs of the whole European Community. The problem, therefore, was one of research, not of a common industrial policy. Any future programme would have to be carried out in the general interests of the Community and not devised solely at the national level.

(Avanti, 23 February 1971;  
Il Sole-24 Ore, 23 February 1971)

## II. MOVEMENTS, ORGANIZATIONS AND PROMINENT FIGURES

### 1. Western Communist Parties hold a conference in London

The Communist Parties of Western Europe held a conference in London from 11 to 13 January. The theme of the conference was: 'The struggle of the working classes in the European capitalist countries in the face of the growth of transnational enterprises.'

The conference was the first meeting of the Communist Parties of Western Europe dealing specifically with economic questions. Delegations from 15 countries took part.

The delegations present emphasized that in the struggle against capital and imperialism, the growth of transnational enterprises raised new problems and threw up new requirements as regards the working and living conditions of the working classes and the other sections of the population, as regards national sovereignty and as regards the chances of democratic progress in each country.

As stated in the final communiqué, 'The conference was a proof of the solidarity of the Communist Parties and demonstrated how necessary and valuable it was to maintain contacts between the parties of the various countries to exchange information and experience so as to coordinate their action.' The communiqué went on : 'We noted, during the conference, that as a result of practical experience there has already been a widespread realization in democratic and working class circles that joint action is both necessary and possible on the problems raised by the development of transnational enterprises.'

Among the various speeches that of Mr. Amendola was particularly remarkable; he reviewed the experience of the Italian Communists in the European Parliament and the political conclusions to be drawn from this experience both for the policy of economic integration in Europe and for the line that the European working class movement should follow.

'... There is a great deal of discussion today about the supra-national powers that the European Economic Community has or should have. Some European federalists feel a centralized supranational state should be set

up to centralize the powers formerly vested in such highly centralized States as France and the United Kingdom. It is these aims that are the target of the criticisms and opposition of those who wish to defend the prerogatives of the nation-States.

... I can understand the attitude of the Communist Party in the United Kingdom in opposing British entry into the Common Market on the conditions indicated by the British Government. The entry of the United Kingdom into the European Economic Community is a problem which should be decided in a sovereign manner by the British people. I hope I may be allowed to add that if Britain does join the European Economic Community I believe that the presence of the British working class in this Community will lend us strength in our struggle to change the Community and make it more democratic. The presence of the United Kingdom in the EEC will also help to counterbalance the hegemony of Federal Germany.

The presence of an Italian Communist delegation in the European Parliament has proved valuable. It has enabled us to learn more about the real nature of the process of internationalizing the economy.

... It is true that the EEC continues to bear the marks of its creation because it came into being during the cold war era on the basis of a supposed identity of interests ('choice of civilization') between the countries of capitalist Europe and the United States, and as a means of combating the supposed threat of the Soviet Union. But today the changes that have taken place in the emphasis of the Community's activities are already clear.

... We have often repeated that the Common Market is an undeniable reality which must be borne in mind. Let us add that we are part of this reality; hence we must make our presence actively felt to change this reality. It will certainly not change just because we take part in the work of the European Parliament in Strasbourg, but only if we act on a broad basis, at social, national, international, trade union and political levels, to induce the peoples of Europe to establish new ways of uniting and cooperating to make Europe, the continent of two great world wars, a continent of peace. It is a question of promoting cooperation in every field so that the peoples of Europe may, through a multiplication of contacts between them, find their common heritage, an awareness of their common interests, in order that the present division of Europe can end and the super States cease to dominate, and so that a rapprochement can be effected between States on the basis of the principles of territorial integrity, non-interference in the domestic affairs of others, and mutual respect for the sovereignty, equality and independence of others.



We need to realize that the European reality is already to some extent changing, and this is partly because of the action taken by the socialist States. There is growing interest among these States in the Common Market and in developing trade and bilateral and multilateral economic relations. The Budapest proposal for a European Security Conference, which the European Parliament has systematically ignored for one year, is now being recognized as promising from the détente point of view, and worth working on.

... Even the election of a European Parliament can become a democratic fact. The Italian Communists have said that they are in favour, but on the following conditions: (i) direct universal suffrage and with common laws applicable for all States, (ii) proportional representation so as to ensure that all political shades of opinion are represented in the Parliament without discrimination, including those of minority groups. This cannot be an Assembly comprising sectors each elected in a different way. Hence we have accused some Europeans of hypocrisy because they talk of European elections as being something for the near future but do not say under what conditions these elections should take place. We must combat the present discriminations so that we can all be present in this Assembly too, and thus carry on our struggle together.'

(Nota Centro Studi di Politica Economica del P. C. I. ;  
L'Unità, 12-13 and 15 January 1971)

## 2. The European Union of Christian Democrats (EUCD) criticizes the German Opposition's attitude to the Ostpolitik

Various European Christian Democratic Parties, including the Dutch one, are very concerned about the way in which the West German CDU has been criticizing and opposing the Ostpolitik of Federal Chancellor Brandt. This was the subject of a discussion during a two-day visit to the Netherlands by Mr. Rumor, former Prime Minister of Italy, and currently Chairman of the European Union of Christian Democrats (EUCD).

On 27 January Mr. Rumor had a meeting with the younger members of the Catholic People's Party, the Anti-Revolutionary Party and the Christian Historical Union in the Second Chamber. The talks were continued with the Chairmen of the three Dutch Christian parties and the Group Chairmen from the Second Chamber.

Generally speaking the EUCD appreciated the West German Government's Ostpolitik but it also wanted to keep its eye open for possible dangers. Nevertheless it could see no reason for criticizing Chancellor Brandt for the steps he had so far taken. In constant touch with the CDU/CSU the EUCD wished to be helpful in assessing and going along with the Ostpolitik. There should be more contacts with the West German party, and possibly with the Christian Democratic parties in the Scandinavian countries and Ireland, in connection with the enlargement of the EEC.

(Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant-Handelsblad, 28 January 1971)

### 3. European industry and the granting of generalized tariff preferences

On 1 February 1971 the Union of Industries in the European Community (UNICE) stated its attitude to the granting of generalized tariff preferences on the exports of manufactures and semi-manufactures from the developing countries. It laid special stress on the principle of simultaneousness. 'Since the system of generalized preferences is devised to enable all the industrialized countries to participate and make comparable efforts, UNICE considers that it would be quite unacceptable for the Community to introduce the benefits it has offered the developing countries without having any assurance that the other industrialized countries are doing the same. If this principle of simultaneousness is not adhered to the Community would have to bear the weight of the preferential imports of the developing countries practically on its own, which would penalize European industry by obliging it to bear the main burden of the risks inherent in increased competition from these products from the developing countries.'

As for the choice of beneficiary States, UNICE states that it must be made according to objective criteria, taking into account the degree of competitiveness of their industries. 'UNICE deplores the fact that the EEC decided to apply the system of generalized preferences to all the developing countries that are members of the "Group of 77" without distinction. The case of the other countries that consider that they are developing countries has, for the time being, not been settled.

The problem of the Communities' granting the benefit of generalized preferences does not arise for countries whose tariff relations with the EEC are or will be settled by special agreements. There could be no question of the EEC's granting the benefit of generalized preferences to the state-trading countries which are applying for this (at present: Rumania, Bulgaria

and Cuba) because their way of arriving at their export prices is incompatible with our own.

UNICE asks that exceptional precautions be taken with respect to products from Hong Kong and Macao. '

Concluding its opinion, UNICE states: 'Generally speaking, a system of generalized preferences would only be acceptable if all the main industrialized countries made comparable efforts in this context in the industrial sector. In particular UNICE could not accept measures to restrict imports, on the part of some of them, on products attracting preferences in other countries.

With these reservations, the procedure of tariff quotas envisaged by the EEC will only achieve its objective if there is real respect for the ceilings laid down and if the rules of origin referred to are strictly applied.

The solution to the complex technical problems still outstanding will also have a decisive effect on the final assessment that one may make of the system. '

(Paper submitted by UNICE)

#### 4. Opinion of the Association of EEC Savings Banks on the plans for economic and monetary union

On 2 February, i. e. a few days before the Council's decision, the Association of EEC Savings Banks published an opinion on the Werner Committee's report and on the European Commission's memorandum on the multi-stage plan for economic and monetary union.

In this opinion, the Association starts by expressing its warm congratulations to the Committee led by Mr. Werner. It also sets out a number of critical comments on the two texts under examination.

On institutional problems, the Association declares: 'Since the Commission's proposals stop at the transition to the second stage, it would

have been essential to reach real agreement on the ultimate objective. The "political significance" and "irreversible nature" of the economic and monetary union as well as the transfer to the Community of the "necessary powers" and "democratic control" of the latter "at Community level", require, before the first stage is embarked upon, a clear and formal resolve by all the Member States to accept a political union. The conclusions reached in the Werner Committee's plan admittedly allude to such union but it is not enough to propose the establishment of two new Community bodies, i.e. decision-taking centres for economic and monetary policy, without also mentioning the links to be established with existing bodies. (European Commission and Council of Ministers). By advocating the political responsibility of the economic policy decision-taking centre but not of the monetary policy body to the European Parliament, the Werner report respects the independence of the central banks. In Article 1 of the proposed decision on the strengthening of cooperation between central banks, the Commission suggests that the Governors should define their liquidity, credit and interest rate policy within the framework of the economic and monetary policy guidelines laid down by the Council.' In the Association's opinion this proposal might excessively curtail the independence of the central banks and of their common institution.

The Association published the following opinion on economic policy. 'The proposed decision of the European Commission on the coordination of short-term economic policies is associated with the simultaneous adoption of the third medium-term policy programme. But for the first stage towards an economic union it will not be enough simply to lay down procedures for consultation in order to arrive at target figures while neglecting to provide short-term emergency indicators ("flashing lights") which the Commission had itself suggested in March 1970.

While the economic objectives are quantified in the third medium-term policy programme the Commission, in its draft resolution, has confined itself to mentioning them successively without indicating priorities. In addition by comparison with the Werner Report which intends to turn the Community into a "bloc of stability", the Commission's proposal seems to have shifted the emphasis somewhat since it mentions stability only in third place after growth and full employment. The Association considers it absolutely essential to include a more clearly defined obligation to safeguard the stability of monetary value in the decisions to be taken on the path towards economic and monetary union.'

The Association also stresses the importance of structural problems: 'In this connection the Association recalls its demand for rapid re-establishment of full convertibility and liberalization of the capital market. The Association also draws attention to the harmonization of measures to promote savings in the Member States; this problem, which is also referred

to in the Werner Report, is a decisive factor in capital market policy and also for fiscal harmonization.'

The Association makes the following comments on monetary policy: 'The premature reduction of fluctuation bands automatically calls for a greater coordination of the economic development of Member States. Speculation on changes in exchange rates would mean that the point at which the central banks must intervene would be reached more frequently for individual currencies, obliging these banks to provide more massive support than if wider fluctuation bands are adopted; parity changes would then be even more likely to occur if economic development continued to diverge during the transitional period before full monetary union.

The system of short-term monetary support, now backed by medium-term assistance, is a counterbalance to monetary speculation. The suggestion made by the Governors of the central banks that the two systems i. e. both short and medium-term financial support under the responsibility of the governments, should be incorporated into the common monetary fund which is to be progressively created seems dangerous during the transitional period in which there is a risk that parity changes will still occur; in fact parities and medium-term support are a matter for the governments while short-term support is the responsibility of the central banks. And in the final phase of monetary union, mutual financial aid will no longer have any practical value since the currencies of the Member States whose parities would then be fixed would be equivalent to a Community currency.'

(Bulletin of the Association of EEC Savings Banks, 4 February 1971)

##### 5. The European Left and the economic and monetary union

The French movement 'The European Left' held a conference in Suresnes on 6 February at which it studied the economic and monetary union. The debate was opened by Mr. Pierre Lavau who presented a report.

After analysing the main policy lines of the economic and monetary union, the Lavau report sets out 'the main features of a socialist attitude to the Werner Plan':

'The members of the European Left have constantly stressed both their desire to help build political Europe and their determination to make it a

socialist one. Some even tend to consider it irrelevant to discuss their readiness if called on to do so, to support any European plan which ignores socialist aspirations and provides only a minimum of means for satisfying them. This attitude is based on the conviction that in any case there can be no Europe that is not a socialist one, at least in the long term, and that no socialism is possible for the French on any scale smaller than the European one.

We do not share this view. We believe that we must strongly challenge any plan liable to prejudice the chances for socialism in the Community countries. The Werner Plan cannot, as a whole, be considered in this light, in that it contains a number of ideas that could be developed under pressure from the representatives of the political left and the trade unions. But these still have to be defined, and we have also to define as clearly as we can where we wish the emphasis to be placed as regards both ends and means.

#### Points for attention

The desire for a common attitude to the dollar and US policy reflects an obvious concern of the French socialists. It is therefore encouraging to see that this is now shared by most of the Community countries even though it first found expression in Gaullist policy - albeit independently of any design for organizing developments in Europe and the world. The Werner Plan thus deserves to be approved on this point, particularly in its proposal that the Community should be represented, as soon as possible, on the main international monetary bodies. But we must go further and challenge the way in which powers and drawing rights are divided up in relation to the quotas paid in by the member countries.

Care should also be taken not to go further than the requirements laid down by the authors of the Werner Plan as regards the domestic policies of the Union. Throughout the whole of the first stage at least the Member States should remain free to make any necessary changes in their own rates of exchange unilaterally. So long as the Union remains a matter of straightforward cooperation, such an option will be the inalienable right of any nation which wishes to protect its economy against possible domination by its neighbours. It would also be unacceptable if the arsenal of resources of cyclical policy were used to thwart wage demands; this is not recommended by the Werner Plan but is invariably the aim of the advocates of monetary orthodoxy. The recent report by the OECD on inflation includes analyses which justify the watchfulness of the trade unions as regards anything affecting wage trends in production cost policy.

Some of the recommendations of the Plan can be applied by the French Left in a way rather different from that intended by the authors. Harmonization of VAT rates, which is designed to equalize tax conditions affecting competition, would be a good way of promoting a serious reform of the whole French taxation system: in so far as the French rate is higher than the European average, harmonization would tend to reduce it and therefore to increase the proportion of direct taxes in total tax revenue. At the same time it would be more difficult for the Government to refuse a change in income tax that makes it less unfair for wage earners.

Above all, the French Left can draw attention to the anomaly in the French Government's position: one cannot say one is in favour of economic and monetary union while rejecting the political conditions of its operation, and proposing nothing but the pursuit of cooperation without any particular end in view. If such an attitude were accepted by our partners it would confront us with the prospect of periodic financial reorganizations, so that it would never be possible in the Community market, soon to include at least ten countries, to re-establish lasting conditions for economic recovery.

#### A firmer development policy

In the matter of policy - whether industrial, employment, regional, urban or research policy - use must be made of a number of facilities that have already been more or less tried out, even by conservative governments, in the various Community countries:

Public (national and regional) investment bodies, to intervene at various levels in the union, are essential to divert savings to crucial development sectors and help to redevelop declining industries. By granting medium-term credits, purchasing shares or setting up public enterprises, they would be able to use part of the resources reserved in the Community budget and of the funds raised from bond issued on the Community market, including Euro-currencies, provided that the monetary authorities can reduce the rates of interest there applied.

The budget of the Union could be increased by raising extra taxes with a view to providing compensation in the sphere of employment, collective facilities and part-financing of the public investment bodies referred to.

As regards incomes and social allowances, the pressure of the trade unions and political Left will be aimed at spreading the benefits obtained in the most dynamic sectors or countries as widely as possible; this obviously means vigorous and, if possible, coordinated action by the trade union

movements in the Community.

All these facilities and policy options should be organized within a much more definite programme than the straightforward projections laid down in the Werner Plan. Credit policy geared to the aims of the Plan, and not only to controlling the cyclical situation, should be one way of promoting the key sectors and the indirect factors in development.

#### Relations between the Union and other countries

The Werner Plan is particularly discreet on this point.

There is no doubt that the policy line taken by Europe in relation to the rest of the world will depend on the policy line it adopts regarding its own development. If it only intends to adopt, while toning down, the most common Western model, economic and monetary union will no doubt tend to acquire a more comfortable position among the great powers which dominate the world's economy.

Conscious or not is this not the idea underlying the aim of making a future European currency into a second reserve currency (which would take over from sterling and offset the dollar)? Not since the second world war has the world been able to welcome such a historic move as the introduction of national (or possibly Community) currencies into the reserves of the central banks - apart, that is, (and then not always) from the countries issuing these currencies.

It is hard to imagine how a European currency could become a reserve currency for the other central banks unless the European union were to win acceptance by the rest of the world for the permanent deficit in its balance of payments, which would be the necessary counterpart for the reserves accumulated by third countries.'

During the course of the debates, Mr. Francois Mitterand, President of the Convention of Republican Institutions, stated: 'I should prefer the nucleus of a policy in which the socialists and trade unionists can participate to no nucleus at all. A Europe without a common currency will remain the Europe of Yalta.' Mr. Mitterand considered that to propose the unification of currencies without going through the intermediate stage of planning was to court failure. Progress had therefore to be made in this direction, and towards a European power based on universal suffrage, through a policy of



'small steps' that took advantage of the present situation.

For Mr. Pierre Mendès France, 'if the political will does not exist it would be illusory to believe that technical arrangements could take its place.

The adoption of the Werner Plan must be accompanied by progress in every field, particularly as regards policies on incomes and social affairs, and planning and investment in research.'

(Organisation française de la gauche européenne : Rapport Lavau;  
Le Monde, 9 February 1971)

6. Speech by Mr. Edward Heath, British Prime Minister, before the Parliamentary Council of the European Movement, and final declaration of the Conference

Addressing the Parliamentary Council of the European Movement at its meeting in London on 12 February 1971, Mr. Heath, British Prime Minister, and Mr. Barber, Chancellor of the Exchequer, both reaffirmed Britain's determination to enter the European Community.

Mr. Heath stressed the political aspects of the British application whereas Mr. Barber dealt with the economic aspects of membership.

Mr. Heath stated: 'What we are engaged in is not simply a knitting together of the unravelled threads of our own Continent. It is not only a final cancelling out of the ancient rivalries which have brought so much destruction in the past. Above all, it is emphatically not an exercise in narrow regionalism. For we, all of us, have worldwide interests and the expansion, not the contraction of these interests, is one of the aims which we share.

We believe that Europe can and should emerge as a community expressing its own point of view and exercising its own influence. Politically the challenge is to create a unity of action which will give our countries collectively that position in world affairs which individually is beyond our reach. As members of the Community, we would wish to share in the continued development of effective institutions to this end. This is the practical approach

to institutional change for which I believe there is wide support.

And if I may make a personal suggestion to you, it would be this. It has always seemed to me, and particularly after talking to those who had so much to do with the founding of the Communities, that the Community itself was created ab ovo, a new sort of organization never before seen in the world, thought of, conceived for the first time, and brought about by the individual efforts of some of the most distinguished Europeans backed by the peoples of their countries.

Why then do we go on thinking of the development of institutions in Europe in the ancient forms seen elsewhere in the world in history instead of trying to think ourselves into fashioning for these additional purposes new institutions of a new kind which will meet the needs of our own particular membership?

The argument about federation and confederation has long seemed to me to be sterile and unworthy of the past of the Communities. We should be thinking in fresh terms of fresh institutions as the founding fathers thought when they first began the creation of this work in the early fifties.'

At the close of its meeting the Parliamentary Conference approved the following declaration:

'It is essential to speed up the creation of an economically and politically united Europe embracing all the democratic countries of Europe which accept the obligations that stem from it.

It is of the greatest importance for the future of Europe that the negotiations in progress for the enlargement of the Community should be rounded off successfully during 1971.

The recent decisions on the establishment by stages of economic and monetary union constitute significant progress in the process of European integration.

The functions of the Community should be extended and should embrace foreign policy and defence.

The agreements concluded on consultations constitute a useful first step. But to ensure the effectiveness of such consultations as those at present in progress between Ministers and senior officials, it will be essential for the enlarged Community to assign the task of making a continuous study of these problems of foreign policy and defence to an independent body, so that reference can be made to a collective European viewpoint in proffering opinions to governments to enable them to devise common European policies.

The further Europe progresses towards political union and the wider the functions of the Community become, the more it will be necessary to strengthen the structures of its executive bodies and to establish democratic control over its budget and its policy. The powers of the European Parliament must be enlarged and its authority increased by the introduction of direct elections based on universal suffrage.

The creation of a united and strong democratic Europe is of the greatest importance for preserving peace, helping the developing countries and improving relations between the East and West of the continent.'

(Document sent by the Parliamentary Council of the European Movement and the UK delegation to the European Communities)

## 7. The Conference of the Monnet Committee in Bonn

The Action Committee for the United States of Europe (Monnet Committee) held a meeting in Bonn from 23 to 24 February 1971.

Six points were dealt with at this meeting: the accession of the United Kingdom, economic and monetary union, action in the social field, relations between the Community and the East and the United States, and the political shaping of Europe.

The Action Committee passed several resolutions on these points:

### I. Accession of the United Kingdom

The Committee notes:

(a) that the main result of the negotiations between Britain and the

Six will be to make the economic problems that they have so far been trying to deal with separately into common problems and enable them to act together in tackling the obstacles standing in the way of their development;

(b) that the enlargement of the European Economic Community ought, after a period of transitional arrangements, to lead to a substantial increase in Britain's resources. This has been demonstrated by the experience of the Six. One of the aims of the negotiations should be to ensure that this increase in resources should enable Britain to help finance the Community budget without any major difficulty;

(c) that Community policy in the financial field ought, instead of being limited mainly to agriculture as is the case today, to be extended during the next few years to other fields such as social policy, regional policy, advanced technology and so on;

(d) that the problems raised by the political organization of Europe ought to be pinpointed and discussed by the countries of the enlarged Community. The participation of Britain, with its strong democratic tradition, will be particularly important.

The Europe thus constituted will be able to play a crucial role in the world in furthering the progress of the developing countries and the cause of peace.

The Committee stresses the importance of the statements made by the British Government confirming that Britain will participate in the gradual establishment of economic and monetary union once it has joined the Community.

The Committee considers that the negotiations with the other applicant States should be pursued in the same spirit as those in progress with Britain.

## II. Economic and monetary union

The decision of the Council of Ministers to create an economic and monetary union is extremely important. The transformation of the present customs union into an economic and monetary union means the transformation of our national economies into one vast European entity ...

Hence the Committee would like a report to be submitted to it within six months concerning the introductory measures taken in the interval.

It has made a request to this effect to President Werner who has accepted.

The Committee considers that absolute priority should be given to reducing the wide disparities between regions in the Community. This calls for a coherent overall economic policy.

### III. Social action

The Committee again stresses the need to pursue economic integration with an eye to social progress and to involve both sides of industry in the gradual establishment of economic and monetary union. It is essential that the Commission consult both sides of industry before adopting the main lines of an economic policy at the Community level.

Moreover, regular joint consultations between the Commission, the Council of Ministers and leading representatives of both sides of industry are essential.

On the basis of the experience gained, the Economic and Social Committee needs to be made more effective.

The Committee asks that the new Social Fund should be set up before the end of the year and endowed with sufficient resources to ensure that joint action by the Member States really helps to maintain the continuity of employment and of workers' income, and in particular to overcome structural and regional problems.

Full employment is a key feature of a real social policy for the Community. This calls for the adoption of a common policy by the Member States of the Community.

The creation of the Standing Committee on Employment could be considered as one of the first and most important contributions that could be made towards achieving such a common policy.

The Committee reaffirms its conviction that free collective bargaining on wages and working conditions between employers and employees is an essential feature of the European economic and social system.

#### IV. Relations between the Committee and the United States

In view of disagreements about trade, the Committee considers it a matter of urgency that cooperation between the United States and Europe be stepped up.

The Committee considers that it would be worthwhile to study with the USA arrangements for regular discussions on an equal footing at which to debate the American and European views on questions of mutual interest. To this end the creation of a standing body for mutual consultations, comprising representatives of the United States and the European Community, might be appropriate.

#### V. Relations between the Community and the East

The Committee ask that an approach be made to the Soviet Union and the East European countries which have not yet recognized the Community, so as to determine how regular consultations could be held on economic issues of mutual interest.

The primary object of these consultations would be an expansion of trade, particularly through the machinery of a multilateral arrangement, the harmonization of credit policies and stepping up the exchange of technological know-how through the creation of European consortia on a really large scale.

In accordance with Article 113 of the Treaty of Rome, agreements negotiated and concluded by the European Economic Community have to take the place of bilateral agreements between Member States and the countries of the East.

#### VI. The political organization of Europe

At The Hague the Heads of State or Government of the Six desired 'to reaffirm their faith in the political objects which give to the Community its whole meaning and significance ...'

Following its resolution of 11 March 1969, (paragraph 8), the Committee decided to set up a sub-Committee which is to be asked to report

within a year on the forms which the political organization of the European Community could take.

In carrying out this task the sub-Committee will be guided mainly by the declaration made by the Committee in Bonn, on 16 December 1969, to the effect that 'the Committee is convinced that a political authority is inconceivable if it does not have its roots in common interests of which people are aware and which are sufficiently well-organized, and in universal suffrage. It considers that economic integration, against a background of social progress, is a condition of and conducive to political integration, but this will not come about on its own unless an effort is made and unless there is a deliberate will to achieve it.

Furthermore the sub-Committee will study how the countries of the European Community will, when it is enlarged, become organized so that they can speak with a single voice on international affairs.

It will take into account the regular consultations that have already been organized in the field of foreign policy, of the need to ensure that the Community can take effective action and, in particular, of the practical requirements of enlargement and of economic and monetary union. It will also refer to the state of progress of the Community and the experience gained in its operation, and its shortcomings. It will indicate what stages need to be laid down and will study the desirability of considering questions relating to the security of the Member States at this stage.

The operation of the European Community will be a matter for its institutions to which the Member States will continue to delegate those of their powers which they have so far retained which may be necessary to solve common problems according to the principles and rules which have made democracy work in our countries.

The elaboration of the difficult and complex tasks calls for discussion and thought. The Committee will make a useful contribution to the major debate which must be held on this subject.

(Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamts der Bundesregierung, No. 28,  
24 February 1971;  
Das Parlament, No. 10, 6 March 1971)

8. The European trade unions pledge their support for the developing countries

On 1 March 1971 the European Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ECFTU) and the European Organization of the World Labour Federation (WLF) have jointly drawn up and sent to the President of the European Parliament a memorandum on 'The European Community and the developing countries'.

The following are extracts from this memorandum.

'Recalling that the first aim of any economic policy that is to be acceptable to the whole labour movement must be to secure and maintain full employment, and being convinced that there must be a new international division of work, the ECFTU and the WLF:

- (a) demand that structural reforms be undertaken now, making use of the European Social Fund, and that there should be a redevelopment of the industries in the industrialized States so as to allow for the launching and development of the industrial production of the developing countries while ensuring that the workers in the industrialized States are not the victims of the necessary changes which must improve prospects for all;
- (b) point out that the top priority in the strategy of the second development decade must be to create productive employment and raise the living standards of the developing countries;
- (c) urge that there should be a rapid coordination of the action of the Member States of the Community on behalf of immigrant workers from associated States and developing third countries, so that they may have working and living conditions that are identical to those of the Community workers within the framework of an organized migration policy...

Considering that world trade should not be geared solely to the criteria of profit and speculation but should come under international cooperation for development, they appeal to the governments and to the Community to encourage:

- (a) giving priority to the conclusion of international agreements on primary commodities, including the setting of stable and fair prices, the conclusion of long-term purchasing contracts, the organization and financing of stocks etc. ... At a later stage such agreements must also contain regulations on synthetic products that compete with primary commodities;



- (b) the establishment of non-discriminatory tariff preferences for manufactures and semi-manufactures exported by the developing countries;
- (c) reduction of indirect taxes on the products exported by the developing countries.

Wanting to promote effective economic cooperation, they call upon the governments and the directing bodies of the Community to accept 1972 as the time-limit for achieving the aim of bringing the level of aid to at least one per cent of the gross national product, as provided in the resolution passed by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1968 ...

Convinced that the structures and the institutions of the Community must measure up to the needs of an active and systematic policy on behalf of the developing countries, the ECFTU and the WLF ask:

- (a) that consultations be held, within the Association, between representatives of the economic and social organizations (including the trade unions) of the associated States and the Community;
- (b) that pending their integration in an international system, an urgent review be carried out by the responsible authorities of the various association treaties with a view to merging them;
- (c) that an independent group of experts be set up to look into and assess the economic and social consequences for the developing countries of the decisions taken by the Community and the Member States. Provision should be made for the publication of an annual report summing up their main conclusions;
- (d) that the overseas development section of the Economic and Social Committee be entrusted with the task of giving opinions on the problems raised by the associations and on the commitments of the EEC within the various international organizations;
- (e) that wider resources be made available to the European Development Fund whose activities should be directed towards:
  - (i) plans to assist the execution of national projects or projects which are part of regional reorganization schemes;
  - (ii) the organization and financing of traineeships and retraining courses;
  - (iii) taking account of projects submitted by trade union and professional bodies in the same way as those of the public authorities. The

representatives of the associated States must take part in the EDF's analysis of projects;

- (f) that technical assistants should be recruited by careful selection, their general psychological and ethnological training polished up before their departure, and facilities given them to continue their professional training or retraining, as necessary; and that a statute for technical assistants, which would guarantee their employment during their stay and on their return to their country of origin, be drawn up in cooperation with the trade union organizations by the Member States and Community bodies;
- (g) that regular consultations be organized between the European trade unions regarding foreign policy decisions, particularly on the associations, relations with the associated States and developing third countries, and direct action for development, either direct or within international institutions;
- (h) that conferences be organized between European trade union organizations and the trade union organizations of the associated States and of the countries of the third world.'

(Document sent by the ECFTU and the WLF)

#### 9. Manifesto of the Liberal Movement for a United Europe

On 4 March 1971 the Liberal Movement for a United Europe held its general assembly at Val Duchesse near Brussels under the chairmanship of Mr. Jean Rey, former president of the Commission of the European Communities. The members of the Liberal Group of the European Parliament, and large delegations comprising many Liberal parliamentarians from Germany, Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands also took part.

In the communiqué issued on this occasion the Movement stated: 'After reviewing the situation in Europe, the political and economic prospects for the Community and the function of liberalism in this context, the assembly, out of a real desire for efficiency, has decided that the Movement should concentrate its efforts in the present Member States of the Community. Associated sections could be set up in the other democratic countries of Europe, particularly those that have applied for membership of the Community. These sections will automatically become full members of the Move-

ment as soon as their country joins the European Communities.

The assembly considered that European unity would be conducive to a society based on freedom, progress and responsibility; united Europe would thus have to promote true social justice, without which freedom is the privilege of a minority.

The Liberal view had always been based on a determination to progress and to change society, with the emphasis on the power of ideas and reason; it had always been resolutely forward-looking and wished to complete what it regarded as its task - the creation of an open European society freed from the shackles of ignorance and poverty and the anxieties of war.

In affirming these principles the assembly showed its determination to take an active and constructive part in achieving European political unity on the basis of democratization and consolidation of the Community institutions.

To achieve this, the Movement pointed out that:

- (a) the present institutions of the Community must be consolidated so that it can achieve its objectives. This will be even more to the point in an enlarged Community. It is time to give practical effect to the principle of consolidation which all the governments endorse;
- (b) the European Parliament must be elected by universal suffrage without further delay; it must be endowed with a real legislative power, so as to consolidate its foundations at the level of the people and to increase its political authority;
- (c) the Council of Ministers must reintroduce the practice laid down in the Treaties of voting on a majority basis, and make its methods of decision-taking both swifter and more effective;
- (d) the powers of the Commission must be increased together with its responsibilities for managing the Community, which must to an increasing extent be run by the executive methods of a government rather than by the deliberative methods of international conferences.

Mr. Jean Rey was unanimously elected Chairman of the Movement. Its Vice-Chairmen will be Mr. Cornelius Berkhouwer, Chairman of the Liberal Group of the European Parliament, and Mr. Gaston Thorn, Chairman of the Liberal International. Mr. Michel Junot, a former Chairman of the Liberal Group at the Council of Europe and at the WEU, will be Treasurer,

and Mr. Joseph Sans, Secretary-General.

(Communiqué of the Liberal Movement for a United Europe, 4 March 1971)

10. Resolution of the Institute for Cooperation between Italy and Latin America on relations between Latin America and the EEC

On 18 March 1971 the Council of Representatives of the Institute for Cooperation between Italy and Latin America (IILA) approved a resolution which they forwarded to the Presidents of the European Institutions.

In this document the IILA Council, after recalling past relations with the Community:

- Notes that some efforts have been made on both sides of the Atlantic to develop relations between Member States of the European Communities and the Latin American countries both on the multilateral and bilateral level, and hopes that future official contacts in Brussels will achieve the objectives and implement the proposals laid down in the Buenos Aires declaration and in the statement by the Council of the European Communities;
- Stresses the support the Italian Government has given to the Latin American countries in the search for effective and permanent cooperation with the European Communities;
- Indicates as the main objectives for the historic meeting of the two continents in the framework of the resolution appended to the Buenos Aires declaration: the rapid application of generalized non-reciprocal and non-discriminatory preferences for manufactures and semi-manufactures of the developing countries; the progressive elimination of preferential areas for primary products; the establishment of a European Development Fund for Latin America; and the development of technical cooperation between Europe and Latin America;
- Emphasizes the urgent need for these objectives to be achieved in the interests of the people of Latin America and Europe;

DECIDES TO

- Renew its demand, in accordance with the Buenos Aires declaration and the appended resolution as well as resolution 3/IX of the 9th extraordinary

meeting of CECLA in Brasilia in February 1971, for the institution of a system of mutual contacts to facilitate the dialogue between Latin America and the European Communities at a high political level;

- To call upon its President and Secretary-General to transmit this resolution to the Institutions of the European Communities.

(Institute for Cooperation between Italy and Latin America - Resolution)

11. Press conference given by Mr. Vetrone, President of the Committee of Professional Agricultural Organizations (COPA), and resolution passed by the Committee

At a press conference in Luxembourg on 18 March, Mr. Vetrone reaffirmed the standpoint of the European farmers regarding the Commission proposals on agricultural prices and structures.

The memorandum submitted by the Commission in 1968 and known as the Mansholt Plan had, indeed, raised hopes of higher farm incomes. COPA stressed that the solution to the problem lay in the link between the prices and structures policies, and called on the Community bodies to defend this link. Cereal prices had not been changed since 1964, and those for other products since 1966. The Commission's present proposals appeared unacceptable because they were inadequate and incomplete and would thus not give the producers any immediate rise in income. They were incomplete because they did not cover all the agricultural products coming under Common Market organizations. Here Mr. Vetrone referred to products from the Mediterranean. They were inadequate because the increase in prices did not take into account the rise in production costs. He trusted that the Council of Ministers would take the wishes of the farming community into account, and that the European agricultural crisis would not become a political crisis. It was to be feared that if the decisions of the Council did not measure up to the wishes of the farmers the latter might call on their respective governments for help.

Mr. Vetrone referred to some of the difficulties that the increase in agricultural prices would raise in relations between the Community and the United States of America, especially now that negotiations for enlarging the Community were in progress. In his opinion one could not talk of protectionism while the Community was only adjusting agricultural prices to cope with inflation, especially since this adjustment was also being made in the United

States and the United Kingdom.

On 23 March COPA held an extraordinary assembly at the Palais des Congrès in Brussels where it passed a resolution which Mr. Vetrone had presented the same day to the Council of the European Communities, also meeting in Brussels.

In this resolution COPA restated the arguments already outlined by Mr. Vetrone at his press conference. It further expressed the disappointment and discouragement felt by farmers in the Community at the stagnation of the common agricultural policy.

It asked that the regulations on the organization of markets should be better adjusted. Finally it addressed a serious warning to the Council: in its opinion only an active and dynamic policy could give the farmers back their confidence in the Community and avoid the disintegration of the common agricultural policy. Failing such a policy, the problems of farmers would have to be solved by national measures which would threaten the unity of the Community.

(Luxemburger Wort, Il Sole-24 Ore, 19 March;  
Le Soir, 24 March)

## 12. European industries want balanced economic expansion

Addressing the trade unions, the governments and the Community authorities, the Union of Industries in the European Community (UNICE) stated that 'vigorous action should be taken by the governments, the European Commission, and both sides of industry, to ensure balanced economic expansion in the Community as a whole. Only at this price will Europe be able to contain the tensions which are appearing in the economies of the Member States and keep expansion going while at the same time maintaining monetary stability. Such action is essential to allow for a common economic and monetary policy to be carried through; it would, in fact, be the first stage.'

UNICE concluded that 'the world-wide inflationary trend has become dangerously widespread within the Community itself where the increase in prices is distinctly greater than it has ever been before. The psychosis of a fall in the value of currencies is spreading. The excessively high level of

interest rates is undermining the normal financing of enterprises and expansion.

The Council of Presidents of UNICE stresses the need to keep open the possibilities of a regular increase in living standards, but points out that wage increases outstrip growth of productivity appreciably in almost every country. The resulting increases in wage costs, which in some countries have reached proportions unknown since the last war, necessarily mean increases in prices. As a result the workers are under an illusion as to the real effect of their wage increases. Despite the indications of short-term economic policy difficulties in the Member States, this wage-cost pressure is being kept up relentlessly and may have the effect of making the inflationary trend self-perpetuating ...

Against the background of this development, which is not really under control, appreciable differences emerge at certain periods between the countries of the West and even between the countries of the Common Market. These differences cannot be maintained for very long within an area which is already highly integrated such as that of the Six, and what follows is a series of alignments in the levels of prices and wages ...

What is more to the point, the differences in the present state of the economy in the Community countries means disparities in the real value of currencies and leads to anarchy in the field of competition. The monetary and commercial disorders that are liable to follow are a direct threat to European integration ...

UNICE considers it its duty to stress the dangers of such a development and to urge Member States to develop harmonious economic, monetary and social policies.

It is a question first of all of ensuring that wage increases do not exceed those permitted by rises in productivity, failing which the increase in the purchasing power of wages will have no lasting foundation.

Governments should also take particular care to keep public spending within limits that are compatible with the general balance of the economy, and see to it that budgetary policy does not aggravate inflationary trends.

(L'Echo de la Bourse, 20 March 1971)





Zweiter Teil - Deuxième partie - Parte Seconda  
Tweede Deel - Part II

METHODISCHE BIBLIOGRAPHIE - BIBLIOGRAPHIE METHODIQUE  
BIBLIOGRAFIA METODICA - BIBLIOGRAFISCH OVERZICHT  
METHODICAL BIBLIOGRAPHY

Diese Bibliographie zählt eine Reihe der Bücher auf, welche die Bibliothek des Europäischen Parlaments im Zeitraum, auf den sich dieses Heft bezieht, erworben hat sowie die Zeitschriften, die sie in der gleichen Zeit auswertete.

Cette bibliographie représente une sélection des titres des ouvrages acquis ainsi que des périodiques dépouillés à la Bibliothèque du Parlement européen pendant la période couverte par la présente édition des Cahiers.

In questa bibliografia figura una scelta dei titoli delle opere ricevute e dei periodici selezionati alla Biblioteca del Parlamento europeo nel periodo coperto dalla presente edizione dei Quaderni.

Deze bibliografie geeft een keuze uit de aanwinsten van de Europese Parlements-bibliotheek en de periodieken waaruit in deze editie van "Europese Documentatie" artikelen zijn opgenomen.

This bibliography gives a selection of titles of books acquired and periodicals examined by the Library of the European Parliament during the period covered by this edition of the Digest.

1. Allgemeine Fragen - Problèmes généraux - Problemi generali  
Algemene vraagstukken - General matters

-----

1. - ALLEMAGNE. Wirtschaft (Bundesministerium). Presse und Information (Referat). Bonn : A. B. C. der Europäischen Gemeinschaften. Hof, Mintzel, 1970. 56 p. 8°  
(24.020)  
-----
2. - AMENDOLA, Giorgio : I Comunisti e l'Europa. (Roma), Ed. Riuniti, (1971). 96 p. 8°  
(Il Punto, 52).  
(24.696)  
-----
3. - BERTRAM, Christoph : Optionen europäischer Politik in den siebziger Jahren. (Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, n° B 49/70, 5 Dezember 1970, p. 42-48).  
(24.139)  
-----
4. - BRAUN, Sigismund von : Fortschritt in den Arbeiten der Gemeinschaft. (Aussenpolitik, n° 5, Mai 1971, p. 261-270).  
-----
5. - CIRCOLO DI STUDI DI PLOMATICI. Rome: La Francia e la Comunità europea. Roma, T. E. R. , 1968. 52 p. 8°  
(Dialoghi diplomatici, 1).  
(23.744)  
1  
-----
6. - CIRCOLO DI STUDI DIPLOMATICI. Rome : Il Rilancio dell'integrazione europea. Roma, T. E. R. , 1970. 24 p. 8°  
(Dialoghi diplomatici, 21).  
(23.744)  
21  
-----
7. - COLONNA, Guido : La Comunità Europea alle soglie del terzo decennio. (Affari Esteri, n° 9, gennaio 1971, p. 109-124).  
-----
8. - CONVEGNO NAZIONALE "Il P. S. U. ED I PROBLEMI EUROPEI". 1971. Florence : L'Impegno del P. S. U. per l'Europa. Atti... Firenze, P. S. U. , 1971. 132 p. 8°  
(24.232)  
-----

9. - CORNELIS, Petrus-Arsène : Europeans about Europe. What European students know and expect of the unification of Europe. A study in social psychology.  
Amsterdam, Swets a. Zeitlinger, 1970. 174 p., tabl. 8°  
(24.174) (bibliographie)
- 
10. - FRISCH, Alfred : Réflexions sur les nécessités, les insuffisances et les limites européennes.  
(Res Publica, n° 1, 1971, p. 5-21).
- 
11. - GROEBEN, Hans von der : Europa : Wunsch und Wirklichkeit. Eine Zwischenbilanz der Europa-Politik.  
(Europa Archiv, n° 1, 10. Januar 1971, p. 1-8).
- 
12. - HENE, Derek H. : Decision on Europe. An explanation of the common market.  
London, Jordan & Sons, 1970. XXV, 239 p., tabl. fig. 8°  
(24.466) (bibliographie)
- 
13. - JANZ, L. : Tous les chemins mènent-ils à l'Europe.  
(Res Publica, n° 1, 1971, p. 59-70).
- 
14. - KUBY, Heinz : Bilanz und Perspektiven der Europa-Politik. Krisenmanagement oder Emanzipationsstrategie. (Referat).  
(S.l.), 1970. 26 p. (n. pag.) 8°  
(Europäisches Gespräch, 1970).  
(23.999)
- 
15. - MARCHAL, André : L'Europe solidaire. T. 1-2.  
(Paris), Cujas, 1964-1970. 8°  
2. Les Problèmes. 1970. XIX, 487 p., tabl., ct.  
(16.715)
- 
16. - MAYNE, Richard : The Recovery of Europe. From devastation to unity.  
London, Weidenfeld a. Nicolson, (1970). 375 p. 8°  
(24.527) (bibliographie)
- 
17. - OPINION (L') et l'Europe dans les pays de la Communauté.  
(Union Agriculture, n° 315, janvier 1971, p. 46-51)
- 
18. - PATERSON, William E. : The Western European small State in the modern world.  
(Internationale Spectator, n° 3, 8 februari 1971, p. 333-342).
- 
19. - PINDER, John, PRYCE, Roy : Europa, Supermacht oder Entwicklungskontinent ? (Europe after de Gaulle. Towards the United States of Europe. Harmondsworth, 1969. Uebertr. a.d. Engl. von Alfred Kuoni).  
(Köln), Bildungswerk Europäische Politik, (1970). 179 p. 8°  
(Europäische Schriften des Bildungswerks Europäische Politik, 26).  
(23.249/1)
-

20. - PUCHALA, Donald J. : Patterns in West European integration.  
(Journal of Common Market Studies, n° 2, December 1970, p. 117-142)  
-----
21. - ROUGEMONT, Denis de : Lettre ouverte aux Européens.  
Paris, Michel, (1970). 213 p., fig. 8°  
(Collection Lettre ouverte).  
(24.219)  
-----
22. - RUSSETT, Bruce M. : Interdependence and capabilities for European  
cooperation.  
(Journal of Common Market Studies, n° 2, December 1970, p. 143-150).  
-----
23. - RUSSO, Carlo : Unione europea. Il compito della nostra generazione.  
(L'Europa, n° 5, 15 aprile 1971, p. 9-23).  
-----
24. - SCHOENDUBE, Claus : Das Neue Europa-Handbuch. Mit einem Vorwort  
von Walter Hallstein. (Hrsg. in Gemeinschaft mit der Europäischen  
Aktionsgemeinschaft e.V., Bonn.)  
Köln, Europa Union Verl., (1969). 248 p., tabl., fig., ill., ct. 8°  
(24.220) (bibliographie)  
-----
25. - VREDELING, H. : Naar een Progressieve Europese Partij ?  
(Socialisme en Democratie, n° 3, maart 1970, p. 144-151).  
-----
26. - WATERMAN, J. The Common market in the 1970's. A farewell to com-  
mon market.  
(Common Market, n° 11-12, November-December 1970, p. 242-248).  
-----

2. Institutionelle Fragen - Questions institutionnelles - Problemi istituzionali - Institutionele vraagstukken - Institutional matters

-----

27. - COLLOQUE EUROPEEN DES JEUNES PARLEMENTAIRES. 1970.  
Paris : Les Jeunes députés face à la démocratie parlementaire. Colloque...  
Paris, 30 novembre - 1er décembre 1970. T. 1-2.  
(Paris, 1970). 2 vol. 4°  
(D. 24.105)
- 
28. - ELEZIONE (Una) per l'Europa. Esposizione del significato e dei problemi del disegno di legge di iniziativa popolare per l'elezione unilaterale diretta dei delegati italiani al Parlamento Europeo, a cura della Commissione Italiana del Movimento Federalista Europeo.  
(Pavia, Il Federalista, n° 2, 1969. Suppl.)  
(24.194)
- 
29. - GAZZO, Emanuele : Attività istituzionali della C. E. E.  
(Affari Esteri, n° 8, ottobre 1970, p. 126-145).
- 
30. - LINDBERG, Leon N., SCHEINGOLD, Stuart A. : Europe's would-be polity.  
Patterns of change in the European Community.  
Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, (1970). VI, 314 p., tabl., fig. 8°  
(24.525) (notes bibliogr.)
- 
31. - NIBLOCK, Michael : The E. E. C. : national Parliaments in Community decision-making.  
London, Chatham-House; P. E. P., 1971. 111 p. 8°  
(European series, 17).  
(24.519) (bibliographie)
- 
32. - PARLAMENTO (Un) Europeo eletto dal popolo.  
(L'Europa, n° 3, febbraio 1971, p. 12-41).
- 
33. - PEDINI, Mario : Il Futuro dell'Euratom.  
Cavalli di Collecchio (Parma), Artegraf. Silva, 1970. 4 p. 4°  
(Extr. de : Parma Economica, n° 8, agosto 1970).  
(24.099)
- 
34. - PERETTI, Charles de : Institutions internationales et bureaucratie.  
Quelques observations sur la politique du personnel d'une Organisation internationale à caractère gouvernemental. Essai pour élaborer une hypothèse de recherche.  
(Revue Générale de Droit International Public, n° 4, octobre-décembre 1970, p. 988-1011).
-

35. - SCHNEIDER, Klaus : Eigene Einnahmen für die Europäische Gemeinschaft.  
(La Fiscalité du Marché Commun. - Europäische Steuerzeitung, n° 41, août 1970, p. 79-89).
- 
36. - SEIDEL, Martin : Das Verwaltungsausschussverfahren bei der Europäischen Gemeinschaft.  
Bergisch-Gladbach, Gustav-Stresemann-Institut, 1969. pp. 37-44. 8°  
(Europa-Informationen, n° 6, 1969).  
(Mj. 19.534)
- 
37. - STAMMATI, Gaetano.: Problemi di bilancio delle Comunità Europee.  
(Scritti in onore di Giordano Dell'Amore. Saggi di discipline aziendali e sociali. T. 2. Milano, 1969. p. 1393-1402).  
(24.398)
-

3. Wirtschaftsfragen - Questions économiques - Problemi economici -  
Economische vraagstukken - Economic matters

-----

38. - ADAPTATION (L') des structures et des activités des entreprises dans l'Europe des Six : il faut créer un instrument spécifique.  
(Fédération des Industries Belges. Bruxelles.: Bulletin, n° 2, 10 janvier 1971, p. 145-148).
- 
39. - CAMPOLONGO, Alberto : L'Indirizzo economico regionale e la Comunità Economica europea.  
(Rivista di Politica Economica, n° 12, dicembre 1970, p. 1279-1294).
- 
40. - FROMENT, Roland, GAY, François : L'Europe occidentale d'économie libérale. (T. 1-2).  
Paris, Sirey, 1970. 2 vol. 4°  
(1). XIII, 324 p., tabl.  
(2). Documents, travaux pratiques. 18 p., tabl., fig.  
(Géographie économique. Série : Les grands ensembles économiques internationaux).  
(24.260)
- 
41. - HAFERKAMP, Wilhelm : Aktuelle Probleme der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft.  
(Glückauf, n° 1, Januar 1971, p. 22-26).
- 
42. - LIND, Harold : Regional policy in Britain and the Six. The problems of development areas. - Christopher Flockton : Community regional policy.  
London, P.E.P., 1970. 76 p., 1 ct. 8°  
(European series, 15).  
(24.102)
- 
43. - MARTINI, Gianfranco : Significato e condizioni di una politica regionale europea.  
(Civitas, n° 11/12, novembre/dicembre 1970, p. 27-44).
- 
44. - MONGELLI, Francesco : Impresa pubblica e mercato comune.  
(Il Mezzogiorno e le Comunità Europee, n° 60, dicembre 1970, p. 51-61).
- 
45. - MULDER, Th. H. : De Internationale onderneming.  
(Economie, n° 5, februari 1971, p. 225-237).
- 
46. - NEME, Jacques, NEME, Colette : Economie européenne.  
Paris, P.U.F., (1970). 560 p., tabl., ct. 8°  
(Thémis. Sciences Economiques).  
(24.258)
-

47. - POLITICA economica a medio termine.  
(Il Mezzogiorno e le Comunità Europee, n° 60, dicembre 1970, p. 34-45).
- 
48. - PRODI, Romano : Le "Compagnie di bandiera" come fallimento della politica industriale della C. E. E.  
(Il Mulino, n° 214, marzo-aprile 1971, p. 245-268).
- 
49. - SEIDEL, Martin : Die Industriepolitik der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft.  
(Europa Archiv, n° 1, 10. Januar 1971, p. 9-16).
- 
50. - SWANN, D. : The Economics of the Common Market.  
(Harmondsworth), Penguin Books, (1970). 200 p. 8°  
(Penguin Modern Economics Texts).  
(23.892) (bibliographie)
- 
51. - TITTA, Alfio : L'Integrazione economico-monetaria della Comunità europea in fase di stallo.  
(Stato Sociale, n° 3, 1971, p. 204-214).
-



4. Monetäre und finanzielle Fragen - Questions financières et monétaires - Problemi finanziari e monetari - Finanziële en monetaire vraagstukken - Financial and monetary matters

-----

52. - AMENDOLA, Giorgio : I Sogni infranti della piccola Europa. Riflessi della tempesta monetaria provocata dall'azione degli U. S. A. (Rinascita, n° 22, 28 maggio 1971, p. 9-10).
- 
53. - ANSIAUX, Hubert : L'Avenir monétaire de la C. E. E. Séance du 5 novembre 1970. Bruxelles, Société Royale d'Economie Politique de Belgique, 1970. 35 p. 8° (Société Royale d'Economie Politique de Belgique, n° 351, novembre 1970).
- 
54. - BARRE, Raymond : Primauté de l'économie ou du monétaire dans le développement de la Communauté. Conférence ... 3 mars 1970. Bruxelles, Société Royale d'Economie Politique de Belgique, 1970. 28 p. 8° (Société Royale d'Economie Politique de Belgique, n° 346, mars 1970).
- 
55. - BROUWERS, G. Naar een economische en monetaire unie. Over het rapport van de groep-Werner. I-II. (Economisch-Statistische Berichten, n° 2770, 28 oktober 1970, p. 1052-1057; n° 2785, 17 februari 1971, p. 148-150, 162).
- 
56. - GEHRMANN, Dieter : Vom Euro-Dollarmarkt zum EWG-Geldmarkt. (Wirtschaftsdienst, n° 5, Mai 1971, p. 258-262).
- 
57. - GOFFINET, Roger J. : Le Plan Werner : Union monétaire ou jeu du hasard. (Revue des Sciences Economiques, n° 165, mars 1971, p. 3-16).
- 
58. - HAHN, Hugo J. : Das Geld im Recht der parlamentarischen Diplomatie. Von der Europäischen Zahlungsunion zur Reform des Internationalen Währungsfonds. Linzer Antrittsvorlesung, 27. April 1970. Baden-Baden, Nomos, (1970). 54 p. 8° (Schriftenreihe Europäische Wirtschaft, 56). (24.143) (notes bibliogr.)
- 
59. - HANKEL, Wilhelm : Währungspolitik unter Integrationszwang. (Wirtschaftsdienst, n° 1, Januar 1971, p. 29-33).
- 
60. - HARMSSEN, Sabine : Der Werner-Plan - Auftakt zu einer europäischen Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion. (Wirtschaftsdienst, n° 12, Dezember 1970, p. 721-726).
-

61. - HESSE, Maria-Dolores : Méthodes et moyens pour établir une nouvelle classification des impôts en se basant sur les principes mis en lumière lors de l'harmonisation des systèmes fiscaux des Etats membres de la C.E.E.  
Bruxelles, (Luxembourg, O.P.O.C.E.), 1970. 42 p., tabl. 4°  
(Communautés Européennes. Commission. Bruxelles : Etudes. Série Concurrence. Rapprochement des législations, 13).  
(Com. 24.458) (notes bibliogr.)
- 
62. - ISTITUTO AFFARI INTERNAZIONALI. Rome : Verso una moneta europea.  
Saggi di U. Mosca (e. a.)  
Bologna, Il Mulino, (1970). 78 p., tabl. 8°  
(Lo Spettatore Internazionale, 9).  
(24.241)
- 
63. - KUSCHEL, Hans-Dieter : Die Entwicklung der EWG zur Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion.  
Bergisch-Gladbach, Gustav-Stresemann-Institut, 1969. pp. 45-58. 8°  
Europa-Informationen, n° 7, 1969/1970).  
(Mj. 19.534)
- 
64. - LARGER, Françoise : La Balance des paiements des institutions européennes.  
(Statistische Studien u. Erhebungen. - Etudes et Enquêtes statistiques ..., n° 3, 1970, p. 5-47).  
(Stat. Com. 24)
- 
65. - LORENZI, Stefano : L'Integrazione monetaria della C.E.E.  
(Rivista di Politica Economica, n° 1, gennaio 1971, p. 60-68).
- 
66. - MENAIS, G.-P. : Le Marché européen des capitaux. Préface de Hermann J. Abs.  
Paris, Les Editions de l'Epargne, (1969). 129 p., tabl. 8°  
(De quoi s'agit-il ?)  
(24.218) (bibliographie)
- 
67. - MEYER-HORN, Klaus : La Coopération des caisses d'épargne dans la Communauté Economique Européenne.  
(Scritti in onore di Giordano Dell'Amore. Saggi monetari e creditizi. T. 2. Milano, 1969. p. 1419-1444).  
(24.398)
- 
68. - MITZKA, Dieter : Die Neue Finanzverfassung der Europäischen Gemeinschaften.  
Bergisch-Gladbach, Gustav-Stresemann-Institut, 1969/1970. pp. 67-74. 8°  
(Europa-Informationen, n° 10, 1969/1970).  
(Mj. 19.534)
-

69. - OELE, A. P. : Een Muntautomaat in plaats van een landbouwtrekker.  
(Socialisme en Democratie, n° 8, september 1970, p. 398-403).  
-----
70. - PARRILLO, Francesco : Il Ruolo del credito nella Comunità Economica Europea.  
(Scritti in onore di Giordano Dell'Amore. Saggi monetari e creditizi.  
T. 3. Milano, 1969. p. 1695-1728).  
(24.398)  
-----
71. - REITSMA, A.J. : Problemen rond een E.E.G. monetaire unie.  
(Economie, n° 3, december 1970, p. 145-158).  
-----
72. - SANTORO, Italo : Gli Investimenti americani in Europa.  
(Nord e Sud, n° 132, dicembre 1970, p. 22-31).  
-----
73. - SCHARRER, Hans-Eckart : EWG Währungsunion, Pragmatismus auf unsicherem Fundament.  
(Wirtschaftsdienst, n° 3, März 1971, p. 132-135).  
-----
74. - TEMPEL, A.J. van den : Impôt sur les sociétés et impôt sur le revenu dans les Communautés Européennes. - Körperschaftssteuer und Einkommensteuer in den Europäischen Gemeinschaften.  
(La Fiscalité du Marché Commun. - Europäische Steuerzeitung, n° 39, avril 1970, p. 27-35).  
-----
75. - TITTA, Alfio : Dopo la conferenza monetaria mondiale di Copenaghen.  
(Stato Sociale, n° 1, 1971, p. 37-47).  
-----
76. - TITTA, Alfio : L'Integrazione economico-monetaria della Comunità.  
(Operare, n° 1, gennaio-febbraio 1971, p. 56-61).  
-----
77. - TITTA, Alfio : La Unificazione monetaria nel M.E.C.  
(Operare, n° 3, maggio-giugno 1970, p. 62-67).  
-----
78. - TOMUSCHAT, Christian : Die Aufwertung der Deutschen Mark. Staats- und völkerrechtliche Ueberlegungen zur Neufestsetzung der Währungsparität im Jahre 1969.  
Köln, Berlin, Heymann, 1970. VII, 48 p. 8°  
(Beiträge zum ausländischen öffentlichen Recht u. Völkerrecht, 55).  
(24.215) (notes bibliogr.)  
-----
79. - WERNER, Pierre : Perspectives monétaires européennes.  
(Chronique de Politique Etrangère, n° 6, novembre 1970, p. 743-756).  
-----

5. Wettbewerb - Concurrence - Concorrenza - Mededinging - Competition

-----

80. - ASZKENAZY, Henri : Les Grandes fusions en Europe en 1970.  
(L'Economie, n° 1127, 22 février 1971, p. 18-21).
- 
81. - CANENBLEY, Cornelis : Das Diskriminierungsverbot im EWG-Kartellrecht.  
(Aussenwirtschaftsdienst des Betriebs-Beraters, n° 4, April 1971, p. 164-172).
- 
82. - CENTRO NAZIONALE DI PREVENZIONE E DIFESA SOCIALE, Milan : La Libertà di concorrenza.  
Milano, Giuffrè, 1970. XV, 230 p. 8°  
(Problemi attuali di diritto e procedura civile, 4).  
(Comitato per le Onoranze alla Memoria di Lorenzo Spallino).  
(24.228)
- 
83. - CHAMPAUD, Claude : Liberté de la concurrence.  
(Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Européen, n° 3, juillet-septembre 1970, p. 486-498).
- 
84. - DUBOIS, Jean-Pierre : La Position dominante et son abus dans l'article 86 du Traité de la C.E.E. Préf. de Berthold Goldman.  
Paris, Libr. Techniques, 1968. 350 p., tabl., fig. 8°  
(24.249) (bibliographie)
- 
85. - FUSIONSKONTROLLE auf nationaler oder europäischer Ebene ?  
Karl Schiller (e.a.)  
(Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb, n° 1, Januar 1971, p. 5-15).
- 
86. - GLEISS, Alfred, HELM, Horst : Anmeldung wettbewerbsbeschränkender Verträge in Brüssel ?  
(Neue Juristische Wochenschrift, n° 8, 23. Februar 1971, p. 297-302).
- 
87. - GOLDMAN, Berthold : Les Champs d'application territoriale des lois sur la concurrence.  
(Académie de Droit International. La Haye : Recueil des cours, 1969, III. T. 128, Leyde, 1970. p. 631-729).  
(6976)
- 
88. - GOLDMAN, Berthold : Droit commercial européen.  
Paris, Dalloz, 1970. 668 p. 8°  
(Précis Dalloz).  
(24.283) (bibliographie)
-

89. - JOLIET, René : Prix imposés et droit européen de la concurrence.  
(Cahiers de Droit Européen, n° 1, 1971, p. 16-52).  
-----
90. - KNOEPFLE, Robert : Zur Feststellung der Nichtigkeit von Kartell-  
vereinbarungen durch nationale Gerichte.  
(Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb, n° 2, Februar 1971, p. 81-90).  
-----
91. - MEYER-LADEWIG, Jens : Der Kommissionsvorschlag für eine  
dritte Richtlinie des Rates zur Koordinierung des Gesellschafts-  
rechts (Nationale Fusion),  
(Der Betriebs-Beraters, n° 35-36, 20.-30. Dezember 1970,  
p. 1517-1520).  
-----
92. - OOSTERHUIS-SMITS, M. Chr. : Nationale rechter, EEG-Commissie  
en partiële nietigheid (artikel 85 van het EEG-Verdrag).  
(Sociaal-Economische Wetgeving, n° 12, december 1970, p. 671-  
679).  
-----
93. - PAPPALARDO, Aurelio : Die Umformung der staatlichen Handels-  
monopole (Art. 37 EWG-Vertrag).  
(Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb, n° 4, April 1971, p. 235-243).  
-----
94. - PIAZZA, Nicola : Diritto di proprietà industriale e tutela della  
concorrenza nel diritto comunitario europeo.  
(Università di Palermo : Annali della Facoltà di Economia e Commer-  
cio, n° 4, 1970, p. 131-149).  
(24.158)  
-----
95. - WAEGENBAUER, Rolf : Les Règles de concurrence applicables  
aux transports.  
(Cahiers de Droit Européen, n° 6, 1970, p. 645-662).  
-----

6. Sozialfragen - Questions sociales - Problemi sociali -  
Sociale vraagstukken - Social matters

-----

96. - ASSOCIAZIONE INDUSTRIALE LOMBARDA. Milan : Comparazione dei salari e del costo del lavoro in Europa. Situazione al 1<sup>o</sup> gennaio 1968.  
Milano, 1969. 111 p., tabl. 8<sup>o</sup>  
(12,533/2)
- 
97. - COUTS (Les) salariaux dans l'industrie de la Communauté Européenne.  
(Fédération des Industries Belges, Bruxelles : Bulletin n<sup>o</sup> 2, 10 janvier 1971, p. 217-244).
- 
98. - FIORENZA, Antonino : I Diritti previdenziali dei lavoratori migranti nella giurisprudenza della Corte di Giustizia delle Comunità Europee.  
(Rivista di Studi Europei, n<sup>o</sup> 1, gennaio-marzo 1970, p. 60-87).
- 
99. - HEIDE, H. ter : Europese vakbonden : mee met Europese ontwikkelingen  
(Socialisme en Democratie, n<sup>o</sup> 8, september 1970, p. 393-397).
- 
100. - JACOB, Philippe : La Directive concernant les modalités de la réalisation de la libre prestation de services pour certaines activités de l'avocat.  
(Cahiers de Droit Européen, n<sup>o</sup> 6, 1970, p. 663-686).
- 
101. - LEVI-SANDRI, Lionello : Realizzazioni e prospettive della politica sociale della Comunità Europea.  
(Rivista di Studi Europei, n<sup>o</sup> 1, gennaio-marzo 1970, p. 3-23).
- 
102. - NEIRINCK, J.D., TROCLET, Léon-Eli, VELDKAMP, G.M.J. : Sociale bestanddelen van economische integratie : Inventarisatie van het sociale beleid van de E.E.G. tot de douane-unie. Door J.D. Neirinck. Met een bijdrage : L'Evolution vers des conventions collectives européennes. Door Léon-Eli Troclet, en : De sociale en regionale politiek van de Europese Gemeenschappen. Door G.M.J. Veldkamp.  
Heule, UGA, 1969. 298 p. 8<sup>o</sup>  
(Europese sociale problematiek en perspectief).  
(24,255)
-

7. Landwirtschaft - Agriculture - Agricoltura - Landbouw - Agriculture

-----

103. - ANNEE (L') agricole 1970. (1) Le film de l'année. (2) Le dossier du statut de la coopération agricole.  
(Union Agricole, n° 316, février 1971, p. 14-42, n° 317, mars 1971, p. 18-26).
- 
104. - ASSEMBLEE PERMANENTE DES CHAMBRES D'AGRICULTURE.  
Paris : Le Plan Ertl en faveur de l'agriculture allemande.  
Paris, Chambres d'Agriculture, 1971. 16 p. 4°  
(Chambres d'Agriculture, n° 456, 15 mars 1971. Suppl.).
- 
105. - BAUER, Herbert : Produktion und Absatz von Brotgetreide in der Welt, in der EWG und in Oesterreich. - Production and marketing of food grains in the world, in the E.E.C. and in Austria.  
(Wien, Oesterreich. Agrarverl., 1968). 205 p., tabl. 8°  
(Extr. de Land- und forstwirtschaftliche Forschung in Oesterreich, 3).  
(Schriftenreihe des Agrarwirtschaftlichen Institutes des Bundesministeriums für Land- und Forstwirtschaft, 5).  
(23.626) (bibliographie)
- 
106. - BETTI, Antonio : Il Mercato comune vitivinicolo.  
Trento, Camera di Commercio, Industria, Artigianato e Agricoltura.  
(1970). 67 p., tabl. 4°  
(Extr. de : Economia Trentina, n° 4, 1970).  
(23.981) (bibliographie)
- 
107. - BONATO, Corrado : Il Piano Mansholt per la riforma dell'agricoltura europea.  
(Camera di Commercio, Industria, Artigianato e Agricoltura. Milan : Realtà Economica, n° 4-5, aprile-maggio 1970, p. 5-15).
- 
108. - BONSEMBIANTE, Mario, CHIERICATO, Gianmaria : Gli Allevamenti bovini nelle Venezie e nella Comunità Economica Europea.  
Padova, CEDAM, 1969. XI, 257 p., tabl. 8°  
(Istituto Federale delle Casse di Risparmio delle Venezie : Studi e ricerche, 3).  
(24.271) (bibliographie)
- 
109. - BRANDKAMP, F., LOHMANN, B. : Produktion und Wertschöpfung der Landwirtschaft im Bundesgebiet.  
(Agrarwirtschaft, n° 2, Februar 1971, p. 45-61).
-

110. - CENTRE D 'ETUDES POLITIQUES, ECONOMIQUES ET SOCIALES.  
Bruxelles : L 'Agriculture belge dans la perspective européenne.  
Bruxelles, C.E.P.E.S.S., 1970. 183 p., tabl. 8<sup>o</sup>  
(Documents-CEPESS, 1970, n<sup>o</sup> 2-3).  
(24.419)
- 
111. - CONFEDERAZIONE GENERALE DELL' AGRICOLTURA ITALIANA.  
Rome : Un Quadro di scelte per l 'agricoltura.  
(S.I.), 1971. 10 p. 4<sup>o</sup>  
(Mondo Economico. n<sup>o</sup> 16, 24 aprile 1971, Suppl.).
- 
112. - CONFEDERAZIONE NAZIONALE COLTIVATORI DIRETTI. Rome :  
Libro verde. 1-3.  
Roma, (Stab.Tip. R.E.D.A.), 1970. 3 vol. 8<sup>o</sup>  
1. Parte generale. 387 p., tabl.  
2. Statistiche. 225 p., tabl., fig.  
3. Politica agricola comune. 375 p., tabl.  
(23.973)
- 
113. - DEUTSCHE LANDWIRTSCHAFTS-GESELLSCHAFT. Francfort s.M.  
Situation und Zukunft der Grünlandwirtschaft. Vorträge auf der  
D.L.G.-Herbsttagung, Bad Aibling 1970.  
Frankfurt a.M., D.L.G.-Verl., 1970. 51 p., tabl. 8<sup>o</sup>  
(Archiv der D.L.G., 47).  
(24.141)
- 
114. - EISENKRAEMER, Kurt : EWG-Agrarpolitik am Scheidewege.  
Bergisch-Gladbach, Gustav- Stresemann-Institut, 1969. pp. 17-24.  
8<sup>o</sup>  
(Europa-Informationen, n<sup>o</sup> 3, 1969).  
(Mj. 19.534)
- 
115. - FONDO (II) Europeo Agricolo di Orientamento e Garanzia  
(F.E.O.G.A.)  
(ITALIE. Ministero del Tesoro. Ragioneria Generale dello Stato.  
Rome : Nota introduttiva al bilancio di previsione. Anno finanziario  
1970. Roma, 1970. p. 249-285).  
(23.964)
- 
116. - FRIETEMA, H.J. : De Vereniging voor de Staathuishoudkunde over  
Europese landbouwpolitiek.  
(Economisch-Statistische Berichten, n<sup>o</sup> 2781, 20 januari 1971,  
p. 52-58).
-



117. - GAETANI D'ARAGONA, Gabriele : La Regolamentazione comunitaria dei mercati agricoli e l'allargamento della C.E.E. Il sud e la politica agraria della comunità.  
(Sintesi Economica, n° 9, settembre 1970, p. 11-17).  
-----
118. - GIDE, Pierre, LOYRETTE, Jean, NOUEL, Philippe : Les Coopératives agricoles dans le marché commun. Etudes comparées. Régime juridique fiscal, social et financier. Sous la direction de J.G. de Ville-neuve, préface de S. Mansholt.  
Paris, Joly, 1970. XL, 486 p. 8°  
(24.284)  
-----
119. - INSTITUT ATLANTIQUE, Paris : Un Avenir pour l'Europe agricole. Rapport d'un groupe d'experts ... Rapp. : Pierre Uri.  
Paris, (Imp. Hofer, 1970), 108 p., tabl. 8°  
(Les Cahiers atlantiques, 4, 1970).  
(24.281)  
-----
120. - ITALIE, Agricoltura e Foreste (Ministero). Bonifica e Colonizzazione (Direzione Generale). Rome : Sociologia del Piano Mansholt. A cura dell'Istituto Nazionale di Sociologia Rurale, Relazione di Corrado Barberis.  
Bologna, Il Mulino, 1971. 250 p., tabl., fig., ct. 8°  
(Studi e ricerche sulla bonifica e sullo sviluppo).  
(24.193) (notes bibliogr.)  
-----
121. - JARCHOW, G. : Die Problematik gemeinsamer Agrarpreise beim derzeitigen Stand der wirtschafts- und währungspolitischen Integration in der EWG.  
(Agrarwirtschaft, n° 6, Juni 1971, p. 185-192).  
-----
122. - KUIPER, M.J. : Financiering van het landbouwbeleid en eigen middelen van de Europese Gemeenschappen.  
(Sociaal-Economische Wetgeving, n° 11, november 1970, p. 615-638).  
-----
123. - MANSHOLT, Sicco L. : Vers une nouvelle orientation de la politique agricole commune.  
(Bulletin des Communautés Européennes, n° 3, 1971, p. 5-8).  
-----
124. - MARSH, John, RITSON, Christopher : Agricultural policy and the common market.  
London, Chatham House; P.E.P., 1971. 199 p., tabl. 8°  
(European series, 16).  
(24.637) (notes bibliogr.)  
-----

125. - MUTH, Hanns Peter : French agriculture and the political integration of Western Europe. Toward "an ever closer union among the European peoples".  
Leyden, Sijthoff, 1970. 320 p. 8°  
(European aspects. Series C : Politics, 22).  
(23.988) (bibliographie)

---

126. - NAETS, Guido : Die Auswirkungen der gemeinsamen Agrarpolitik der E.W.G. auf die Handelsströme während der Uebergangszeit.  
(Aussenwirtschaft, n° 4, Dezember 1970, p. 384-402).

---

127. - PETERS, A. : Some major issues of the forthcoming decade for E.E.C. 's agricultural policy.  
(Common Market, n° 11-12, November-December 1970, p. 258-260).

---

128. - PETRILLI, Giuseppe : Dimensione internazionale della politica agricola.  
(Affari Esteri, n° 8, ottobre 1970, p. 93-108).

---

129. - PRIEBE, Hermann : Landwirtschaft in der Welt von morgen.  
Düsseldorf, Wien, Econ, (1970). 450 p., tabl. 8°  
(24.780) (notes bibliogr.)

---

130. - PROSPETTIVE (Le) del vino italiano con l 'entrata in vigore del regolamento comunitario.  
(Camera di Commercio, Industria e Agricoltura, Ancona : Bollettino Economico, n°9, settembre 1970, p. 12-17).

---

131. - RIES, Adrien : L 'Agriculture luxembourgeoise dans le marché commun.  
(Luxembourg), 1970. IX, 220 p., tabl., fig., ill. 8°  
(Grand-Duché de Luxembourg, Ministère de l 'Economie Nationale : Cahiers économiques, 45. - Service Central de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques Statec).  
(23.986) (notes bibliogr.)

---

132. - RIES, Adrien, ZELLER, Adrien : La Physionomie de l 'agriculture luxembourgeoise au 15 mai 1970.  
(Bulletin du STATEC, n° 1, 1971, p. 1-6).

---

133. - SCHMITT, G. : Offene Fragen der europäischen Agrarpolitik.  
(Agrarwirtschaft, n° 1, Januar 1971, p. 2-12).

---

134. - SORBI, Ugo : La C.E.E. e l'integrazione agricola. Origini, vicende, prospettive. Pres. d. G. Colonna di Paliano. Firenze, Tip. Coppini, 1970. XII, 443 p., tabl., fig. 8°  
(Istituto di Recerche Economiche, Agrarie e Forestali dell 'Università di Parma).  
(24.036) (bibliographie)
- 
135. - UNRUHE an der Grünen Front. (Zeitgespräch par) Josef Ertl (e.a.) (Wirtschaftsdienst, n° 5, Mai 1971, p. 235-252).
- 
136. - WALTERMANN, Franz : Die Agrarpolitik als Schrittmacher der EWG.  
Bergisch-Gladbach, Gustav-Stresemann-Institut, 1969/70.  
pp. 53-58. 8°  
(Europa-Informationen, n° 8, 1969/1970).  
(Mj. 19.534)
- 
137. - WEYDERT, Jean : Dimensions d'une réforme de l'agriculture européenne.  
(Lettre de l'O.C.I.P.E., n° 24, 23 avril 1971, p. 2-5).
- 
138. - WIRTH, Hermann : Die Landwirtschaft zwischen Gestern und Morgen.  
(Stuttgart, etc.), Kohlhammer: Deutscher Gemeindeverl.. (1970).  
118 p., tabl., fig. 8°  
(Zahl und Leben, 11).  
(24.263)
-

## 8. Verkehr - Transports - Trasporti - Vervoer - Transport

-----

139. - BERTIN, Jean : La Place des transports dans la société moderne.  
(Transports, n° 161, avril 1971, p. 113-123).  
-----
140. - BODSON, Victor : Perspectives de développement de la politique  
commune des transports. - Entwicklungsaussichten der gemein-  
samen Verkehrspolitik.  
(Droit Européen des Transports - Europäisches Transportrecht,  
n° 4. 1970, p. 489-533).  
-----
141. - C.E.E. : harmonisation des charges d'infrastructure.  
(Fédération des Industries Belges, Bruxelles : Bulletin, n° 3.  
20 janvier 1971, p. 402-410).  
-----
142. - COTTINET, Paul : Un Tournant de la politique des transports  
dans la Communauté Economique Européenne.  
(Transports, n° 157, décembre 1970, p. 525-529).  
-----
143. - FOERSTER, Karl : Verkehrsströme der Binnenschifffahrt in Europa.  
(Internationales Verkehrswesen, n° 1, Januar-Februar 1971,  
p. 10-15).  
-----
144. - FOS, Europort du Sud.  
Paris, La Documentation Française, 1971. 38 p., tabl., ct. 4°  
(Notes et Etudes Documentaires, n° 3.769, 8 mars 1971).  
-----
145. - MARCHAL, M. : Le Régime comparé des différents ports fluviaux  
de la Communauté Européenne et leur rôle dans le développement  
économique régional. 1-  
(Revue de la Navigation, Ports et Industries, n° 2, 25 janvier 1971,  
p. 40-43).  
-----
146. - POLIMENI, Renato : I Nodi del traffico nella Comunità Europea.  
(Parallelo 38, n° 2, febbraio 1971, p. 87-98).  
-----
147. - POSTHUMUS, S.A. : Structuur en functie van het Europese luchtnet.  
(Socialisme en Democratie, n° 10, november 1970, p. 470-479).  
-----
148. - TORLEY DUWEL, I.G. : Incorporatie van communautaire verorde-  
ningen in de nationale vervoerwetgeving.  
(Nederlands Juristenblad, n° 17, 24 april 1971, p. 457-466).  
-----

149. - VANDERPERREN, W. : Circulation et signalisation routières.  
Le code européen de la route existe-t-il ?  
(Transports, n° 160, mars 1971, p. 89-97).
-

## 9. Energie - Energie - Energia - Energie - Energy

-----

150. - CASA, Anna F., VENDITTI, Paolo : L 'Industria del combustibile nucleare in Europa. IV Congresso Foratom.  
(Comitato Nazionale Energia Nucleare. Roma : Notiziario, n° 12, dicembre 1970, p. 68-80).  
-----
151. - CAZZANIGA, Vincenzo : Lo Stato attuale della politica energetica comunitaria.  
(Rivista di Studi Europei, n° 2, aprile-giugno 1970, p. 154-165).  
-----
152. - GRUEMM, H. : Energieerzeugung und Umwelt.  
(Atomwirtschaft - Atomtechnik, n° 6, Juni 1971, p. 278-287).  
-----
153. - JAMME, Hans Peter : Das Neue gemeinschaftliche System von Beihilfen für den Steinkohlenbergbau der Gemeinschaft.  
(Glückauf, n° 6, 18. März 1971, p. 231-235).  
-----
154. - KUCICH, Nino : L 'Evoluzione in atto nel mondo petrolifero.  
(Affari Esteri, n° 10, aprile 1971, p. 98-109).  
-----
155. - MAC-DOWALL, André : L 'Energie et la politique énergétique en Grande-Bretagne.  
Paris, La Documentation Française, 1971. 60 p., tabl., fig., ct. 4°  
(Notes et Etudes Documentaires, n° 3. 754-3.755, 18 janvier 1971).  
-----
156. - NEUE Kernkraftwerke in Europa. 1-  
(Atomwirtschaft - Atomtechnik, n° 3, März 1971, p. 138-149,)  
-----
157. - PERILLI, Maria L. : L 'Uranio nel mondo alla fine del 1970.  
(Comitato Nazionale Energia Nucleare. Roma : Notiziario, n° 1, gennaio 1971, p. 39-55).  
-----
158. - REUTHER, Ernst-Ulrich : Hat die Kohle noch eine Chance ?  
(Glückauf, n° 3. Februar 1971, p. 103-111).  
-----
159. - ROUX, Abraham Johannes : Prospettive per gli impieghi pacifici dell 'energia nucleare negli anni '70.  
(Comitato Nazionale Energia Nucleare. Roma : Notiziario, n° 1, gennaio 1971, p. 25-32).  
-----
160. - SATZ (Der) "Euratom ist tot" ist sowohl richtig wie falsch. Ein Gespräch mit dem Staatssekretär im Bundesministerium für Bildung und Wissenschaft, H.-H. Haunschild, über die Zukunft der Europäischen Atomgemeinschaft.  
(Atomwirtschaft - Atomtechnik, n° 3, März 1971, p. 118-121).  
-----

161. - SCHUSTER, Guenter : L 'Energia nucleare nella R.F.T. nel prossimo decennio.  
(Comitato Nazionale Energia Nucleare : Notiziario, n° 3, marzo 1971, p. 35-48).  
-----
162. - SEMRAU, G. : Der Steinkohlenbergbau in den Ländern der Europäischen Gemeinschaft im Jahre 1970.  
(Glückauf, n° 9, 29. April 1971, p. 352-354).  
-----
163. - ZIJLSTRA, K. : De Springprocessie van de energie. Recente ontwikkelingen op de energiemarkt en hun oorzaken.  
(Economisch-Statistische Berichten, n° 2778, 23 december 1970, p. 1236-1240).  
-----

10. Forschung und Kultur - Recherche et culture - Ricerca e cultura  
Onderzoek en cultuur - Research and cultural matters

-----

164. - COOPERATION (La) entre les universités européennes. (Par)  
A. Spinelli (e.a.).  
Paris, Revue du Marché Commun, 1970. XIX p., p. 533-864. 4°  
(Revue du Marché Commun, n° 139, décembre 1970).  
(24.350)
- 
165. - HAIGH, Anthony : A Ministry of education for Europe.  
London (etc.), Harrap, (1970). 191 p. 8°  
(24.526) (bibliographie)
- 
166. - VEDOVATO, Giuseppe : L 'Università europea, oggi.  
(Rivista di Studi Politici Internazionali, n° 1, gennaio-marzo 1970,  
p. 45-53).
- 
167. - VENDRAME, Giorgio : Divario tecnologico e di produttività fra  
America ed Europa.  
Treviso, Canova, 1970. 91 p., tabl. 8°  
(24.402) (bibliographie)
-



11. Assoziierte Länder und Gebiete - Pays et territoires associés  
Paesi e territori associati - Geassocieerde landen en gebieden  
Associated countries and territories

-----

168. - ASSOCIATION C.E.E. - E.A.M.A. Conférence parlementaire de l'Association. (Yaoundé, 11-13 janvier 1971).  
(Afrique Contemporaine, n° 54, mars-avril 1971, p. 13-14).  
-----
169. - BIANCONI, Giancarlo : Difficoltà nell'applicazione dell'accordo di associazione C.E.E. - Grecia.  
(Rivista di Diritto Europeo, n° 1, gennaio-marzo 1971, p. 39-50).  
-----
170. - ELSNER, Ilse : Versuch einer Partnerschaft - Gedanken zur Parlamentarischen Konferenz des Jaunde-Abkommens.  
Hamburg, Hamburger Gesellschaft für Völkerrecht und Auswärtige Politik, 1968, pp. 221-226. 8°  
(Extr. : Verfassung und Recht in Uebersee, n° 2, 1970).  
(23.624)  
-----
171. - MAROC (Le) et le marché commun.  
Paris, (Impr. Pithiviers), 1971. L, 344 p., tabl., ill. 4°  
(Revue du Marché Commun, n° 142, mars-avril 1971).  
-----
172. - SENTI, Richard : Afrikanische Präferenzen zugunsten der E.W.G.  
(Aussenwirtschaft, n° 4, Dezember 1970, p. 427-442).  
-----
173. - THEUNS, H.L. : Hulpverlening aan de Nederlandse Antillen.  
(Internationale Spectator, n° 5, 8 maart 1971, p. 499-521).  
-----

12. Aussenbeziehungen - Relations extérieures - Relazioni con l'esterno  
Buitenlandse betrekkingen - External relations

-----

174. - CASADIO, Gian Paolo : L 'Allargamento della Comunità Economica Europea.  
(Politica Internazionale, n° 4, luglio-agosto 1970, p. 30-44).  
(24.299)
- 
175. - CASADIO, Gian Paolo : La Politica della C.E.E. nel Mediterraneo.  
(Comuni d'Europa, n° 1, gennaio 1971, p. 3-5).
- 
176. - CATLIN, Georges E.G. : The Atlantic Commonwealth.  
(Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1969). 115 p. 8°  
(Penguin Special S 273).  
(23.974) (notes bibliogr.)
- 
177. - COHEN, R. : De EEG en de ontwikkelingshulp.  
(Socialisme en Democratie, n° 5, mei 1970, p. 229-234).
- 
178. - COSGROVE, Carol Ann : Grossbritannien und die Europäische Gemeinschaft. Die britische Diskussion über den Beitritt.  
(Europa-Archiv, n° 2, 25. Januar 1971, p. 55-64).
- 
179. - DAHRENDORF, Ralf : Möglichkeiten und Grenzen einer Aussenpolitik der Europäischen Gemeinschaften.  
(Europa Archiv, n° 4, 25 février 1971, p. 117-130).
- 
180. - DANEMARK et Norvège face à la C.E.E.  
(Moniteur du Commerce International, n° 1037, 18 mars 1971, p. 1115-1127).
- 
181. - DANIMARCA (La) nell 'integrazione europea. (Kredietbank : Bulletin hebdomadaire, 17 octobre 1969).  
(Rivista di Studi Politici Internazionali, n° 1, gennaio-marzo 1970, p. 83-90).
- 
182. - EKELAND, Sigurd : L 'Economie norvégienne et l 'Europe.  
(Oslo, Olsens, 1970 ). 98 p., tabl. 8°  
(Ministère Royal des Affaires Etrangères. Service de Presse).  
(24.114)
- 
183. - EROEFFNUNG (Die) der Gespräche zwischen den Europäischen Gemeinschaften und den Ländern der FINEFTA-Assoziation, die nicht die Aufnahme beantragt haben.  
(Europa-Archiv, n° 2, 25. Januar 1971, p. D 33-D 53).
-

184. - GALLAVRESI, Lucilla : Europa e America latina.  
(Relazioni Internazionali, n° 9, 27 febbraio 1971, p. 202-203).  
-----
185. - GOUZY, Jean-Pierre : La Suède ou les contradictions de la  
neutralité.  
(L 'Europe en Formation, n° 130, janvier 1971, p. 21-26).  
-----
186. - GRANDE-BRETAGNE (La) et le marché commun en 1970. (Ed. p.  
Christine Janton).  
Paris, La Documentation Française, 1971. 47 p. 4°  
(Problèmes Politiques et Sociaux, n° 56, 22 janvier 1971).  
-----
187. - GUAZZARONI, Cesidio : Comunità europea e Stati Uniti.  
(Affari Esteri, n° 10, aprile 1971, p. 3-22).  
-----
188. - INSTITUT DE RECHERCHES ET D 'ETUDES SOCIOLOGIQUES ET  
ECONOMIQUES. Genève : Etude prospective socio-économique de  
la Suisse dans l 'environnement euro-atlantique et le contexte mondial.  
Prospective 1990. Projective 1975. Objective 1968. Sous l.dir. de  
J.H.E. Chable, G.-L. Comtesse et R.N. Schreyer  
(Genève), I.R.E.S.E., 1968. 3 vol. 4°  
(23.691) (bibliographie)  
-----
189. - JULIA, Didier : Gran Bretagna - mercato comune. Rapporto pres.  
all 'Assemblea Nazionale francese dal ... (Parigi, 27 giugno 1969).  
(Rivista di Studi Politici Internazionali, n° 1, gennaio-marzo 1970,  
p. 54-74).  
-----
190. - KASER, Michael : Comecon : integration problems of the planned  
economies. 2nd ed.  
London (etc.), Oxford U.P., 1967. VI, 279 p., tabl., fig. 8°  
(Royal Institute of International Affairs).  
(17.769/1) (notes bibliogr.)  
-----
191. - KLOCKE, Helmut : Der R.G.W. und sein Verhältnis zur E.W.G.  
(Aussenpolitik, n° 5, Mai 1971, p. 281-299).  
-----
192. - KRENZLER, Horst Günter : Die Beziehungen der E.W.G. zu den  
Mittelmeerländern.  
(Europa-Archiv, n° 4, 25. Februar 1971, p. 139-150).  
-----
193. - MANFREDINI, Marialuisa : L 'Agricoltura nell 'interscambio della  
Spagna. Condizioni per una intensificata collaborazione con l 'Italia  
e la zona del M.E.C.  
Padova, CEDAM, 1968. VII, 176 p., tabl., fig., ct. 8°  
(23.756) (notes bibliogr.)  
-----

194. - MAZZA, Gianni : La Norvegia e il mercato comune europeo.  
(Parallelo 38, n° 3, marzo 1971, p. 187-195).  
-----
195. - MISTRORIGO, Luigi : U.S.A. ed Europa nel futuro dell 'America  
Latina.  
(Civitas, n° 11/12, novembre/dicembre 1970, p. 45-54).  
-----
196. - MOLL, A. : Nieuwe leden in de EEG.  
(Ars Aequi, n° 4, april 1971, p. 149-158).  
-----
197. - NOETEL, Rudolf : Future development of East-West trade.  
(Economia Internazionale, n° 4, novembre 1970, p. 212-238).  
-----
198. - NOUVELLE-ZELANDE : Britain, New Zealand, and the E.E.C.  
A New Zealand Government statement.  
(Berwick upon Tweed, Tweeddale Pr.), 1971. 11 p., fig., 1 ill. 8°  
(24.593)  
-----
199. - NOUVELLE-ZELANDE. Monetary and Economic Council. Wellington:  
New Zealand and an enlarged E.E.C.  
Wellington, Shearer, 1970. XIV, 79 p., tabl., fig. 8°  
(New Zealand Monetary and Economic Council : Report, 19).  
(24.592)  
-----
200. - PAPISCA, Antonio : Aspetti giuridici delle relazioni commerciali  
C.E.E.-U.S.A.  
(Rivista di Politica Economica, n° 7, luglio 1970, p. 821-856).  
-----
201. - PAYS (Les) de l 'A.E.L.E. et les Communautés Européennes.  
(E.F.T.A.-Bulletin, n° 9, décembre 1970, p.3-7; n° 1, janvier-  
février 1971, p. 10-21).  
-----
202. - RIKLIN, Alois : Warum schliesst der Bundesrat den EWG-Beitritt  
aus ?  
(Europa, n° 1, Januar 1971, p. 2-4).  
-----
203. - RIPPON, Geoffrey : Britain and Europe. Common sense on the  
common market  
(London, Conservative Group for Europe, 1971). 15 p. 8°  
(24.691)  
-----
204. - RONCHETTI, Silvio : L 'Armonizzazione delle statistiche del  
commercio estero : una necessità comunitaria.  
(Rivista di Studi Europei, n° 2, aprile-giugno 1970, p. 200-214).  
-----

205. - SOLIDARITE Europe - Pays en Voie de Développement. Incidences des transformations de structures économiques dans la C.E.E. (Conclusions du Colloque de Val-Duchesse, 3-5 décembre 1970). (Lettre de l'O.C.I.P.E., n° 22-23, 5 février 1971, p. 267-297).  
-----
206. - STEPHENSON, Peter : 1980 : dentro o fuori la C.E.E. ? (Mondo Operaio, n° 3, marzo 1971, p. 34-37).  
-----
207. - SVIZZERA (La) e l'integrazione europea. (Economia Ticinese, n° 2, febbraio 1971, p. 14-23).  
-----
208. - TOSCANO, Tullio : La Politica commerciale della C.E.E. e le relazioni economiche internazionali. (Rivista di Politica Economica, n° 1, gennaio 1971, p. 17-45).  
-----
209. - WEIL, Gordon L. : A Foreign policy for Europe ? The external relations of the European Community. Forew. by Jean Rey. Bruges, College of Europe, 1970. 324 p., tabl. 8°  
(Studies in contemporary European issues, 7).  
(24.071) (bibliographie)  
-----
210. - YOUNG, S.Z. : Britain and the E.E.C. : the negotiations so far. (The World Today, n° 5, May 1971, p. 202-210).  
-----
211. - ZAMPAGLIONE, Gerardo : L'Ingresso di Gran Bretagna, Danimarca, Irlanda e Norvegia nelle Comunità Europee. (Affari Esteri, n° 8, ottobre 1970, p. 109-125).  
-----

13. Verteidigungsfragen - Défense - Difesa - Defensie - Defence

-----

212. - BERTRAM, Christoph : West German perspectives on European security : continuity and change.  
(The World Today, n° 3, March 1971, p. 115-131).  
-----
213. - BEUGEL, E.H. van der : Defensie-aspecten in het Europa van morgen.  
(Internationale Spectator, n° 3, 8 februari 1971, p. 269-284).  
-----
214. - BIRNBAUM, Karl E. : Peace in Europe. East-West relations 1966-1968 and the prospects for a European settlement.  
London, Oxford, New York, Oxford Univ. Pr., 1970. XII, 159 p. 8°  
(Oxford paperbacks, 224).  
(24.464)  
-----
215. - BUNTINX, Henry M.V. : De Casus foederis in het NATO-Verdrag.  
(Res Publica, n° 1, 1971, p. 43-58).  
-----
216. - CROMWELL, William C., FORMAN, Nigel, JOFFE, Joseph :  
Political problems of Atlantic partnership. National perspectives.  
Bruges, College of Europe, (1969). 458 p. 8°  
(Studies in contemporary European issues, 3).  
(23.794) (notes bibliogr.)  
-----
217. - GASTEYGER, Curt : Das Zerbrechliche Gleichgewicht. Kritische Fragen zur europäischen Ostpolitik.  
(Europa-Archiv, n° 4, 25 février 1971, p. 131-138).  
-----
218. - HARMEL, Pierre : Auf der Suche nach neuen Formen europäischer Sicherheit.  
(Europa-Archiv, n° 5, 10. März 1971, p. 151-158).  
-----
219. - VERFUERTH, Heinz : Jugoslawiens Absicherung in Europa.  
(Aussenpolitik, n° 2, février 1971, p. 92-104).  
-----

14. Rechtsfragen - Questions juridiques - Problemi giuridici  
Juridische vraagstukken - Legal matters

-----

220. - BARREAU DE LYON. Lyon : Droit pratique européen. Conférences  
... T. (1) -  
Lyon, Ed. Tout Lyon, Moniteur Judiciaire, (1968- 8°  
2. Novembre 1969 - mars 1970. (1970). 90 p.  
(21.504)
- 
221. - DERINGER, Arved, SEDEMUND, Jochim : Europäisches Gemein-  
schaftsrecht. Die Entwicklung bis Januar 1971.  
(Neue Juristische Wochenschrift, n° 8, 23. Februar 1971,  
p. 312-316).
- 
222. - EMPEL, M. van : EEG-lid-staten voor de rechter. (Artt. 169 en  
171 van het EEG-Verdrag).  
(Nederlands Juristenblad, n° 12, 20 maart 1971, p. 317-323).
- 
223. - GRABITZ, Eberhard : Entscheidungen und Richtlinien als unmittel-  
bar wirksames Gemeinschaftsrecht. Zur Analyse der Leber-Pfennig-  
Urteile des EuGH.  
(Europarecht, n° 1, Januar-März 1971, p. 1-22).
- 
224. - LOUIS, Jean-Victor : Droit et politique des relations extérieures  
des Communautés Européennes.  
(Cahiers de Droit Européen, n° 1, 1971, p. 3-15).
- 
225. - LYON-CAEN, Gérard : L'Harmonisation du droit des Etats membres  
concernant certains aspects de la représentation commerciale.  
(Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Européen, n° 4, octobre-décembre  
1970, p. 666-673).
- 
226. - MATHIJSEN, P.S.R.F. : Theologische interpretatie der Europese  
Verdragen. Rede ... Katholieke Universiteit te Nijmegen ...  
15 mei 1970.  
Nijmegen, Dekker & Van de Vegt, (1970). 27 p. 8°  
(23.634) (notes bibliogr.)
- 
227. - MERTENS DE WILMARS, J. : Les Enseignements communautaires  
des jurisprudences nationales.  
(Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Européen, n° 3, juillet-septembre  
1970, p. 454-468).
-

228. - MIGLIAZZA, Alessandro : I Problemi di diritto internazionale relativi alla creazione di una società commerciale europea. (Rivista di Diritto Internazionale Privato e Processuale, n° 4, ottobre-dicembre 1970, p. 761-789).  
(24.129)
- 
229. - MORAND, Charles-Albert : Les Recommandations, les résolutions et les avis du droit communautaire. (Cahiers de Droit Européen, n° 6, 1970, p. 623-644).
- 
230. - NAGEL, Heinrich : Die Anerkennung und Vollstreckung ausländischer Urteile unter den westeuropäischen Staaten - eine Zwischenbilanz. (European Transport Law.-Droit Européen des Transports, n° 5, 1970, p. 1338-1354).
- 
231. - ROSSI, Pierluigi : Osservazioni sui rapporti tra ordinamento comunitario ed ordinamento interno. (Rivista di Diritto Europeo, n° 1, gennaio-marzo 1971, p. 3-19).
- 
232. - SCHRANS, Guy : Inleiding tot het Europees economisch recht. Gent, Leuven, Story-Scientia, 1969. XXIII, 579 p. 8°  
(24.450) (bibl.par chap.)
- 
233. - TRATTATO istitutivo della Comunità Europea del Carbone e dell 'Acciaio : commentario. Dir. da Rolando Quadri, Riccardo Monaco, Alberto Trabucchi. Comitato di red.: Benedetto Conforti (e.a.). T. 1-3.  
Milano, Giuffrè, 1970. 3 vol. 8°  
1. Art. 1-45. XX, 584 p.  
2. Art. 46-100. XII p., pp. 585-1398.  
3. App. - Indici. VIII, 363 p.  
(R. 23.667)
- 
234. - VANDERSANDEN, Georges : Le Rôle de la Cour de Justice des Communautés Européennes dans le processus d'intégration communautaire. (Aussenwirtschaft, n° 4, Dezember 1970, p. 403-426).
- 
235. - VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT, P.: Het Ontwerp vestigingswet detailhandel, de cyclische ontwikkeling van de sociaal-economische wetgeving en de EEG. (Sociaal-Economische Wetgeving, n° 2, februari 1971, p. 75-93).
- 
236. - VERMEULEN, W.H. : Artikel 169 van het E.E.G.-Verdrag en de zondaar die te laat berouw getoond heeft. (Sociaal-Economische Wetgeving, n° 12, december 1970, p.679-685).
-